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HISTORIA MENTEM ARMET

Lessons of the Past

By LOUIS MORTON

IT is a distressing paradox of our time, when we are concerned as never before with military problems on whose solution may depend our national existence and even the survival of civilization, that we should turn our backs on history and deny that the lessons of the past have any validity for the present.

There are many reasons for this. The problems we face are enormously complex and highly technical; the weapons on which we must rely and which threaten our existence are so revolutionary in character as to make past experience seem highly irrelevant. And there are few to tell us that this is not so, for military history has never really been seriously studied in this country. The historian has stood on the sidelines while his academic colleagues, the political scientists, the economists, the physicists, and others, have become increasingly active, officially and unofficially, in the study of national security problems.

The self-imposed exclusion of the historian from the study of our military problems has been unfortunate, for he alone, by temperament and training, is able to provide a badly needed perspective and balance to the work of his fellow social scientists. The weapons with which they deal may be new, but the concepts that guide their use are old. Despite the revolutionary changes in warfare and in America's role in world affairs during the past fifteen years, there is a great deal in common between today's problems and earlier wars. This can be discerned clearly in the war we fought against Japan between 1941 and 1945. We can mark it in Japan's decision to attack the two most powerful naval and industrial nations in the world; in our own attitude toward war and the objectives for which we were fighting; and in our unswerving adherence to a formula of surrender that dictated a strategy of total destruction.

I

Consider first the action that brought the United States into the war. This was the result of a deliberate decision by the Japanese and not by the Americans. Contrary to the view held by some historians, it was not the intention of President Roosevelt to force Japan into war, but rather the opposite—to deter Japan from aggression. That was the

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clear intent of the policy of economic aid to and support of Nationalist China from 1937 to 1941, of the oil embargo, and of the presence at Pearl Harbor of the Pacific Fleet—the great deterrent of 1941, as is the Strategic Air Command in our own day.

But American policy in 1941 produced an effect quite different from what was intended, for it narrowed the choice of the rulers of Japan to submission or war. In their view, Japan had no alternative but to go to war while she still had the power to do so. She might lose, but defeat, as General Tojo remarked, was better than humiliation and submission.

The decision to start the war, then, was Japan's, but the sequence of events that led to the decision, the choices that the Japanese leaders faced in the fall of 1941—these were perhaps as much the result of American policy as of the inner necessities of Japanese political and economic life. The aim of American policy, pursued with such vigor by Mr. Hull and others, was peace, not war. Perhaps no other course was possible at the time, but one wonders whether American policy-makers had fully considered *all* the consequences of their decisions. In a world of fission and fusion bombs, of intercontinental missiles, of massive retaliation and nuclear deterrents, such a failure today could have the most disastrous consequences.

The method the Japanese chose to start the war is as instructive as the decision for war itself. By their attack on Pearl Harbor and Clark Field, they precipitated the United States into war and unified the American people as nothing else could have done. Determined to avenge the crushing blow at Pearl Harbor, the Americans were in no mood to negotiate, and negotiation was the only way the Japanese could be sure of keeping what they took by force.

With the perspective of hindsight, this course appears as a supreme act of folly. The goal the Japanese had set for themselves when they went to war was control of Southeast Asia, a region rich in the oil, tin, bauxite, and other resources they desperately needed to carry on the conflict in China. If this was their goal, why did they choose to attack Hawaii and the Philippines? The United States was the most powerful nation in the Pacific. Why should the Japanese deliberately provoke her when their objectives lay in Southeast Asia? Why did they not limit their attack to British and Dutch possessions in Asia in the hope of keeping the United States out of the war? Such a course, it is true, would involve risks, but the risks might be worth taking.

Actually, as we know now, the Japanese did consider this possibility, but they were convinced—whether rightly or wrongly we will never

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know—that the United States would go to war no matter in which direction they moved. That being the case, they had little range of choice. The military argument tipped the scale. Success, the military argued, depended on knocking out the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the Far East Air Force in the Philippines. These two forces, which the United States regarded as deterrents to war, represented to the Japanese the most serious threats to the attainment of their objectives in Southeast Asia, and the Imperial Navy refused to take the risk of exposing its flanks to attack by either. It was for this reason that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, struck at Clark Field, and invaded the Philippine Islands. Thus, the forces with which the United States had hoped to deter Japan became in fact the justification for war and established in Japanese minds the necessity for the attack against the United States. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that deterrents to war may have the opposite effect from that intended, and may themselves become the first object of attack. This fact, combined with the dangers of a policy that presents a potential enemy with too narrow a choice, should give pause to any who would place their hopes for peace on deterrents and on an unyielding, if admirable, determination to stand firm in negotiation.

II

The most important single judgment a political or military leader can make, says Clausewitz, is to forecast correctly the nature of the war upon which the nation is to embark. On this everything else depends. The Japanese leaders were fully aware of this truth, but as in so many other things they guessed wrong. From the start they intended to fight only a limited war. They had no plans to invade and defeat the United States and never considered any. Instead they planned, once they had secured their limited objectives, to set up a defense of such depth that the United States would be persuaded to accept a negotiated settlement rather than fight a long and costly war. Their problem, therefore, was to force the Allies to fight the war as they—the Japanese—wished; that is, to prevent a limited war from becoming total.

Most Japanese leaders, including General Tojo, thought this could be done. And they had strong reason, it must be admitted, for believing so. Twice before, in 1895 and 1905, they had waged limited wars against powers stronger than Japan and each time they had won. What they failed to realize was that China in 1895 had no fleet worthy of the name and that Russia in 1905 was able to put only a fraction of its resources into the war against Japan. Nor was either of these powers

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at the beginning of the century in the same class as the United States or Great Britain. In 1941 these two together represented the greatest concentration of naval and industrial power in the world. Japan's only hope of success against such a combination lay in negotiated peace, and this possibility she virtually ruled out on the first day of the war by the sudden and treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor.

It would seem, then, that despite the great victories they won in the opening months of the war, the Japanese committed a series of almost incredible blunders. They attacked the United States when they might have gained their objectives without doing so. They badly miscalculated American public opinion and the strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States. They hoped for a negotiated peace, but chose a method of attack that made such a solution impossible. They planned to fight a limited war, but lacked the resources and means to wage total war if their plans went awry. The Japanese almost seem to have deliberately embarked on a course that could end only in national suicide. Rarely does history offer as striking an illustration of military plans at variance with political goals, of military strategy dominating national policy. The "principal cancer of Japan," wrote Admiral Nomura, ambassador to the United States in the fateful months leading up to Pearl Harbor, was the independence of the military from civilian control—a blunder, he added, that must "never be repeated in the future."[1]

III

In the United States there was never any question about the supremacy of the civilian over the military. But this is not to say that policy and strategy were always in harmony, or that military plans in a democracy cannot become so vast and inflexible as virtually to commit the nation to a single course. As a matter of fact, one can make a good case for the reverse by examining the American reaction to the Pearl Harbor attack. At that time the war plan in existence was RAINBOW 5. This plan, which had been developed before the war, called for a defensive strategy in the Pacific with the main effort to be made in the Atlantic area against Germany and Italy. Only after the defeat of the European Axis would the Allies turn the full weight of their effort against Japan. Clearly the plan was not designed for the situation in which the United States found itself on December 7, 1941, but rather for a situation in which the United States, allied with

[1] Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura, "Stepping Stones to War," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXVII, No. 9 (September 1951), p. 929.

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Great Britain and the other Associated Powers, would be at war with the European Axis as well as Japan.

But when the Japanese attacked, the War Department put RAINBOW 5 into effect immediately, though the United States was at peace with Germany and Italy. A RAINBOW 5 strategy in a war against Japan alone simply made no sense and some of Roosevelt's advisers urged him to declare war on Germany. This the President steadfastly refused to do. Fortunately, he was rescued from this dilemma by the German declaration of war. We may well ask what would have happened had Hitler resolved not to support Japan? Would the United States have been forced to declare war on Germany to adhere to the strategy dictated by RAINBOW 5? We would have had to do so, or else abandon our European allies and reverse our strategy. There is little doubt, I think, that we would have followed the former course—not for strategic reasons alone, it is true. But Germany's declaration of war, like Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, resolved a difficult problem indeed for Mr. Roosevelt and the American people in December 1941. A future enemy may not be so obliging.

IV

Military dictatorships, such as Japan was in 1941, have no monopoly on inflexibility in planning. Neither is civilian supremacy in itself an assurance that political objectives will guide military strategy. The agreement made at Yalta in February 1945 illustrates this point as well as any single incident of World War II. Here is a case of a political decision based almost entirely on the requirements of a given strategic plan, that drawn up for the defeat of Japan. This plan, which had been approved in September 1944, called for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, first Kyushu to the south and then Honshu, where lay the Tokyo plain.

These operations, it was generally conceded, would be most difficult, involving large forces and the certain prospect of very heavy casualties. Moreover, the plan made no provision for neutralizing the supposedly powerful Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the sizable Japanese forces in North China, both of which were capable of reinforcing the troops in the home islands. A Soviet attack on the mainland was the answer to this problem. "A Russian drive into Manchuria coincident with or prior to our invasion of Kyushu," declared the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "would prevent any appreciable movement of Japanese forces southward into Korea and North China and would necessitate retention

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of all Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland. Such action by Russia," the Joint Chiefs concluded, "would facilitate an invasion of Kyushu and our ultimate invasion of the heart of Japan."[2]

For these and other reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stoutly supported Soviet intervention in the Far East, though they scrupulously skirted the political questions involved in the price we would have to pay for such intervention. Stalin was agreeable, and gave assurances in November 1943 and again in September and October 1944 that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan approximately three months after the defeat of Germany. His price, he told Mr. Harriman frankly, would be the cession of Dairen and Port Arthur, the southern half of Sakhalin, the Kuriles, leases on the South Manchurian and Chinese railways, and the preservation of the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia. For this, he would not only attack Japan but also conclude a treaty of friendship with the Nationalist government of China and assist Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese.

Before Yalta the entire question of Soviet intervention was carefully reviewed by the military planners in the light of doubts cast on the necessity for Soviet participation in the war against Japan. The result was a reaffirmation of the desirability, though not the necessity, of Soviet participation under certain conditions as to timing, availability of forces, and place of attack. The planners were well aware of the disadvantages of Soviet intervention, but these were political, not military, considerations and therefore not within their purview. They realized also that the interests of the Soviet Union in the Far East and in the postwar settlement would probably require her to enter the war, and that it would therefore be well for the United States to secure her entry at a time and under conditions most favorable to us. Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded shortly before they departed for Yalta that "We desire Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan."[3]

If Roosevelt had needed additional assurances, he could have received them from General MacArthur. In three separate conversations, twice with senior and reputable Army planners and once with Mr. Forrestal

[2] Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa, 30 June 1944, JCS 924, Report by Joint Staff Planners, in *The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan*, press release, Department of Defense, September 1955, p. 29.

[3] Russian Participation in the War Against Japan, JSC 1176/6, 18 Jan 1945, Encl A, in *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1955, pp. 389ff.; JCS Memorandum for the President, 23 Jan 1945, in *ibid.*, pp. 396-97.

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—since denied by General Whitney—MacArthur gave his views on Soviet intervention. Though these conversations took place after Yalta, they were made, so far as is known, without knowledge of the agreement there concluded between Stalin and Roosevelt and can be taken to represent MacArthur's real views. On all three occasions, the General supported strongly the existing plan for the defeat of Japan and stated emphatically that American forces should not invade Japan until three months after the Red Army had attacked the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. He understood perfectly well that Stalin would ask a price, and he thought it should be paid. Otherwise, he said, the Japanese would exact a terrible price in American casualties when the landings were made.[4]

Perhaps there was little else that Roosevelt could have done under the circumstances except to give Stalin what he asked. Short of war, how could the United States stop Russia or prevent her from taking what she wanted anyway? By the agreement at Yalta, Roosevelt could hope to further the establishment of a strong and united postwar China, to place limits on Soviet expansion, and to gain Stalin's promise to enter the war at a date and under conditions that fitted our plans. But to do even this much, Roosevelt needed a powerful argument that would justify such an arrangement. He found it in the strategy of his military advisers, for it was the plans they drew up that established with inexorable military logic the requirements for Soviet intervention in the war against Japan.

V

There is much truth in the assertion that the United States fought World War II with a single-minded devotion to the ideal of military victory and with little awareness of the political objectives for which the war was being waged. These, it was felt, only complicated the task of fighting and delayed the end. For most Americans, war was an aberration, a nasty business to be concluded as quickly as possible so

[4] MacArthur's views on this subject caused considerable controversy. The author's statements are based on Memo, Brig. Gen. G. A. Lincoln for Gen. Marshall and Maj. Gen. Hull, 25 Feb 1945; Informal Memo, G. A. L. [Lincoln] for Chief of Staff, 8 Mar 1945; Memo, Col. Paul L. Freeman, Jr., for Gen. Marshall, 13 Feb 1945, sub: Summary of an Hour and a Half Conversation with General MacArthur; Msg, Gen. MacArthur to Gen. Marshall, 20 Apr 1945, all in *Entry of the Soviet Union . . . , op.cit.*, pp. 50-52, 55-57; and Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1951, pp. 307-8. Forrestal's statement is in Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, entry for 28 Feb 1945, p. 31; and the denial by General Courtney Whitney is contained in a letter to the Editor, *Washington Post*, 2 Apr 1955. MacArthur's postwar denial, made in response to a statement by Senator Lehman, can be found in *New York Times*, 24 Mar 1955.

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that the world could return to normal. Americans did not regard peace and war as opposite sides of the same coin but rather as separate and distinct. Viewed thus, every war became a crusade against evil. "Democracy," wrote George Kennan, "fights in anger. . . . It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to provoke it—to teach that power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again. . . ."[5]

This typically American approach to war, which can be detected today in the concept of massive retaliation and in the slogan, "There is no substitute for victory," places heavy restrictions on military strategy. It raises to the level of national objectives the mass desire for a quick end to the war, the punishment of the enemy, and the speedy return to civil life of the citizen soldier. This desire in turn levies on military strategy a double requirement: first, to defeat the enemy decisively and completely; and second, to get the war over as quickly as possible. In planning the defeat of Japan we can see both factors operating clearly in the restrictions imposed on strategy by the unconditional surrender formula, and in the insistence on ending the war as quickly as possible, regardless of the cost.

Behind the insistence on ending the war as quickly as possible was the belief, firmly held by both civilian and military leaders, that the American people would not stand for a long war. General Marshall was especially sensitive on this point and invariably tested strategic plans against the criterion of their effect on the length of the war. There were other ways of defeating Japan than by invasion. Blockade or bombardment or a combination of both would surely have accomplished the same end. But they would have taken longer and time was of the essence.

Secretary of War Stimson felt this pressure as much as Marshall. In March 1945, he had visited an Army camp in Florida and there had talked with men on their way to the Pacific after serving in Europe. "These men," Stimson wrote, "were weary in a way that no one merely reading reports could really understand." More strongly than ever before he felt that "the primary obligation of any man responsible for and to these Americans was to end the war as quickly as possible."[6] This was a compulsion that no American leader could escape.

Unconditional surrender imposed its own restrictions on strategy. As Colonel Lincoln, chief Army planner in the latter part of the war,

[5] George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, New York, 1951, p. 61.
[6] Henry J. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, 1948, p. 632.

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remarked, "It probably gave the armed forces a task unnecessarily large. . . ."[7] After Saipan the Japanese knew they could no longer win and began to look for a way out. Finally, they approached the Soviet government in the hope that the Russians would mediate with the Allies to bring the Far Eastern war to an end. And the Americans knew this very well. In the view of the intelligence experts, the Japanese might be willing to give up virtually all the territory they had seized, grant Korea its independence, and dismantle their military machine, if they could be sure of keeping the Emperor.

But the unconditional surrender formula could not be changed this late in the war. To do so would lead to charges of appeasement and a weakening of the final efforts against Japan. "We must be careful," Marshall cautioned, to "avoid giving any impression that we are growing soft."[8] In a sense, we had become the victims of our own wartime propaganda.

Our political and military leaders were aware they had lost their freedom of action and frozen their strategy. But they were helpless at this stage of the war to break loose from the bonds of unconditional surrender. Thus Marshall reminded his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they must be careful not to crystallize the phraseology of unconditional surrender to preclude terms that might be, as he put it, "psychologically more conducive to the earliest defeat of Japan."[9] But what finally made Japan "psychologically" more amenable to unconditional surrender was not the turn of a phrase but the new and terrible bomb that an American B-29 dropped on Hiroshima on the morning of August 6, 1945. And, it must be added, the surrender when it came was unconditional only in name, for the Japanese were allowed after all to keep their Emperor.

Surely these lessons of the Second World War have some relevance for us today. Pearl Harbor emphasized the dangers of inadequate preparedness and divided command; Yalta our failure to co-ordinate political objectives with war aims realistically; and Hiroshima the bankruptcy of a policy that required the complete defeat of the enemy and a strategy of destruction. Nor is Japan's failure to mesh its strategy with the objectives of policy, and to estimate correctly the requirements of limited war, without value in this nuclear age. We have not lost

[7] Lecture at National War College, 30 Jan 1947. Quoted with permission of the author.

[8] Memo, Marshall for Secy of War, sub: Basic Objective in the Pacific War, 9 June 1945, ABC 337 (11 Jan 1945), Sec 1A.

[9] Draft Memo by Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, no date, no sub, in *ibid.*

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sight altogether of these lessons. There are hopeful signs for the future in the machinery developed since 1945 for bringing political and military planning into harmony with national goals, and in the increased interest in and study of limited war in all its various forms. History does have its uses and, properly read, it may reveal many more lessons than those that emerged from the Pacific war a decade and a half ago.

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REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET NOVELS

By ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON

THERE is every likelihood that future historians of the Russian novel will praise the Soviet period for the record number of volumes produced and blame it for an equally unprecedented decline in artistic standards. Yet one may hope that the twenty-first-century critic, in fairness to an unhappy past, will not overlook a redeeming feature of the Soviet novel, i.e., its considerable anthropological value. The present reflections about a few recent or fairly recent Soviet novels do not deal with their literary qualities. They are concerned exclusively with the light these novels cast upon various aspects of everyday life in Soviet Russia, including, it may be added, the life of the novel makers themselves.

I

Leonid Leonov's *Russian Forest*,[1] written between 1950 and 1953, provides perhaps more illumination and more food for thought than any other Soviet product in the field since the end of the last war. (Because of its public repudiation in Russia, if not for other reasons, Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* may be safely excluded from the list of *Soviet* novels.) *Russian Forest* has both an apparent and a real theme. While the latter is much more important, the former is by no means without interest. In addition, there are a number of political judgments strewn over the pages of the novel, some of which are worth noting.

The theme apparent is writ large over the title page: it is the problem of Soviet forestry politics. The hero of the novel, a professor of forestry, loves the forest and wishes the forest-covered areas of the country to be maintained unreduced and unthinned. He would not only preserve the aggregate extent of the forest, but also freeze the existing geographic distribution of forest lands. In defending his position, the professor adds to the long list of Soviet claims to invention by asserting that the concept of "sustained yield" (i.e., the concept of a forest which is "normal" as to age structure and produces year in, year out, a harvest maximized in some rational fashion) was developed by Russian students of forestry (p. 318).

In temperament and *Weltanschauung*, our professor—his name is Virkhov—is a direct descendant of Doctor Astrov in Chekhov's *Uncle*

[1] *Russkii les*; the page references below are to *Sobraniye sochinenii (Collected Works)*, Vol. VI, Moscow, 1956.

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Vanya, except that Chekhov's *médecin de campagne* expressed himself simply, using good Russian, while the Soviet professor prefers a dubious jargon. "The forest," he teaches and preaches, "is the sum of productive forces and not of production forces" (p. 251). This obscure formulation in pseudo-scientific style sounds very much like a quotation from the official Soviet textbook of economics. But the tenor of the professor's pronouncements does imply some criticism of Soviet policy. The official Soviet line consists, first, of accusing the pre-revolutionary government of barbarous destruction of forests and, second, of demonstrating how after the revolution the traditional pre-revolutionary principles of forest conservation prevented, for a number of years, full utilization of timber resources. This is not a very consistent position, but it is a fact that in 1929, when Soviet policies were radically revised, forest utilization was completely subordinated to the general policy of high-speed industrialization and the amount of lumber cut for domestic use and for export came greatly to exceed natural growth.[2]

Thus Professor Virkhov may be regarded as a critic of Soviet policy. To be sure, the criticism is very mild. First of all, except for charges of poor workmanship, it never is made quite explicit. Nor are the Soviets likely to be very sensitive to strictures in this area. Considering the extent of their general trespasses upon sound principles of resource conservation, the predatory use of forests would seem the least grievous of Soviet sins. Some permanent reduction in extent or density of forests, of course, may well have been justifiable. The problems of rational forest utilization are in general much more complex, and the choices to be made involve many more factors than Leonov and his professor seem to grasp. Not that there is any evidence that the Soviet government was guided by an accurate calculus. On the contrary, some of the elements involved, such as a reasonable "forest per cent" (i.e., an interest rate with the help of which the optimum rotation, or felling age, can be determined), were proscribed in Soviet Russia for ideological reasons. The Soviet ideas of forest exploitation were gross and crude. Still, quite apart from permanent changes in rotation that can be quite sensible, temporary deviations from "normalcy" are a regular phenomenon in forestry policies and can be as rational as "normalcy" itself. At any rate, the losses suffered need not be irreparable. Some of them can be remedied by afforestation. A log is not like a chunk of iron ore. It can be replaced, even though at some cost. It is also quite

[2] Cf., e.g., V. A. Popov, *Lesnaya promyshlennost' S.S.S.R.* (*The Forest Industry of the U.S.S.R.*), Vol. 1, *Lesoekspluatatsiya* (*Forest Exploitation*), Goslesbumizdat, 1957, pp. 15 and 33.

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possible, and in fact likely, that by the beginning of the 1950's, when Leonov wrote his novel, the Soviet government was getting ready for a change in its forestry policy and Leonov's novel was a welcome—if not a government-inspired—vindication of the new policy.

However this may be, the wish to protect the Russian forest is painted over in the novel with such a heavy coat of Soviet patriotism that the light touches of criticism tend to disappear beneath it. Some of Leonov's interpretations of recent events are gems of Soviet metaphysics and/or historical accuracy and should not be overlooked. We are treated, for instance, to an analysis of the feelings of the Soviet population in the summer of 1941 after Hitler's attack upon Russia: "Behind regrets about construction work that had to remain unfinished, one could discern contempt for the enemy—for this immediate enemy and also *for the other—the main and hidden enemy who got scared of peaceful competition between the two systems*" (p. 105; italics added). Apparently the reference is to the mythical being known as "capitalism." Or is it to the United States? The ambiguity seems intentional and the purpose is to suggest, subtly and darkly, that the United States had stood behind Hitler's aggression and that, in doing so, it was moved by fears of Soviet achievements. In this connection also, a perceptive view of American national character is helpful. In a conversation between Professor Virkhov and a friend who is an old Bolshevik and a model of a revolutionary hero, the latter describes some uncivilized acts which, he says, have been committed by the American army. The professor, duly horrified, asks the deeply probing question: "Who are they then?—soldiers or robbers?" and promptly receives an illuminating answer: "They are merchants. Soldier is the great title of a man who knows how to die for an idea. . . . But name for me at least one idea which in the course of the last hundred years has emerged from the merchant class and was implemented in the name of life [*sic*]. . . . Merchants, at the very best, grow to be pirates" (p. 680).

One must wonder whether Leonov himself realized that his perfect Communist repeated almost verbatim ideas from Werner Sombart's *Haendler und Helden* (*Merchants and Heroes*), a book of "patriotic cogitations" written in Germany during World War I and directed against England (Munich, 1915). Even Leonov's style in those paragraphs with its nebulous haecceities sounds very much like a rendition into Russian of reactionary German writings.

In view of these deplorable characteristics, it is not surprising to learn how despicably the Americans acted during the war. Day in, day out, Professor Virkhov and his neighbors wonder where the second front

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will be opened; they continue to speculate for nine hundred days, until on the nine hundred and first, when the Germans attack in the Ardennes, the Muscovites smilingly read the telegraphic prayers for help which come from their allies (p. 718). Thus the Anglo-American forces apparently managed to get to the Ardennes without ever opening a second front. The moronic effrontery of this presentation of the course of World War II in the West would be difficult to surpass. It is also hard to believe that the average Soviet reader is, or that Leonov believes him to be, so stupid, ignorant, and gullible as to accept Leonov's counterfeits for true coins. In general, it is probably more reasonable to assume that statements of this sort are to be taken within the context of Soviet *mores* as part of a ritual; as a somewhat pompous affirmation, that is, of loyalty to the regime. But Leonov does seem to go further than is required by the Soviet code of proper behavior for a writer. In addition to mistreatments of the past, his novel also contains some glimpses of future history. Varya, the ideal heroic figure of a young Soviet girl who loses her life fighting the Germans, places the last war in its proper historical perspective: "You see," she explains to her friend, the professor's daughter, "the fascists are just an episode in a great historical competition. . . . Remember your history: if it took full thirty years to settle the trifling dynastic conflicts between the Red and the White Roses, then it should not be surprising if it takes a century to decide the great argument between the Red and White halves of mankind. But you may assume that we have done the first twenty per cent of the job" (p. 129).

This is very strong stuff indeed, and one can only conclude that the insurance premiums which Soviet writers must pay are high. Still, it seems advisable to be overinsured rather than underinsured. A writer who shows such fervent loyalty *in magnis* surely must be permitted a fleeting moment of eccentric independence of judgment *in parvis silvanis*. Leonov is widely regarded as one of the foremost Soviet novelists. It is almost frightening to see a man who aspires to the reputation of a great Russian writer cast aside all pretenses at historical veracity, and common sense, and common decency. The Soviet novel does reveal the predicament of the Soviet writer and, through him, that of the Soviet system.

All this is by no means devoid of interest. There is more to Leonov's novel, however, than cheap sentimentality in the style of Otto Ludwig's *Erbförster*, or semi-literate ideas about rational calculus of forest utilization, or shameless distortions of historical truth. It is only in a very superficial sense that Leonov's novel deals with the vicissitudes of the

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Russian forest. Its actual subject is the vicissitudes of Soviet man. For it is a novel about the *Lebenslauf*, the span of life, the human biography in Soviet Russia. This is the real theme of the novel and a much more rewarding one.

Professor Virkhov's forestry theories may be flat, but his view of human biography probes deeply into the very core of the Soviet social system. Progress, our professor believes, consists in an increase of moral duties which must proceed *pari passu* with an increase in the volume of material goods; only the perfect man can achieve perfect happiness. *"Hence everybody must make it his business to have a perfect biography"* (p. 59; italics added). This is indeed a sentence full of significance. Unfortunately its translation in English does not do justice to the Russian style, which uses a phrase taken from the archaic language of the Tsarist *ukazy*. In fact, for a moment the reader hesitates, not knowing whether Leonov and his hero really mean what they say. The concept of perfect biography and the way in which it is expressed are irresistibly reminiscent of Shchedrin's celebrated satirical sallies against Imperial Russia in which he glorified *yedinomysliye*, perfect conformity in thinking, as the great ideal of the rulers of Russia. But the reader's doubts are out of place, for Leonov is very much in earnest. The problem of perfect biography is indeed a crucial problem of Soviet society. Not that it originated in Soviet Russia, but it is there that it acquired an extent and a weight and a significance which it had never possessed before. It would seem useful therefore to clarify the concept, before examining its application in Leonov's novel.

There are many possible criteria for classifying societies and civilizations. But the prevailing attitude toward a man's biography is far from the least important among those criteria. For it is related to another and perhaps more widely noted distinction, that between settled and migratory or immigration societies. The settled society, as the term is understood here, is one in which the whole life of an individual as a rule is passed within one fairly narrow social circle. In such societies there is no caesura in a man's ideal biography. His biography is perfect in the very specific sense in which a settled society values such perfection: it achieves a unity of life. According to a Russian proverb, no word can be thrown out of a song. No part, however small, can or need be thrown out of a man's biography in a settled society.

The values of a migratory society are radically different. This is a society in which the process of the stranger's losing his alien quality is perennially undone or renewed by the influx of new strangers. The migratory society may coincide with one growing industrial city; it

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may comprise a region like the valley of the Ruhr, or a huge country like the United States. A society can be more or less "migratory" depending *inter alia* on its geographic extent or its rate of growth, or on the distance separating it from the areas whence the migrants come and the degree of irreversibility inherent in the act of migration. But the likelihood is that the attitude to a man's life of such a society will tend to differ greatly from that of a settled society. Naturally, such an attitude does not emerge instantaneously. In a sense the puritanism of New England in several of its aspects was an attempt to negate the basic experience of migration. To become fully migratory, the American society had to shed much of puritan provincialism. Just because the ideas of the "old country" travel with the migrants and are brought in as specific "brain-case" imports, establishment of a migratory society is a long process even in a young country such as the United States. Once such a society has been established, however, and a new ideology peculiar to it has developed, the migratory society acquires easily discernible traits. In such a society a unity of life, a perfect biography, cannot be regarded as the ideal. The very fact of the migration, the very transformation of a peasant into a city dweller, of a European into an American, create a hiatus in biography. They tear it asunder and force the man to begin a new life. It is not an accident that it was an American philosopher who emphasized the moral characteristics of the "twice-born."[3] In a sense, emigration is death. The emigrant, as the Parisian argot has it, *ravale son bulletin de naissance*; the naturalization certificate attests the second birth.

The newcomer to a migratory society may have very weighty reasons to forget his past. By suppressing the memory thereof he liberates himself from a record of failure or crime or humiliation. He may want to dismiss his past simply because the burden of nostalgic sentiments is too heavy to carry; or because he feels that the memories lame his energies and thwart his will in an environment that invites action and places high value upon the will to act. In such circumstances, the scriptural injunction against looking backward is filled with new significance. Goethe's urgent advice, "*Stirb und werde*!" should be written over the gates of immigration societies. The immigrant must obey it or pay the penalty of becoming, again in Goethe's words, *"ein trueber Gast auf der dunklen Erde."*

The specific "migratory" attitude toward unity of life affects many areas of behavior and endeavor. Examples are not far to seek. The

[3] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York, 1903, particularly pp. 166 et seq.

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manners of an immigration society do not favor inquiries into a man's past. One of the causes for the temporary success of Senator McCarthy must have lain in the pleasure of overstepping in public an ancient taboo, a well-established rule of private life. Business life provides many an instance of differences between settled and immigration societies. In the former, bankruptcy is likely to end a businessman's career. Even a protested bill of exchange is extremely hard to live down. In an immigration milieu, failure does not block the road to subsequent success and, in fact, success, once achieved, either obliterates the memory of the failure or even tinges it with glory. In a settled society, the Jack-of-all-trades is presumed—has been presumed since the days of the Homeric or pseudo-Homeric *Margites*—to be a tyro in all and is looked upon with disdain. The man who keeps changing from one trade to another is expected to fail; indeed, given the prevailing attitude, he is most likely to fail. In a migratory society, the virtues of specialization tend to remain unrecognized and unrewarded. The feeling of being up to any task, of being "a man and not a mollusc," is the specific attribute of a man in such a society, as was discovered by the French worker whose report about his downright un-French experience in California was quoted by Marx.[4] It is another matter that the organization of modern factories often requires the worker to perform a single recurring operation. Such operations are quickly learned and, in a growing and mobile society, they are as quickly abandoned and forgotten.

In an immigration society, a second marriage is much more likely to repair a previous marital failure. At any rate, the milieu does not diminish the second marriage's chance of success by refusing to accept it. (It may be easily ascertained by appropriate comparisons that specific religious injunctions are quite insufficient to explain the difference in attitudes.) An even clearer case is provided by marriages of widowed persons. They are frowned upon and viewed as attestations of disloyalty in a settled society and greeted with gladness in a migratory society. To be sure, differences in family structure, the resulting differences in the position of aged people, fear of loneliness in one case and social approval of solitude in the other—all these affect the social judgment of remarriage. Still, it is the willingness to forget—i.e., the refusal to place a high value upon unity of life—that makes possible the position assumed in immigration societies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the propensity to write memoirs is so much more widespread in a

[4] *Das Kapital*, Volksausgabe, Moscow, 1932, p. 513.

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settled society than in a migratory society. At the same time such memoirs as do get written in an immigration society are much less in the nature of autobiographies in the proper sense of the word. They tend to deal with events, not with the span of a unique life. Maeterlinck once said that it is memory that presupposes and constitutes the unity of life. In the settled society it is the memoirs that as a rule are concerned with revealing a man's life as a straight line placed within limits that are both narrow and predetermined by the fixed co-ordinates of birth, family, social set or class, and professional endeavor.

These are significant differences which penetrate deeply into man's customs and feelings. They are the threads from which the fabric of everyday life is woven. They stem from the nature of the society in which they exist and they themselves exert a powerful influence upon the mobility and fluidity of social bodies. There is little doubt that they have direct bearing upon much of modern economic history. An immigration society and an industrial society are not coterminous. Obviously, there were immigration societies that had nothing to do with modern industry. On the other hand, a developed industrial society may have shed most of the qualities of an immigration society. Certain elements of such a shedding process have been clearly perceptible in the United States over the last quarter of a century or so. This is particularly true with regard to some of the aspects mentioned in the foregoing. And yet, one way of looking at the industrial evolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is to regard it as a change from a settled society to an immigration society. Every industrialization which was more than a mere development of manorial handicraft or a growth of cottage industry almost naturally tended to partake of the elements of an immigration society. Industrialization was destructive of provincialism. It metropolized the society. It broke the unity of man's life and, by so doing, tended to reduce the value attached to it.

It is true, of course, that within the old established political entities the transformation was slower and often less complete. To some extent, pre-industrial values have been adjusted to new conditions rather than abandoned altogether. Still, no one can compare the habits of the population, say, in the teeming cities of the Ruhr valley with those of the little towns in Mecklenburg or in any two similarly comparable areas in France, Italy, or any other European country without registering a profound difference in attitude toward a man's life. What is so peculiar about the Soviet type of industrialization is that it represents an attempt to build up an industrial society while preserving the basic features of a settled society. Revolutions, civil strife, and foreign wars have con-

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vulsed the land. The countryside has disgorged millions and millions of *muzhiks* into industrial employment. Large cities have been built in places where not even a tiny hamlet had anticipated the urban future. Tremendous migrations over the face of the enormous country have taken place. And still throughout this period of unprecedented change the government which has been responsible for most of the change has refused, as it were, to recognize its impact upon the course of individual lives. To repeat, this refusal is the real theme of Leonov's novel, to which we may now return.

In accordance with the established custom in Soviet novels, the "positive" hero, Professor Virkhov, has an antagonist, Professor Gratsianski. This bearer of a family name which was chosen to indicate descent from the Russian clergy bitterly attacks Virkhov's views on forestry policies. While Virkhov is a conservationist, his opponent is in favor of placing the forest at the service of industrialization. This is clear enough. The substantive arguments used are much less so. Some of them are mere abuse and inconsistent abuse at that. While Virkhov accuses the bourgeoisie of destroying the Russian forest, Gratsianski refuses to be "scared" by the conservative rules of forest utilization invented by the bourgeoisie for its own purposes (cf. p. 421). But there is no need to seek for clarity. For arguments do not matter in reality. It is not by puncturing the opponent's logic or erudition that an argument can be won, but by puncturing his biography. Gratsianski derives most of the support for his point of view from the fact that Professor Virkhov as a boy had received a present of twenty-five rubles (about $12.50 in pre-1934 gold dollars) from a big businessman (p. 143). Furthermore, while he was a student, several payments of twenty-five rubles were made to him from a source that remained unknown. Gratsianski explains that it would be unrealistic to believe in pure philanthropic motivations on the part of the mysterious donor; it is much more natural to assume that he had some long-term designs and hoped to be recompensed at the cost of national properties at some remote future time when the former student would be holding a responsible position in forest administration. Furthermore, Virkhov had married a girl who had been raised on a gentry estate, and this circumstance, too, is used to refute Virkhov's ideas on what to do with the forests. Finally, there is an even more potent, seemingly incontrovertible argument which Gratsianski is holding in reserve as a secret weapon for the moment of the real showdown: this is his knowledge of the fact that Virkhov had adopted and raised the child of a "dekulakized" peasant.

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This array of far-fetched nonsensicalities may be quite irrelevant to the point at issue. Yet they are taken seriously. Professor Virkhov's young and virtuous daughter, when informed of her father's dubious past, and particularly of the unexplained twenty-five rubles, is plunged into black despair. She tries to change the pronunciation of her name by shifting the accent to the first syllable so as to dissociate herself from her father; and she wonders whether acquaintance with the daughter of a tainted man will not be detrimental to her friend, Varya. The technical expression used throughout the novel for damaging a person's reputation by associating with him or her is "to cast a shadow upon somebody."

It would be pleasant, and in fact almost liberating, if one could regard all this as a satire directed against the Soviet attitudes to biography. But unfortunately this is not possible. First of all, because Leonov's "positive" character himself is the inventor of the concept of perfect biography. Second, because the plot of the novel, divested of the incidentals of partisan fighting and air raids on Moscow, consists of nothing but the gradual unmasking of Gratsianski. His theories of forestry are confounded by showing that in his student days he had seduced and then heartlessly abandoned a girl and her child that was also his. And the *coup de grâce* falls when, through a series of contrived coincidences, it transpires that Gratsianski, again in his student days, stood up an audience of workers to whom he was supposed to deliver a lecture and, in addition, betrayed to the police (somewhat unwittingly, it appears) a mutual friend of his and Virkhov's, the great revolutionary, who, as we have seen, later on was to become a student of Werner Sombart's theories. Once these events of some thirty years ago have been revealed or are close to being revealed, Gratsianski is finished. A richly deserved punishment is in store for him, while Virkhov is rewarded by a medal and in addition recovers the wife who had left him many years earlier. (The separation, incidentally, had seemed final; still, mindful of the unity of their respective biographies, neither the professor nor his spouse permitted themselves to enter into any new relationships.) But a man with Gratsianski's biography does not even know how to wait patiently for just retribution from the society, as represented by the appropriate organs of the Soviet government. He remains an obdurate individualist and, after having composed a monograph on suicide, he himself chooses this "most despicable way of deserting from life" (p. 673). Thus virtue has triumphed and the battle of biographies has been satisfactorily decided by the victory of the less imperfect life story.

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To summarize: this is an unattractive book. It contains half-baked disquisitions on forestry, brazen distortions of historical truth in supine obedience to the wishes of the dictators, a preposterous search for closets filled with skeletons, and characters drawn with the tritest means. And all this is presented in a pretentious, perfectly unnatural style and is spread thinly over nearly eight hundred pages of dense print—with frank disregard of all counsels of artistic economy. And yet it is an important book which makes a real contribution to our understanding of Soviet society. In dealing with the curiosities of imperfect biographies, it actually reveals the imperfections of Soviet industrialization.

It is not the first time in Russian history that economic development designed to close the gap between Russia and the West has westernized Russia in some respects while keeping it oriental or even "orientalizing" it in others. The reforms of Peter the Great were a great step toward westernizing the country. But the simultaneous curtailing of the liberty of all classes of the population was a step away from the West. The unevenness of Soviet progress is its most outstanding trait. Soviet industrialization conducted under the auspices of a ruthless dictatorship has not received its economic consummation: the Soviet government cannot afford to let its population enjoy the fruits of industrialization in the form of a rapid increase in the levels of consumption. But just as consumption is kept close to pre-industrialization levels—thus, in effect, ignoring the changes that have taken place in the size of capital stocks, in the knowledge of technological processes, and in the skill of the workers—so the evaluation of human beings is still kept at a level consonant with small and stable pre-industrial settlements rather than with the large and rapidly growing industrial centers. These provincial attitudes have been perpetuated with a vengeance. Just as serfdom in Russia was conjoined with a modern police state and hence approached outright slavery to a degree unknown in the West, the ubiquitousness of the Soviet dictatorship has raised provincialism to the level of a national dogma and, in so doing, has made it more destructive of individual freedom and happiness than genuine provincialism ever was.

It is the essence of pre-industrial societies to stand upon traditionalism, to live in the past and according to the past, and to value it highly. It is the essence of industrial, or at least industrializing, societies to let bygones be bygones, to live in the present and to think of the future. It is paradoxical indeed that the Soviet society, which is so strongly bent upon change, has shown such a high rate of economic

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growth, and claims to live for the future, should unceasingly probe into the past of its individual members; it is strange that a system which has discovered for itself that only falsifying the past yields perfect history should persist in clamoring for perfect biography. If the Soviet writers were allowed to notice these inconsistencies and to discuss them publicly, they might well be tempted to speak of "dialectics" and "historical contradictions." As it is, they prefer to think in absolutes. The government establishes a categorical distinction between good and evil in a man's past and makes it operational through the instrument of the questionnaire—the Soviet substitute for, and improvement upon, memoir writing. Perfect memory is enforced by law. The *Ivany Nepomnyashchiye*, the non-remembering Ivans, who used to roam over the Russian plain and were the bane of the Tsarist police, are still not allowed to plead poor memory. They have been taught to read and write. Accordingly, they must read the questions and write the answers, weaving the flimsy web of a flawless life story.

One did not need Leonov's book in order to know that the life of the average Russian citizen is dominated and kept in perennial jeopardy by the questionnaire—this embodiment of, and the perennial menace to, perfect biography. But Leonov's novel does show how the institution of the ubiquitous questionnaire translates itself into men's thinking about men, and how it becomes an institutionalized and internalized piece of social ideology, and, as such, an instrument of domination. It is perhaps not pretty to see a writer of reputation extol and glorify the tools of police oppression. But whatever our judgment of Leonid Leonov, his book has both clarified and enriched our judgment of the social system that exists in Soviet Russia.

II

Relations between the sexes present an obvious field for exercises in perfect biography. Marital fidelity is of course well suited to epitomize the unity of life and to stress the stability of a provincial society. Accordingly, Soviet literature as a rule has shown no interest in matrimonial deviations and sexual irregularities. For a long time the novelists went on mass-producing cheap figurines of Baucis and Philemon, dressed up in Soviet style, and sometimes even had recourse to the Soviet Olympus for appropriate substitutions for the roles of Zeus and Hermes in the Greek story. It is one thing, however, to track down and to expose the possessor of an impure biography. It is another thing blandly to deny his existence. By depicting Soviet citizens, male

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and female, either as fierce virgins or monogamous maniacs, Soviet novels inevitably came into conflict with reality, which, in these particular areas, was neither fierce nor maniacal.

Fortunately, there are limits to this decline of Russian literature to the level of penny—or kopek—novelettes. Presumably, the tradition of the Russian novel—which means its competition with the Soviet novel for the interest of the modern reader—is a strong force in keeping the Soviet novel within the bounds of verisimilitude. As a result, there have been two or three ethnographically more valuable treatments of marriage in Soviet Russia. First, the novel *Ivan Ivanovich* by Antonina Koptyayeva (Moscow, 1949) produced surprise among Soviet readers by demonstrating the incredible fact that a marriage of two perfectly decent people can fall apart; and that even an energetic intervention on the part of the local party boss (first secretary of the *Raykom*) may fail to put it together again. Koptyayeva then wrote a second novel, *Druzhba* (*Friendship*—Moscow, 1956), in which the tradition of the happy ending—even more deeply rooted in the in the Soviet novel than in the Hollywood movie—emerged triumphant. In the inferno of besieged Stalingrad, the hero, Ivan Ivanovich, a surgeon by trade and an abandoned husband by misfortune, manages to form a new attachment after having saved the life of his former wife through a skillful operation and having wavered for some time among several attractive candidates. These novels, too, contain some expressions of opinion on international politics and the course of world history. Such cogitations fully deserve to be placed beside those of Leonov which have been quoted earlier. The two books provide some sidelights on the grasping arrogance of the local party boss, who even tries to prescribe the types of operations which a surgeon may or may not perform in the local hospital; the way in which these ambitions are curbed by a successful appeal to higher party authorities is no less instructive than the threat of criminal prosecution to which a wrong diagnosis seems to expose the physician. But the novels' main interest stems from their having blazed the trail for a fuller and freer treatment of Soviet marriage.[5]

Such a presentation is contained in Galina Nikolayeva's *Bitva v puti* (*Battle on the Road*), a novel which appeared seriatim in 1957 in the journal *Oktyabr'*.[6] This no doubt is one of the most revealing prod-

[5] In what appears to be her latest novel, *Derzaniye* (*Daring*—Moscow, 1959), Koptyayeva proceeds to wreck the second marriage of the surgeon, who leaves his wife in order to correct an error of choice made in Stalingrad a decade earlier. Fortunately for the abandoned wife, she too is put on the road to an alternative happiness.

[6] Nos. 3-7; in subsequent references, only the issue and page numbers will be cited.

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ucts of recent Soviet *belles-lettres*. It is not simply a novel about the risks of Soviet matrimony. Like most Soviet novels, *Battle on the Road* provides valuable insights into aspects of Soviet life which, although unflattering, are so common within the Soviet system that they are considered perfectly natural, and their inclusion in a work of fiction is simply a sort of *Kleinmalerei*. For the same reason, they escape the blades of the censor's scissors. But Nikolayeva's novel offers a good deal more than a collection of *obiter pincta*. It bears the clear stamp of having been written after the Twentieth Party Congress, at the apogee of the rebound from the restraints of the Stalinist era. Both in being deliberately critical and in disregarding taboos, this novel is quite unusual and probably much more significant than Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*, which happened to catch the eye of the reading public within and without Soviet Russia.

The novel supplies a broad canvas of Soviet life. In many respects, it confirms impressions previously gained of the way Soviet factories and collective farms operate. We have heard before about the problem of managerial honesty. Still it is interesting to note that the successful factory manager, in reporting the percentage of flawed goods in total output, deducts the permissible amounts, thus producing a more favorable picture by false means (No. 7, p. 120). A chairman of a *Kolkhoz* caught in various prevarications insists that it is his honesty that makes him lie: "Honesty requires me to manage the *Kolkhoz* in such a way as to yield profit to the State and to the *Kolkhozniki* [the *Kolkhoz* farmers]. But planning sometimes is plainly directed against profit." And the writer dots the "i's" by adding that "the errors of planning and the trammels upon initiative" make it necessary for alert and dedicated men "to lie and to act deviously" (No. 5, p. 43). This is not in any sense novel information. We have known for a long time that illicit activities of the managers are designed both to evade the plan and to make its operation possible. But it is perhaps the first time that a Soviet writer has stated the complexity of the situation so sharply and so frankly.

The factory manager has an "exchange fund," that is to say, concealed stacks of goods which he can offer to the railroads as a consideration for extra-quick service; alternatively, he lets his factory shops perform special and quite unscheduled repair work for the railroads (No. 5, pp. 26, 27, 92). This again is a well-known phenomenon —a part of the Soviet concept of *blat* or *blatmeysterstvo*, terms which originally referred to the underworld and underworld operations, but

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in Soviet Russia have come to connote illicit economic operations.[7] But the description of these conditions is given a very modern, post-Stalin twist in the novel. The director of the factory, which manufactures tractors, returns from Moscow to announce that the factory will henceforth contribute its share to the output of consumers' goods by establishing workshops producing beds, frying pans, stove parts, and similar commodities. The decision reflects the promises to improve the levels of consumption made first by Malenkov and then by Khrushchev. But the reason for the director's readiness to add output of pots and pans to that of tractors should be noted: to have consumers' goods at his disposal will greatly increase his bargaining position in various *blat* operations. And equally enlightening is the fact that the director's opponent in the factory, the chief engineer—the "positive" hero of the novel—combats inclusion of consumers' goods in the production program because what Soviet factories need is efficient specialization in a few well-defined operations rather than dissipation of energies in attempts to produce a wide variety of articles. According to the chief engineer, it is bad enough that the factory must continue to produce the smallest and simplest parts that go into a tractor engine instead of receiving them from the outside (No. 5, p. 67). The difficulties in organizing efficient inter-factory co-operation have long been a very sore point in Soviet industrialization. It is quite instructive to see how the half-sincere attempts to satisfy the consumers by makeshift arrangements, while avoiding the requisite structural changes, are received within Soviet factories.

Nikolayeva's critique does not confine itself to the relative safety of local conditions in the factory. The target has been widened to include the powerful first secretary of the *Obkom*, the virtual boss of a huge region and of the Ministry to which the tractor factory reports and which is accused of having lost its grasp of the enormously expanded productive machinery. In the end, the struggle within the factory is satisfactorily resolved. Both the director of the factory and the first secretary of the regional party committee are exposed and demoted. The secretary, who is described as having worshipped the infallible, mysterious, incomprehensible power of one man, the chosen vessel of wisdom (No. 6, p. 44), tries to speak of the "magnificent constructions of our era" which make it inevitable for the Ivan Ivanovich Ivanovs to restrict themselves and even to make some sacrifices (No. 7,

[7] Etymologically, the term *blat* comes from the German *Platte*—i.e., gang (of criminals or rowdies). It probably fits well into the Russian language because of the subconscious association with the Church-Slavonic *blato*, swamp or filth.

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p. 115). But the chairman of the Central Committee meeting which sets everything right cuts the secretary short: "But some people regard those sacrifices as a grave and temporary necessity which must be terminated as quickly as possible; others regard them as a natural law which it does not pay to think about and which it is harmful to talk about" (*ibid.*). The practical effect of the two positions may be identical. But this remark spells the doom of the secretary and the director. The chief engineer becomes the director of the factory, eager to remedy past errors and omissions and in particular to do something about the main evil of Soviet factories and collective farms: "the mechanization without organization" (No. 4, p. 73; No. 5, p. 113; No. 7, p. 129), which certainly is an aphoristically felicitous way—thrice repeated—of pointing to a crucial problem of Soviet economic development, a disability to which much attention is likely to be devoted in the next few years.

To appreciate the full breadth of Nikolayeva's criticism, add to the foregoing, first, the fact that the husband of the heroine, a devoted party member, is arrested and executed as an "enemy of the people"; then the description of the general atmosphere of shivering cowardice, including the suggestion that members of the secret police are not above taking advantage of the wives of arrested men; and, finally, the expulsion of the heroine, even prior to her husband's execution, from the Communist youth organization on charges of being overdressed at a meeting and of having failed to greet her fellow members properly (No. 4, pp. 28-33).

Some of Nikolayeva's strictures simply justify certain reforms of the Khrushchev era. The attacks upon economic ministries which adumbrate Khrushchev's decentralization are of this kind. But, on the whole, her criticism has been bold, comprehensive, and far-reaching. To be sure, she has remained true to the Soviet tradition and has served up a happy ending in which rewards and retributions are distributed to each according to his or her deserts. The reader is left with the strong suggestion that the change for the better within the tractor factory is bound to be duplicated over the whole range of the Soviet economy. The fateful knocks on the door in the dead of night belong to the past. The Soviet citizen can sleep quietly, and the future seems bright.

And yet, the peculiarity of Nikolayeva's novel is that her happy ending is confined to the public sphere, as it were. At the level of private relations and in terms of individual happiness, the novel ends

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in gloom and despair.[8] It is at this level that Nikolayeva's novel represents a real innovation in Soviet literature, being the first whose central theme is adultery. The subject is introduced and treated with circumspection. "Socialist people are not made for adultery," says the hero (No. 7, p. 93). There is no description of the pleasures of the flesh. But there is human truth in the irresistibility of the attraction which the hero—the chief engineer—and the heroine—an engineer in the same factory—feel for each other. An oft-told story is related with simplicity and dignity, and the long years of spinsterly modesty enforced upon literature by a government that trod under foot all laws of decency elevate the appearance of this story to the rank of a political sensation.

Its primary significance, however, does not lie in providing a high point on the gauge by which fluctuations in post-Stalinist liberalism can be measured. Much more important is the unusual glance into the more permanent and more stable structure of the Soviet value system which Nikolayeva's story affords. The happiness of the lovers finds a sudden termination in the fashion standardized by the second-rate French novel of the nineteenth century. By accident, the deceived wife surprises the sinful pair in the *pied-à-terre* which they have rented on the periphery of the town. By the next morning the story is the talk of the town. The party cannot remain indifferent, and the new first secretary of the *Obkom* hastens to the factory to comfort the new director, who bravely exhibits the "face of a fighter." And the woman? Alas, no one comforts her. She cannot return to the factory and must leave town, which she promptly does, after having confessed her sin to her husband and having received from her lover 300 rubles for travel expenses.

Once more the provincialism of the Soviet value system has been exposed. A settled society has little respect for privacy. Neither the town, nor the factory, nor the party boss is willing to regard the episode as the private affair of those immediately concerned. But what is even more striking is that in this case Soviet provincialism has not only the same form but also the same substance as the time-honored provincialism of the so-called bourgeois societies. It is the woman whose biography has received the indelible stain. The man can escape unscathed, the beauty blemish hardly affecting the perfection of his biog-

[8] In this respect, the present novel is very different from Nikolayeva's earlier novel, *Zhatva* (*Harvest*), for which, in 1950, she received the Stalin Prize. The high award was richly deserved. For in that fully standardized and altogether uncritical presentation of life on a postwar collective farm, public and private happy endings were indeed one and indivisible.

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raphy. His marital life will go on as before and the unity of his life will remain unbroken. Again, one can only marvel at the paradoxical complexity of Soviet society. It has allowed women to become engineers in steel mills and to perform physical jobs which in less socialistic countries are entrusted to men, and preferably to machines. But right and wrong in sexual relations are still distributed in patterns that were formed in the days when the village blacksmith was the main exponent of industrialization. Thus when the provincial quest for perfect biography is somewhat relaxed, the underlying provincialism of the value system becomes even more apparent and even more surprising.

III

Thanks to Nikolayeva's critical attitude, the curtain has been lifted to allow at least a glance at some hitherto concealed sides of Soviet life. It would be quite erroneous, however, to assume that novels lacking in critical spirit are necessarily uninformative and unilluminating. Vsevolod Kochetov's novels, including his recent bestseller, are a case in point. Here is a writer raised and steeped in the atmosphere of Soviet conformity. Through his novels, beginning with *Pod nebom rodiny* (*Under the Sky of the Fatherland*—Leningrad, 1955), which was written between 1947 and 1950, usually passes a member of the secret police who is a truly fine chap, possessed of all kinds of virtues. Even in a discussion between two agronomists on the structure of relative prices in the United States and Soviet Russia—the price ratio of cars and horses in the two countries is at issue—the hero quickly confounds his adversary by a thinly veiled threat of denunciation to the *GPU* (*Pod nebom rodiny*, p. 124). It is natural for Kochetov to deprecate increases in the standard of living of the Soviet population: what matters, he says, is increase in the productivity of labor (*ibid.*, p. 259).

In pre-revolutionary Russia there was a type of writer generally characterized as belonging to the school of *chego izvolite*?—"What can I do for you, sir?" Kochetov's servility has been remarkable even under Soviet conditions. In his second novel, *Zhurbiny* (*The Zhurbins*—Leningrad, 1953), published in the last year of Stalin's life, the novelist was quick to notice the rising tide of Soviet anti-Semitism, and he obliged by assigning to a Jew the role of the only unreformed scoundrel in the book. Some scholars have preferred to withdraw from the pressures of life in Soviet Russia into pure theory. Again, Kochetov's watchful eye is upon them—and in his third novel, *Molodost'*

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s nami (Youth Is with Us—Moscow, 1957), this contemptible behavior is appropriately castigated (p. 93). In the fourth novel, *Brat'ya Yershovy* (*The Yershov Brothers*), which is said to have sold several hundred thousand copies, Kochetov rushed to the defense of the dictatorship against the critics of the post-Stalin era.[9]

In a sense, the book is a deliberate retort—novel for novel—to Dudintsev. If the latter tried to show how factory management, government bureaucracy, academic experts, and even judicial organs conspired in order to suppress an invention and punish the inventor, Kochetov puts the conspiratorial shoe on the other foot, and serves up a fraudulent inventor who is engaged in criminal intrigues directed against the factory director and the party bosses. In addition, he also manages to insert into his novel (No. 6, p. 97) some brief mockery of Erenburg's *The Thaw*, which was one of the first, if not the first, literary expressions of dissatisfaction with Stalin's era. He is anxious to issue warnings against the tendency to accept with open arms the returnees from jails and forced labor camps: "One must distinguish between those who suffered innocently and those who were released out of generosity. . . . The Soviet government has a generous soul . . . It is generous because it is strong . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 20). In short, Kochetov is a faithful servant of the regime, its willing mouthpiece. And still his novels contain much more than just a few grains of useful information, the value of which is all the greater since one must assume that it has been imparted quite unwittingly. A few examples may be in order here.

It is *Brat'ya Yershovy* that most impressively and quite effortlessly gives the reader some feeling of the extent of informing and denouncing which thicken the air in Soviet Russia. The city boss, the first secretary of the *Gorkom*, Gorbachev, is presented as a person of excellent standing and impeccable reputation. But the enemy is on the march. The wily and false inventor composes a denunciatory epistle in which Gorbachev is accused of having used city snow ploughs in order to clear the street in front of his daughter's house on the day of her wedding. The denunciation goes to the next higher party authority, the first secretary of the *Obkom*, i.e., the regional committee. The latter knows that the maligned person has a weak heart; there is no doubt about the trifling character of the complaint. But the Soviet code of action prescribes paying full attention to every accusation. Gorbachev is shown the letter, suffers a heart attack, and

[9] *Brat'ya Yershovy* appeared in 1958 in *Neva*, Nos. 6-7; in subsequent references only the issue and page numbers will be cited.

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dies (No. 7, pp. 119 et seq.). It is truly impressive to observe Kochetov's uncharming naïveté which makes him believe and make believe in his turn that it is the anti-Soviet inventor who has killed Gorbachev rather than the defenselessness of the dictatorial police state against informers.

That informing is a problem not even Kochetov can pretend to ignore. Another member of Kochetov's collection of ideal *GPU* men suddenly breaks out in a long tirade against the "slanderers, careerists, . . . whose denunciations clog the machinery of the party, of the soviets, and of the judiciary." He adds, "I am afraid of them" (*Molodost' s nami*, p. 433). The colonel's further suggestion that "there should be a law against informing" may be a helpful one, provided that the law also institutes a different attitude to human biography.

It is in the same novel that incidentally, by way of explaining the weakness of a character, Kochetov refers to an earlier episode in his life. The character, a professor, in filling out a questionnaire, had represented himself as the son of an artisan when in reality he was the son of a miller. An amateur hunter for inconsistencies in questionnaires discovered and denounced the falsification. A long investigation followed in which an unbelievable number of various government agencies and party authorities participated. It was the professor's wife whose boundless energy and perseverance beat off the attack, but not before she had gone to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Her husband was saved, but he never recovered from the experience (*ibid.*, pp. 218-19).

Nor is it merely the state and the party that are on the lookout for biographical chinks. The private citizen is well trained to do his own private investigating, as it were, in a supplementary fashion. One of the brothers of the Yershov family was a prisoner of war of the Germans. After his return to Russia he spent years in a forced labor camp. When, finally, he is allowed to return to his home town, his own brothers subject him to a grueling, humiliating, and pointless cross-examination (*Brat'ya Yershovy*—No. 6, p. 80). These are indeed useful illustrations of Leonid Leonov's ideal of a perfect biography and of what it means when the concept is shifted from abstract theory to everyday life. Soviet novels explain both Soviet life and Soviet novels. With the help of Kochetov's novels one can place Leonov's ideal of a perfect biography in a perfect society in its proper perspective and learn to distinguish more clearly between the mechanics of power exercised within a dictatorial system and the trappings of an outworn ideology.

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There is much said in *Brat'ya Yershovy* about art and literature. One gets some idea as to how far-reaching has been the dissatisfaction with the official art and official literature, and how important was the wave of fresh air that came rushing in from Poland and Hungary. "They say in Poland that socialist realism is good for nothing but plywood constructions," says one of the heroes in Kochetov's novel (No. 7, p. 84), possibly one of those who, again according to Kochetov, kept their mouths shut for decades and now after Stalin's dethronement have been emboldened to raise their voices in criticism (*ibid.*, p. 94). Will this movement of long-suppressed protest bear some permanent fruit? Or will the Kochetovs and those behind them —and above them—continue to keep Russian literature within the pinfold of socialist realism under the watchful eye of dictatorial censorship? The prospect may be as cheerless as the retrospect. There is no doubt that the Soviet government can effectively preclude the revival of the Russian novel. But it is quite unlikely that it can fully succeed in obstructing the Soviet novel's revelatory function. This is the conclusion that emerges *a minori ad maius* from Vsevolod Kochetov's literary exercises.

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MYTH AND REALITY ABOUT PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN INDIA

By RANJIT SINGH BHAMBRI

I

WIDESPREAD criticism and suspicion of the activities of businessmen have been a striking feature of public debate on economic and social affairs in India since 1947.* It has almost been a matter of habit with literate Indians to blame the commercial classes and the financial interests for the country's economic backwardness. In spite of the generous contribution of businessmen to the Congress Party funds, and the close association of Mahatma Gandhi with many prominent industrialists, the business community found itself under thick clouds of public hostility after independence.

Relations between commercial and industrial organizations and the government deteriorated gradually after the Congress Party assumed power. The speeches of some members of the government and the Congress Party often contained sweeping criticism of various activities of the business community. When he addressed the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 1949, Mr. Nehru argued that Indian capitalists and industrialists gave the impression of frailty and feebleness. They were "not big enough to face the problems of the day," he suggested. He warned them, too, that "if your demands come in the way of the good of the masses, your demands will be completely ignored."[1] His statement expressed clearly the popular assumption that Indian businessmen are interested only in making large profits for themselves, with complete disregard of the public interest.

The death of Sardar Patel in 1950 removed the most powerful defender of the businessmen's point of view in Mr. Nehru's government. State participation in direct industrial production has been increasing in the last few years. The government has started new industries under its control. Certain sectors of the economy have, for strategic as well as ideological reasons, been reserved for public enterprise. Moreover, the government has increased its control over the day-to-day activities of private firms.

* I am grateful to Miss Ruth Murphy, who read the first draft of this article and suggested numerous improvements in style.

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Independence and After: A Collection of the More Important Speeches, from September 1946 to May 1949*, [Delhi], 1949, p. 189.

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In December 1954 the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament) passed a resolution which accepted the "Socialist pattern of society as the objective of social and economic policy." The Congress Party passed a similar resolution at its annual conference held at Avadi in January 1955, and declared itself in favor of the establishment of a socialist pattern of society in India.

II

Much space has been given to discussion of the exact meaning of the phrase "Socialist pattern of society" and the implications of recent government legislation for the future of private enterprise in India. That the Congress Party does not propose to nationalize all means of production is obvious. This was made clear by Maulana Azad (the late Minister for Education, Natural Resources, and Scientific Research) when he introduced the above-mentioned resolution at the Avadi session of the Congress Party. He said: "I would like to draw your attention, especially at this time, to the deliberate use of the phrase socialist pattern of society. This is most important because we want to have a socialist pattern and not socialism."[2] The authors of the second five-year plan put the matter more precisely: "The accent of the socialist pattern is on the attainment of positive goals; the raising of living standards, the enlargement of opportunities for all, the promotion of enterprise among the disadvantaged classes and the creation of a sense of partnership among all sections of the community. These positive goals provide the criteria for basic decisions."[3] Moreover, the government's agricultural policy suggests that the distinction drawn between "socialism" and "socialist pattern of society" is important. It is well known that the Congress Party is committed to the principle of the abolition of the Zamindari system and the distribution of land among the peasants. It is therefore self-evident that as long as India remains a country of thousands of villages, as long as the majority of her people derive their livelihood from the land, private enterprise will remain the predominant form of production in the economy.

But the proper role of private enterprise in the fields of industry, large-scale distribution, finance, and foreign trade has been a subject of keen controversy in the last ten years. The activities of the government in these sections of the economy have taken various forms. Numerous state-owned plants have come into existence. These plants are

[2] *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 20, 1955.
[3] Planning Commission, Government of India, *Second Five Year Plan*, [New Delhi], 1956, p. 24.

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owned either by government departments (e.g., Chittaranjan Locomotive Factory and the Integrated Coach Factory at Perambur) or by public corporations specially created to run them (e.g., Hindustan Aircraft Ltd., Sindri Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd.). In some cases the government has entered into partnership with certain foreign or Indian firms (e.g., Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., Hindustan Shipyard Ltd.). The state has acquired controlling shares in some firms. Air transport, the Imperial Bank of India (now called the State Bank of India), and the insurance companies have been nationalized in recent years.

These state activities have increased the importance of public enterprise in the Indian economy. It has been estimated that in 1950-1951 the book value of capital assets in the public sector of organized industry was Rs. 440 million, in contrast to a book value of "productive" assets of Rs. 11.1 billion in privately owned factory establishments—a ratio of 1:25. As a result of increased investment on government account, by 1960-1961 two-thirds of the total capital invested in organized manufacturing will be privately owned and one-third government-owned.[4]

These steps have been taken with the intention of accelerating the pace of industrialization, which has been the overriding national objective since 1947. It is widely assumed that private enterprise is too weak to accomplish this heroic task. Until 1956 at least, it was common practice to warn private enterprise that in order to survive it must make the greatest efforts to increase output, particularly the output of industrial products. In their published statements, businessmen of course accepted the prime national objective. But they argued that the policy of nationalization created an atmosphere inimical to expansion. Furthermore, excessive regulation of industry, in their view, could not encourage the private initiative and enterprise on which the success of the ambitious plans for the industrialization of the country depended.

In India this particular debate is not just another ideological discussion of the relative desirability of private enterprise and state activity in the field of production. The tone of this debate and the nature of the arguments used by both sides are determined by the economic environment and aspirations of the Indian people. It is abundantly clear that the place of private enterprise in Indian industry, and the concrete meaning of a "mixed economy," will depend upon the opinion of the public, particularly the educated elite, during the next few years. We must therefore ask ourselves why and how the public came to acquire

[4] George Rosen, *Industrial Change in India*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, pp. 13-14.

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a negative and hostile attitude toward private enterprise. If this attitude springs from deep-rooted cultural factors and ideological reasons, the private businessman may be allowed to continue only for a short period until the government finds it convenient to take over the industries in the private sector. But if this attitude is based on the past economic performance of Indian businessmen, changes in their performance will surely determine future policy. In the latter case, the present economic policy of the government, owing to its effect on the performance of private enterprise, will become the most important factor in the determination of public attitudes and hence of future economic policy toward private enterprise.

III

The vast majority of men have always viewed with a mixture of admiration, envy, and suspicion the activities of those who accumulate large fortunes and create industrial empires. The businessman in fact has never been a popular figure. "Dislike of him," writes Professor T. S. Ashton, "runs, a continuous thread, through nineteenth century literature, showing up most strongly in the writings of Ruskin and his followers, but visible also in those of novelists and essayists, who much preferred the ways of gypsies and tramps to his."[5] Even in the United States of America, big business is very often suspect in the eyes of the public merely because of its size. Exploitation by the large corporations and financial interests was a familiar complaint of United States farmers until very recently. Likewise, there is a widespread feeling among the Indian peasants that landlords, traders, and moneylenders are largely responsible for their poverty. Yet the Indian peasant believes, no less strongly than the American farmer, that the right to own private property is an inalienable human right.

Western writers on India have often tried to explain the popular dislike and suspicion of business success, and the slower rate of growth of Indian industry, in terms of the supposedly anti-business leanings of Hindu religious and social thought.[6] This is a pathetically weak explanation. It is based on a rather superficial acceptance of the opinions

[5] Professor Ashton goes on: "They [the businessmen] were variously portrayed as ostentatiously rich or poor-spirited and mean; in either case they were far too much pre-occupied with money. . . . It was an obvious duty to expose [them], and so, a generation or more ago, journalists and others, especially in the United States but also here [i.e., England], took with enthusiasm to what came to be known as muck-raking. It was an easy way to public esteem and literary fame." *Business History* (Liverpool), I, No. 1 (December 1958), p. 1.

[6] E.g., Helen B. Lamb, "The Indian Business Communities and the Evolution of an Industrialist Class," *Pacific Affairs*, XXVIII, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 101-16.

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which are expressed publicly. In any society there is inevitably a gap between what is said and what is practiced. But this gap tends to be unusually wide in India, where paying lip service to certain principles which are in practice disregarded is only too common. For example, in their public speeches, spokesmen of the Congress Party almost habitually declare their faith in Gandhian principles, yet the economic policy of the party is based on principles which are the exact contrary of Gandhi's economic philosophy. Social life in India is in many ways a vast ritual. Without a careful analysis of the beliefs of the people, it is quite easy to reach misleading conclusions on this question. Religious principles, however important, do not explain the hostility of the public to Indian businessmen.

It is important to realize that specific criticism of businessmen and their practices is voiced mainly by the educated classes. The habit of criticizing Indian businessmen has come to be regarded as an occupational disease of the elite. It is this section of the population which is responsible for the formulation of public opinion and for government policy. To explain that policy we must inquire why this section of the population came to adopt an attitude of hostility toward business. Their views cannot, of course, be explained in terms of their adherence to Hindu religion and thought, which do not place a high value on the accumulation of riches. By and large, educated Indians dislike most of the economic manifestations of "Hindu culture." They admire Western societies for their higher standards of living and they admire the Soviet Union even more for having achieved a remarkable rate of economic growth in the last few decades. It is thus absurd to suggest that the Indian intellectual does not consider the pursuit of wealth a respectable activity because it is against "authentic" Indian values.

Educated Indians are not hostile to business, not even big business. They have been hostile to Indian business—quite a different thing. For over a generation they have regarded rapid industrialization of the country as the only way of eliminating poverty and modernizing the country. Indian businessmen, in their opinion, have failed to achieve a satisfactory rate of industrial growth. An outside observer may consider the achievement of Indian industry before 1947 quite impressive, while the condition of agriculture would seem appalling to him. The educated Indian will not deny this. He may take pride in pointing out that even before the Second World War India was regarded as the tenth most important country in the world, and was the second largest in Asia (next to Japan) in terms of total industrial output. He may

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even concede that this achievement, in the face of opposition from a hostile government, deserves a word of praise.

But all these qualifications do not upset his main argument, that Indian industrial output per capita still remains one of the lowest in the world, and that it could have expanded more quickly. Even the backwardness of agriculture is due, in part, to the very slow pace of industrialization. In the first half of the twentieth century, industries in every other developed country were creating more and more jobs and taking people off the land. But in India very few jobs were created in industry or other non-agricultural occupations in this period. By 1947 manufacturing industries employed barely 2.4 million workers.

The number of Indian businessmen who invest their capital in industry still remains deplorably low. Most of them have accumulated fortunes in money-lending, trade, and speculation. This excessive devotion to trade and speculation has produced the common belief that Indian businessmen are only interested in "unproductive" enterprises.

Lack of vigor, of initiative, and of willingness to take risks have come to be regarded as the distinguishing feature of most Indian businessmen, who have concentrated on activities yielding quick and large profits, and have been traditionally shy of investing in industries which bear fruit over a long period and are most beneficial to the economy. Indian investors have often expected the government to provide all the help and encouragement in setting up an industry. The feeling has arisen that the government should assume many of the business risks while private enterprise earned all the profits. Yet any interference by the government in the activities of the firms has provoked the charge that attempts to regulate industry will discourage enterprise and initiative.

Furthermore, various writers have argued that, until recently, most Indian businessmen have shown very little sense of social responsibility, either toward their employees or toward consumers. Their taste for conspicuous consumption is well known. They have seldom contributed to the promotion of education or of welfare. The standard of business honesty among them is reputed to be very low.[7] It would be difficult to find many businessmen in India who believe that the purpose of

[7] I have talked with hundreds of small traders and shopkeepers (in North India) who seriously argue that honesty and success in business do not normally go together. Many of them strongly believe that rich businessmen owe their wealth either to good fortune or to greater dishonesty. Even some sophisticated Indians have suggested that wealth cannot be accumulated by honest means. For an interesting example, see the anecdote from *All India Congress Committee Economic Review*, April 1, 1956, quoted in C. A. Meyers, *Labour Problems in Industrialisation*, New York, 1958, ch. II.

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economic activity is to meet the needs of society most efficiently. Accumulation of personal fortunes, according to their view, is the main aim of a business.

IV

This picture of the average Indian businessman—interested in trading, speculation, and quick profits, lacking in other initiative and enterprise, shirking the risks of investments which pay in the long run, displaying little concern for the welfare of his employees and almost no sense of social responsibility—is, though exaggerated in some ways, substantially correct. But neither Western nor Indian writers on this subject have recognized that these drawbacks are not peculiar to Indian businessmen. In all underdeveloped countries, businessmen are guilty of all or most of the shortcomings that have been attributed to the Indian businessman. In Latin American countries today, businessmen display a marked lack of classic capitalist vigor and enterprise; they have a strong taste for speculation, and their capacity for conspicuous consumption is perhaps second to none. In eighteenth-century France or England the standards of business honesty were not very high, and in Russia, in the nineteenth century, these standards were, according to Professor Alexander Gerschenkron, "disastrously low."[8] In England an almost complete lack of a sense of social responsibility toward employees was a notable aspect of the businessman's psychology in the early days of the industrial revolution. Recent research into the economic history of most industrialized countries, and factual material relating to poor countries, which has been accumulated in large quantities, strongly suggest that some of the defects of the Indian business community should be ascribed less to the peculiarities of Indian culture, as many Western writers have done, than to the underdeveloped state of the economy.

Educated Indians, on the other hand, seem to forget that a lack of social responsibility, enterprise, and initiative has been perhaps the outstanding feature of all aspects of social life in India in the last few decades. As individual members of an amorphous society, businessmen have not been guilty of anything with which the majority of Indians could not be charged. Of course, businessmen have in the past shown a strong dislike of risky enterprises. But the educated classes are the worst offenders here. The tendency of literate Indians to go in for safe government jobs requiring hardly any initiative and almost no risk is too well known to need any elaboration. The universities have tended

[8] In Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, Chicago, 1952, p. 18.

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to produce a type of mind which is happy and satisfied only in familiar grooves, and they have only just begun to analyze seriously the social and economic problems facing the country.

Moreover, it is not generally realized that private initiative is not in itself a sufficient remedy for the economic ills of underdeveloped countries. In emphasizing these factors, the critics of private enterprise are unconsciously subscribing to the oversimplified laissez-faire theory that, once the immense potential of free, pioneering, individual initiative is released, economic growth will automatically be assured. Before 1947 conditions in India were unfavorable to the rapid expansion of industrial enterprises. There were, of course, very sound economic and political reasons for the inability of individual businessmen to undertake larger risks. Market opportunities in India were rather limited until recently, except for a few industrial products; and the resources of most businessmen were not large enough to provide the basic overhead facilities necessary for balanced growth. Except during the brief period of the Second World War, the British Raj did not see the need for rapid industrialization of the country. Hence the government was neither ready nor willing to provide the thrust for an effective industrial revolution. It is not entirely the fault of businessmen that they did not show any willingness to undertake greater risks in so hostile an economic environment.

V

Both the economic climate and the performance of private enterprise have changed appreciably in the last few years. During the Second World War, the British government encouraged the production of industrial goods in India to facilitate its war effort. Moreover, a shortage of imported products increased consumer demand for the products of Indian industries. But industrial production did not increase much during this period. The index of industrial production rose only from 100 in 1937 to 120.0 in 1945. What increase occurred was mainly due to the fuller utilization of existing industrial capacity. Further expansion in capacity was not possible in this period because new machinery, usually imported from industrial countries, was largely unavailable. The index of production fell back to 109 in 1946 and to 102.4 in 1947. The political and economic situation after 1947 was very uncertain. Most industries were working well below their full capacity. It is generally argued that, as a result of the uncertainty, industrial production did not show any marked upward trend till 1953.

During this period relations between the government and private

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enterprise were deteriorating gradually. In 1952 Mr. Sarkar, a past president of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, wrote that "businessmen are now under suspicion everywhere. We are fast losing goodwill."[9] Various commentators suggested that the behavior of industrial production in this period provided a convincing proof that Indian businessmen were completely lacking in initiative and could not be effective agents in the industrialization of the country. Mr. Asoka Mehta, the Socialist leader, popularized the phrase, "Indian capital has gone on strike." Businessmen, on the other hand, played up the issue of nationalization. The government was blamed for creating uncertainty about the future of private enterprise. It was seriously argued that no increases in production could take place in this uncertain economic environment.

The volume of industrial output increased after 1953. According to the revised index, industrial production increased from 100 in 1951 to 105.6 in 1953—a gain of only 5.6 points. But in 1954 the index jumped to 112.9 and in 1955 to 122.1. For the first four months of 1958 the index of industrial production stood at 141.2. These figures show that in 1953 private firms started to increase production at an impressive rate. The performance of private enterprise has been very satisfactory in the first three years of the second five-year plan. Most industries in the private sector passed their targets. The total investment allocated to the private sector over the entire plan period was in fact carried out in the first eighteen months. The sharp increase in the volume of capital goods imported on private account in 1956 and 1957 was perhaps the chief cause of the foreign exchange crisis.

Moreover, the number of private registered companies has increased by more than 125 per cent since the Second World War. These indices of the growth of private enterprise provide some evidence in favor of the hypothesis suggested above, that the lack of vigor shown by private enterprise may have been due to lack of a favorable climate before 1947.

VI

However, the sources of the strength and weakness of private enterprise in India have not been properly understood either in India or abroad. This lack of understanding is most obvious in the statements of Indian industrialists. The nationalization of the Imperial Bank of India and the insurance companies, and the policy of increasing control over private firms, embodied in the Companies Act of 1955, were ex-

[9] N. R. Sarkar, "My Days in the Federation," *Silver Jubilee Souvenir*, Calcutta, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 1953, p. 197.

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tensively criticized by businessmen. This is, of course, a perfectly natural reaction on the part of those who believe in the efficiency and virtue of private enterprise. But the main argument advanced needs careful analysis. Up to the promulgation of the Industrial Policy Resolution of April 1956, prominent businessmen argued in their public speeches that the policy of the government was generating uncertainty, sapping the confidence of private enterprise, and might arrest the growth of production. But the behavior of industrial production in the private sector between 1951 and 1956 shows quite clearly that production was scarcely affected by the climate of uncertainty; instead, it fluctuated in direct relation to the level of public investment. In the years 1951-1953, a period of slack demand and low level of public investment, most industries were working below full capacity. According to the *Monthly Statistics of Selected Industries in India*, in 1952 and 1953 nearly half the industries were working at less than 50 per cent of their capacity. A substantial increase in the volume of public investment in 1952 increased monetary demand for consumption goods. Industrial production therefore showed a very impressive recovery after 1953 and private investment also increased. It is clear that the production policy of most firms was not affected by the feeling of acute uncertainty which was a common theme in the speeches of businessmen in the period 1953-1956.

The claims made on behalf of private enterprise have been modified in the last three years. Whereas previously it was argued that the government was destroying the springs of private initiative, the current theme is that private enterprise has done remarkably well *in spite* of the socialistic policy of the government. In one of his speeches, Mr. J. R. D. Tata, chairman of Tata Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., declared: "I feel the charge that free enterprise in India has shown no initiative in recent years is particularly hard to take. I for one am in fact surprised at the amount of initiative displayed *considering the discouragement and disincentives to which it has been subjected.*"[10]

The ideas expressed by Mr. Tata are shared by some economists in India and in the United States. For example, Mr. Wilfred Malenbaum, chairman of the India Project of the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote recently: ". . . Indian industry in the last few years has demonstrated a vigor and vitality worthy of industry in the most developed lands. This vitality has been clearly manifest in the private sector, *despite* India's commitment to a socialistic pattern of society and a policy of increasing nationalization

[10] *Economic Weekly* (Bombay), January 1956, p. 51; italics added.

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in its industrial mix."[11] Moreover, it is argued that industrialization will now proceed faster if the state gradually withdraws from the sphere of economic activity and the policy of an almost crippling regulation of industry is reversed. However, a closer investigation of the events of the last five years suggests that these conclusions are unwarranted. Private enterprise has done well *not in spite of, but because of*, the various activities of the government since the inauguration of the first five-year plan. Public investment in power, transport, communications, and various other industries has created considerable purchasing power. It is this purchasing power which makes possible the boom in the consumer goods industries owned almost entirely by the private sector.

Part of the confusion in this controversy arises from a basic flaw in the accepted theory of investment to which businessmen generally subscribe. It is widely assumed that there is a fixed amount of investible resources available in an economy at any period. This assumption is the basis of the theory that investment undertaken by the state can take place largely at the expense of private investment. Experience, however, suggests that this assumption of a "fixed" amount of investible resources holds good only in a totally planned economy. In a mixed economy, on the other hand, the flow of investible resources can vary within fairly wide limits. The amount of investment that one firm will find profitable to undertake depends upon the planned or expected investments of other units in the economy. Theoretically, it is possible that the state, in order to raise revenue and finance investment, may impose such a high rate of taxation that private enterprise becomes both unable and unwilling to undertake any saving and investment. But all the available evidence suggests that so far neither the rate of taxation nor the pattern of government investment has reduced the opportunities for expansion of private enterprise in India. In fact the complementary nature of private and public investment has proved important in at least two basic ways. First, public investment has created the purchasing power without which production of consumer goods remains unprofitable. Second, public investment is slowly creating those overhead facilities, like transport, communications, and power generation, which are necessary to the smooth operation of all industries. In principle there is no reason for investment in overhead services not being undertaken by private firms. But in the case of India, and indeed of all underdeveloped countries, even the most ardent advocates of private enterprise will concede that the provision of these services is beyond the limited resources of private enterprise.

[11] Foreword to Rosen, *op.cit.*, p. xv; italics added.

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Furthermore, the Indian government has provided various direct stimuli to encourage the expansion of private investment. The taxation policy makes liberal allowances for ordinary and extra depreciation, and enables firms to recover a large part of their investment in new capacity during the early periods of the plant's life. In addition to the depreciation allowance, an investment allowance of 25 per cent is given by the taxation authorities and losses may now be carried forward indefinitely. Tax policy touching reserves and dividends affects saving and encourages firms to increase investment. The institutional framework for the provision of industrial finance has been widened. A National Industrial Development Corporation has been set up to encourage the growth of new industries. Special credit facilities are provided for the small- and medium-sized firms which find it difficult to raise capital through the usual channels. Moreover, the machinery of import control has been thoroughly overhauled, and tariff policy is being used as an instrument of industrial development to provide new industries with such protection as is thought to be desirable.

In fact, private enterprise in India has never before received such generous treatment from the state. As a result, it has served the country rather well in the last few years. There is, of course, no doubt that the government has increased its control over the operations of all private firms beyond a certain specified size. Firms have to secure licenses to import goods from abroad. The output prices of certain specified industries, like cement and paper, are directly controlled, and profits are not allowed to rise above a proportion considered "fair" by the administrators. Moreover, the employment policy of the firm is not regarded as an exclusively private problem but is subject to strict government supervision.

The multiplication of controls in recent years has caused serious concern in business circles. The major criticism of this policy is that it leaves little room for personal initiative. While it cannot be denied that recent company legislation has been rather unwise in certain respects, a general increase in the degree of state control of economic activity is inevitable in a planned economy. The requirement of export licenses and permits for expansion becomes a regrettable necessity in an economy which is trying to develop as rapidly as possible with hardly any reserves of foreign exchange. The 1957 exchange crisis, brought about by the excessive enthusiasm of private enterprise, has not led to a smooth rate of economic growth. A certain degree of restraint and co-ordination, implicit in a system of controls, is essential to rapid economic development.

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It is necessary to emphasize that the published statements of businessmen and their actual performance tell two quite different stories. The economic system has assimilated the various government measures quite comfortably. The speeches of businessmen should not blind us to the real source of their recently acquired strength. A reference to government-generated uncertainty has become as much a matter of habit with the company chairman as an avowal of faith in the socialist pattern of society with the cabinet minister.[12]

VII

These changes in the performance of private enterprise in Indian industry clearly call for a revision of some popular notions about Indian businessmen, and about the proper role, strength, and limitations of private enterprise in the course of economic development.

The Indian businessman, like businessmen in all free societies, is interested in increasing profits. But the sphere of economic activity in which maximum profits can be realized depends upon the economic environment, which varies from one society to another and changes during the course of economic development. Indian businessmen have habitually devoted most of their energy to trade and speculation because in an underdeveloped country, and especially in the face of competition from more efficient industries in developed lands, industrial investment is unprofitable.

In the last ten years the government in India has managed to create a more favorable economic climate. Individual businessmen, in the pursuit of private profits, are gradually devoting their energies to the building-up of industries. It is entirely misleading to suggest that businessmen have suddenly acquired a new vitality and vigor which they lacked only a few years ago. The more important aspect of recent economic evolution is that increases in effective demand and the umbrella of protection provided by the state have reduced the degree of risk involved in industrial investments. In other words, risks have become more nearly proportionate to the small scale of Indian businesses. Of course, the desire to reap quick profits in trading and speculation is still very much in evidence. Habits acquired over a number of generations do not change

[12] Government control of private activity cannot, of course, be increased indefinitely without harmful effects on the volume of production. My point is that, so far, increasing government control and "government-generated uncertainty" have hardly affected the level of productive efficiency. If anything, these measures have helped to improve the performance of the private sector by creating the general feeling that private enterprise is on trial.

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in a decade. But the process of transformation has already started and will no doubt gather momentum in the course of the next few years. It is becoming more fashionable to invest in industries. And as the volume of industrial activity increases, the relative importance of trade and speculation will decline. More than that, in an expanding economy these activities acquire a new and useful meaning. They can no longer be described as unproductive.

We shall do well to remember that Indians have not attached much value to private enterprise as a way of life. To them, it is merely an agent of economic growth, a method of achieving a higher standard of living for the masses. On the other hand, strong dislike of private enterprise is very thinly spread among certain sections of the public. The economic policy of the government is based on markedly empirical and pragmatic considerations. The men in office have so far shown themselves quite untinged by any doctrinaire preference for state action for its own sake.[13] The slogan of "a socialistic pattern of society" and the threat of nationalization only remind the businessman that he must fulfill a useful role, use his economic power with consideration, and acquire a new sense of responsibility. Accumulation of private wealth can no longer be the only business of business.

It should be obvious that in the democratic framework of India, the place of private enterprise in industry and the concrete meaning of the term "mixed economy" will depend upon the attitude of the electorate and, above all, of the articulate and restless educated classes. The developments of the last five years, and the relative success of private enterprise, have taken the sting out of public criticism of businessmen. The thesis that educated Indians disliked business success because of some deep-rooted cultural reasons was not, of course, based on a serious analysis of the facts. In fact the level of industrial output has become a very popular topic of discussion, and Indians have developed a remarkable taste for the study of statistics.

As private enterprise becomes more successful, and more responsible, it is also becoming more respectable. These factors are bound to have

[13] The following quotation from one of Mr. Nehru's speeches (delivered in the Lok Sabha, May 23, 1956) shows that maximum economic growth is the guiding principle of the economic policy of the government. Replying to doctrinaire socialists who urged nationalization of all Indian industries, Mr. Nehru said: "The whole philosophy lying behind this Plan is to take advantage of every possible way of growth, and not, by doing something which fits into some doctrinaire theory, imagine we have grown because we have satisfied some textbook maxim of a hundred years ago." Planning Commission, Government of India, *The New India: Progress Through Democracy*, New York, 1958, p. 52.

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a considerable impact on future economic policy. If India remains a mixed economy, most of the credit for this will no doubt go to Mr. Nehru's government, whose pragmatic policy created an economic climate in which personal initiative and enterprise could harness and create resources, build up productivity, and fulfill the most important social needs.

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PARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY

Britain in the Suez Crisis*

By LEON D. EPSTEIN

I. Introduction

OFTEN as foreign policy may be the subject of partisan discussion in modern democracies, important international commitments are usually made only with support, or the expectation of support, from the great bulk of the political community. This has surely been the ordinary American and British pattern, labeled bi-partisan, non-partisan, or extra-partisan. We assume that political support extending well beyond the ranks of the party in office is essential for a successful foreign policy, and especially for a substantial military venture. Even the American decision to defend South Korea, while it was necessarily made by the Democratic administration before any apparent political consensus and while it eventually involved the United States in an unpopular war, was never in itself a partisan policy which Republicans as a group refused to support. The one outstanding recent instance of a truly partisan foreign policy is Britain's Suez action of 1956. As the significant deviant case, it provides useful insights into the process by which an alternative to the usual bi-partisan arrangement is developed and conducted. Specific questions concern the making of the Suez intervention decision, the nature of parliamentary support for this decision, the role of party loyalty in maintaining such support, and the significance of partisan opposition.

Before attempting answers to these questions, only a brief detour is necessary to put in order the fairly familiar international events that began with President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956.[1] Almost immediately, Britain with France started well-publicized military preparations in the Mediterranean, and at the same time took the lead among Western nations in seeking Egypt's agreement to international control of the Suez Canal. No such agreement was reached, and by late October it was plain that the United States was not supporting any threat of force to secure Egyptian agreement. Naturally this failure of negotiations provided

* Grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the University of Wisconsin made possible the research for this study as well as for a larger projected work.

[1] An account of this and subsequent events, together with the important documents concerning Middle Eastern affairs, is in the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1956*, London, 1959, pp. 73-354.

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the background against which Britain's subsequent reaction to Israeli-Egyptian hostilities would be understood. However, when these hostilities started, the British government announced, on October 30, only its desire (with France) to separate the invading Israeli troops from the Egyptians, and to do so at the canal in order to safeguard it. Failing to secure Egyptian assent within the prescribed twelve hours, Britain and France launched their military effort to occupy the canal zone. The attack, mainly by air and naval bombardment, lasted from October 31 through November 6. Only on the final two days were troops landed, and they occupied no more than the northern end of the canal. During this week of war, Britain and France vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution against their action, temporarily refused to comply with a UN General Assembly resolution, and finally accepted the Assembly's cease-fire order when it was coupled with the promise to create a UN force in the area. But no international control of the canal was promised or achieved. Nevertheless Britain withdrew its troops in December, and advised its shipowners to start reusing the canal in May 1957. British policy was not only defeated; it was reversed.

II. Development of the Partisan Policy

Although the circumstances for the invasion of Egypt—namely, the Israeli attack—were not anticipated during the early discussions of what Britain should do about Nasser's nationalization of the canal, there can be little doubt that the partisan lines, later so sharply to divide the nation, had already emerged in the August-September debate over how far Britain should go in securing its desired solution of the canal issue. It is true that at the very first, in late July and early August, this difference over means was less evident than the nearly unanimous agreement that Nasser had acted wrongly and that Egypt's sole control of the canal was bad for Britain. There was then an absence of substantial dissent from the prime minister's statement of July 30, repeated on August 2: "No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power. . . ."[2] Nor did Labour officially object to Eden's accompanying announcement of precautionary military measures, including the call-up of some reservists.

However, in the specially summoned September parliament, Eden

[2] 557 *H.C. Deb.* 919 (July 30, 1956) and 1603 (August 2, 1956).

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defended what was, by then, a publicly belligerent policy. In describing the way he hoped the recently formed canal users' association would operate to circumvent Egyptian control, Eden came to the possibility that the Egyptian government would not co-operate with the association: "In that event Her Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as seem to be required either through the United Nations, or by other means, for the assertion of their rights."[3] Then the next day, September 13, in response to considerable parliamentary pressure to renounce the threat of force outside the United Nations, Eden refused to make an absolute pledge to this effect. He did say that it would be the government's intention, "except in an emergency," to refer to the Security Council, but he repeated meaningfully that "the Government must be the judge of the circumstances."[4] Eden's statement gave only limited assurance to those who had by September come to fear or suspect that the government contemplated joint Anglo-French military action against Nasser. This included some Conservatives. They did not, like the Labour opposition, accuse the government of preparing to use force, but, while denying that this could be the intention, their spokesman pointedly said that a nation which used force on its own, except in self-defense, would violate the UN Charter. On this theme, the notable speech was by Sir Lionel Heald, a Conservative backbencher with the prestige of a former attorney-general, UN delegate, and representative at the International Court. Two other Conservative backbenchers explicitly agreed with the tenor of Heald's remarks,[5] and it was fairly assumed that he had spoken for a substantial minority of a few dozen MP's. Eden thus had public notice that his own party contained an anti-force potential, apart from one or two other Conservatives who pursued special lines of their own in relation to Nasser.

Generally, however, this dissenting Conservative minority did not mar the partisan picture that was developing. For one thing, the Heald group did not openly criticize the government. And, more importantly, the bulk of the Conservative party seemed to believe in a very strong anti-Nasser stand even if it did involve the use of force. The lead here was taken by the Conservatives who had objected, in 1954, to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement under which Britain's long-standing military occupation of the canal zone was ended. On July 27, 1956, Julian Amery, a leader of these residual Suez rebels, asked Eden rhetorically:

[3] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 11 (Sept. 12, 1956).
[4] *Ibid.*, cols. 307-8 (Sept. 13, 1956).
[5] *Ibid.*, cols. 182-87, 235-36, 273-75 (Sept. 13, 1956).

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"Is my right hon. Friend aware that he will have the overwhelming support of public opinion in this country on whatever steps he decides to take, however grave, to repair this injury to our honour and interests?"[6] This was the line supported vociferously by the annual Conservative conference in mid-October when the party appeared to adopt the policy of the former Suez rebels. Specifically the conference, in its resolution approving the government's strong Suez stand, added a toughening addendum proposed by the fire-eating leaders of the old rebel group.[7] There was only one dissenter, and his attempt to speak was howled down.[8] Moreover the amended resolution, insisting on international control of the canal, was approved by a government representative.[9] It is true that this resolution, despite the hints of its amenders, did not mention the use of force. But the conference's commitment to the international control that Egypt had already rejected might be taken as implicit toleration of force to obtain such control—since there was no other way to get it.

On the other hand, the Labour Party had already made it abundantly clear that it was against the use of force outside the UN. It is fair to say that notice had been served virtually from the time of nationalization itself. This is important to establish in light of subsequent charges that the Labour party leader, Hugh Gaitskell, had changed from a stronger to a weaker anti-Nasser position between August and September. Change in tone there might have been, since his initial reactions to the nationalization reflected as much indignation as Eden's. But even on August 2 when Gaitskell compared Nasser to Mussolini and Hitler and when he said there were "circumstances in which we might be compelled to use force, in self-defence or as part of some colletive defence measures," he added: "I must, however, remind the House that we are members of the United Nations, that we are signatories to the United Nations Charter, and that for many years in British policy we have steadfastly avoided any international action which would be in breach of international law or, indeed, contrary to the public opinion of the world. We must not, therefore, allow ourselves to get into a position where we might be denounced in the Security

[6] 557 *H.C. Deb.* 779 (July 27, 1956).

[7] *76th Annual Report* of the Conservative Conference (1956), p. 22. The resolution contrasted sharply with Labour's insistence, at its October conference, on a peaceful settlement. *55th Annual Report* of the Labour Conference (1956), p. 70.

[8] *76th Annual Report, op.cit.*, pp. 33-34. The dissenter was William Yates, MP.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-37. Filling in for the government was the comparatively junior Anthony Nutting, a minister of state for foreign affairs who was later to resign in protest against Eden's Suez action.

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Council as aggressors, or where the majority of the Assembly were against us."[10]

This reservation was repeated at the end of Gaitskell's speech. Yet there is reason to think that it received little attention at the time, partly because the bulk of the speech stressed the seriousness of Nasser's seizure of the canal. Furthermore most of the other Labour speeches in the debate of August 2 urged that Britain do something about the canal. In fact, there were four Labour MP's whose reservations about the use of force seemed less definite than Gaitskell's,[11] and among these was the semi-retired Herbert Morrison, formerly foreign secretary and less than a year before defeated for the party leadership by the much younger Gaitskell. Altogether the debate of August 2 did give an impression of bi-partisan agreement, and the Conservatives cannot be blamed for making much of this at the time in order to strengthen the government's hand in dealing with Egypt. However, the bi-partisan picture appeared only when the question of using force was not in the forefront of discussion, and it was not there because the government, whatever its intentions, had not yet shown that it contemplated using force outside the UN.

In the mid-September parliamentary debate, of course, the hypothetical use of force was much more conspicuous, and so was the partisan opposition to it. Gaitskell now stressed that Labour's views against the use of force had been communicated earlier, and in a variety of ways, to the government. Besides referring to his own earlier reservations in his August 2 speech, Gaitskell said that even before that occasion he and his deputy leader had twice talked with Eden and that he (Gaitskell) had then warned Eden that he could not rely on Labour support if he contemplated the use of force. Moreover, Gaitskell reported that between August 2 and mid-September he had made the same point in two letters to Eden. This was in addition to a Labour parliamentary committee visit, in mid-August, with Eden and his colleagues in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a government statement renouncing the use of force outside the UN.[12] There could, therefore, be hardly anything new in mid-September about Gaitskell's criticism of Eden's unwillingness to renounce the use of Anglo-French force. Furthermore there could be no doubt that Gaitskell spoke for the bulk of his party at this stage. Conservatives did not think otherwise; in fact, they argued that Gaitskell had changed his own position from early August in

[10] 557 *H.C. Deb.* 1616-17 (August 2, 1956).
[11] *Ibid.*, cols. 1658-59, 1666, 1671-72, 1713-14 (August 2, 1956).
[12] 558 *H.C. Deb.*, 18-20 (Sept. 12, 1956).

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order to fall in line with his party, and especially with the left-wing, which had been quicker than Gaitskell to criticize the government.

No matter how uncomplimentary the reasons Conservatives gave for Gaitskell's position, they had now to face the fact that the Labour party was opposed to what it regarded as a potential governmental foreign policy. The Labour leader made this explicit when he said that this was one of the circumstances in which the usual opposition restraint on an international issue was not in order. There was a difference of vital importance, and it was "the duty, not only the right, of the Opposition to speak out loudly and clearly."[13] This is exactly what Labour did in the Commons on September 12 and 13 as it rejected the policy which the Eden government undertook a month and a half later. Repeatedly Labour speakers stated their opposition to the use of force, and specifically to its use in "what would seem to be an engineered incident,"[14] outside Britain's UN obligations. Not only were they against the adoption of such a policy, but they indicated that if it were adopted they would refuse to support the government in carrying it out. This promised opposition, representing about half the nation, seemed to Labour yet another reason against military action. In Labour's eyes it appeared incredible that war could be contemplated with the support only of the majority party, and perhaps, as indicated in the September debate, not all of that.[15]

III. The Military Commitment

The Israeli-Egyptian hostilities which were to serve as justification for the British government's eventual military action were hardly the occasion for the establishment of bi-partisanship, and the opposition was not consulted before the Anglo-French decision to issue the twelve-hour ultimatum to Egypt on October 30. Labour leaders were told privately of the decision after it was made and only fifteen minutes before it was presented to the House of Commons.[16] In this circumstance, Gaitskell asked for time to think over Eden's announcement, although he raised almost immediately the question of what right British and French forces had to intervene before a UN pronounce-

[13] *Ibid.*, col. 16 (Sept. 12, 1956). [14] *Ibid.*, col. 139 (Sept. 12, 1956).

[15] Nor at this stage did military measures against Egypt have the support of a broad public. Only about one-third of the interviewees in a Gallup poll of late August favored military action if Egypt rejected the then current proposals for international control of the canal. (This poll result and other Gallup data subsequently cited in Table 1 are from the files of the British Institute of Public Opinion.)

[16] This report of the government's communication with the opposition was accepted by both parties. 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1351, 1373 (Oct. 30, 1956); 570 *H.C. Deb.* 533 (May 15, 1957).

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ment. In addition, he asked Eden that no further physical action be taken until either the Security Council reached a decision or the Commons had a chance to discuss the matter further. Eden said he could give no such undertaking,[17] thereby making it plain that Britain was already committed to military action unless Egypt peacefully accepted occupation.

Following this brief exchange, which took place late in the afternoon, there was a more extended evening debate on October 30—the first of several crisis debates. Gaitskell's criticism was now based on the grounds that Britain and France should not have acted independently just when the Israeli-Egyptian affair was being referred to the Security Council, that there was no legal justification for the proposed action, and that there had not been adequate consultation with the United States and the Commonwealth.[18] Since Eden refused again to defer action, Labour insisted on dividing the House by parliamentary vote. Despite a few deliberate abstentions and a generally lower-than-usual vote because of the division's unexpectedness, the result (270 to 218) showed conclusively that Britain was launching its military action against the express desires of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition.

Although the division also showed that the prime minister's own party supported his commitment, there is no evidence that Conservative MP's as a group took any part in making the particular decision. Indeed the question has often been raised as to how many of even the Conservative leaders were consulted before Eden's commitment to act with France. The most widely circulated, but documentarily unsubstantiated, story is that "a handful of men," smaller in number than the cabinet membership, were involved in the decision, and that the full cabinet was informed only when it was too late to reverse the joint Anglo-French commitment.[19] Any such handful of men would have had to include, besides the prime minister, the foreign secretary and the defence and service ministers. In addition, Harold Macmillan, then chancellor of the exchequer, is usually alleged to have been one of the inner group. In all such allegations, made by opponents of the Suez action, it is assumed that some cabinet members would have opposed the action if they had been consulted early enough. On the other hand, the Conservative leadership subsequently insisted that Eden had "the consistent and loyal support of all his colleagues in the Cabinet," and that his decisions were taken "with the full, complete and

[17] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1283 (Oct. 30, 1956).
[18] *Ibid.*, cols. 1344-51.
[19] Gaitskell repeated this version, 602 *H.C. Deb.* 56-57 (March 16, 1959).

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unanimous support of his Government."[20] Furthermore, one of the ministers frequently supposed to have been lukewarm about the venture later asserted that he had "unhesitantly supported the Government."[21] In public, at least, this was factually correct for all cabinet members.

The intriguing constitutional question of how many cabinet members, besides Eden, made the crucial commitment must be left to eventual historical investigation. It remains only to say that *if* an inner group made the decision, presenting it to the full cabinet at such a late date that opposing the decision would have required resignation or destruction of the government, the doctrine of "collective responsibility" would have been understood to mean that some cabinet members assumed responsibility for basic decisions whose making they had not even discussed.

IV. Conduct of the Opposition

Although an all-out attack on a war actually being waged had obvious political risks, Gaitskell's announcement of Labour policy, on October 31, contained no withdrawal from the promised thoroughgoing opposition: "I must now tell the Government and the country that we cannot support the action they have taken and that we shall feel bound by every constitutional means at our disposal to oppose it." He stressed the word "constitutional," and indicated that this ruled out attempts to dissuade anybody from carrying out government orders. But Labour would seek "through the influence of public opinion, to bring every pressure to bear upon the Government to withdraw from the impossible situation into which they have put us."[22]

There began the most intense parliamentary attack in recent British political history. During the whole of the next week, even on a Saturday, Eden and other ministers were forced to defend their policy against a barrage of shouted interruptions and angry rhetoric.

Disuniting the nation in the face of an enemy was a charge which Labour anticipated and tried to meet. That it was tragic for Britain to be divided was granted at the outset of military action, but Labour blamed the division on the Conservative government's deviation from the established British policy of adherence to the UN. Opposition leaders insisted that they were "as proud and anxious for our country"[23] as were the Conservatives, and that they too disapproved of Nasser. Clearly here the Labour party was on the defensive. Probably any opposition party in such circumstances would have to defend its patri-

[20] Prime Minister Macmillan, *ibid.*, col. 153; 570 *H.C. Deb.* 425 (May 15, 1957).
[21] R. A. Butler, 561 *H.C. Deb.* 1575 (Dec. 6, 1956).
[22] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1462 (Oct. 31, 1956). [23] 560 *H.C. Deb.* 36 (Nov. 6, 1956).

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otism, but the need to do so was especially sharp for British Labour because of its still recent struggle to become respectable in the eyes of marginal voters.[24] Labour as an unreliable custodian of the national interest was an image which the party had long sought to live down, and always against the Conservatives' identification of their own party with the nation. Now Labour critics were met with epithets like "every country but your own," "traitorous defeatist," "Nasser's little lackey," and "Nasser's party."[25] Conspicuous patriots among Conservative MP's, notably a holder of the Victoria Cross and a blinded veteran who was president of the British Legion, rose to protest the damage to troop morale caused by parliamentary opposition.[26]

In particular, Hugh Gaitskell's patriotism was strongly attacked with the accusation that he put his own political ambitions, both to unite his party and to defeat the government, ahead of the good of his country. His "hysterical" attack on the Suez operation was even contrasted unfavorably with the more philosophic critique of Aneurin Bevan,[27] formerly the figure used by Conservatives to frighten marginal voters. The virulence of the attack on Gaitskell is understandable. He was intensely involved in the particular issue, and his position as the still new parliamentary party leader could cause Conservatives to believe, correctly or not, that he had stepped out of his usual moderate role in order to appeal for the first time to his earlier left-wing opponents. Moreover Conservatives had probably expected something else of Gaitskell, perhaps on the basis of his original strong anti-Nasser speech in August and perhaps also on the basis of his middle-class, public school, and university background so similar to that of most Conservative MP's. Thus Gaitskell earned the special enmity reserved by Conservatives for traitors to their class and its traditions. But, even without this special feature, an opposition leader criticizing a war could expect to be presented to the public as the prime non-patriot and to have this image used against him for some years.

Another opposition difficulty that seems characteristic of such a situation concerns the availability of knowledge relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. There is always the possibility that an opposition, cut off from confidential government sources of military and diplomatic information, may present arguments which can subsequently be destroyed when the full facts are disclosed. Although the possibility exists

[24] As explained by W. Ivor Jennings, *Parliament*, Cambridge, Eng., 1957, pp. 179-80.
[25] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1562 (Oct. 31, 1956) and 1905 (Nov. 3, 1956); 560 *H.C. Deb.* 1370 (Nov. 19, 1956); 562 *H.C. Deb.* 1254 (Dec. 19, 1956).
[26] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1697-98 (Nov. 1, 1956); 560 *H.C. Deb.* 362 (Nov. 8, 1956).
[27] As by Macmillan, 561 *H.C. Deb.* 1471 (Dec. 6, 1956).

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in any political system, it is more likely in Britain than in the United States because non-ministerial MP's do not have the independent access to government information that American legislators enjoy through the committee system. Even the top foreign affairs leadership of the British opposition would have only as much confidential information as the executive leadership of the government was willing to impart. And this might be nil when bi-partisan consultation broke down, as it did prior to and during the Suez crisis. The political consequence could be substantial even though no actual disclosure of information to weaken the anti-Suez case were ever made. The possibility, real or not, was used by the government to try to strengthen its position during the crisis. There is Eden's broad hint on November 1: "We fully recognize the risks of the action we have taken, but in our full responsibility, with our full information, we believe it was the only action available to our two Governments."[28] More pointedly, at the end of the action itself, a cabinet defender of the Eden policy said that the decision had been made "in the full knowledge of all the considerations, a great many of which are not known to hon. Members opposite. . . ."[29]

Neither this factor nor any other difficulty seriously marred the unity of Labour's opposition to the Suez action. The degree of parliamentary party solidarity was impressive, and especially so when it is appreciated that Labour, like most parties, secures votes basically on domestic economic and social issues, and that there was nothing about Suez which could be assumed to rally working-class interests in automatic opposition. To be sure, the several intellectual traditions of the party were all squarely against military intervention. On this, pacifists, UN enthusiasts, and both liberal and socialist anti-imperialists could for once unite behind the party leadership. Furthermore the friends of the American alliance, like Gaitskell himself, joined the onslaught against British policy with the assurance that this time it was the Conservatives who disagreed with the United States. Only two sizable elements in the parliamentary Labour party could be suspected of wavering. One consisted of an indeterminate number of older non-intellectual trade unionists, conceived as responding in purely patriotic terms. But if they did so respond, they nevertheless adhered publicly to their party's position out of habits of loyalty typical of British unionists. Here, after all, was an apparent chance to bring down the government, and it ill-suited a loyal representative of the labor movement to spoil this opportunity. The second element of potential disaffection consisted of the 17 Labour MP's who were Jews, or at least of the several who

[28] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1653 (Nov. 1, 1956). [29] 560 *H.C. Deb.* 279 (Nov. 8, 1956).

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were active and devoted Zionists. In order to support the Labour critique, they had to distinguish between Israel's military action against Egypt, which they considered justified, and Britain's own action. This distinction they did make, after what looked like doubt and ambiguity during the first two days of the crisis.[30] In doing so, the Jewish MP's were supported not only by their own Labour-based convictions but also by the fact that most of the non-Jewish pro-Israel feeling was concentrated in Labour's intellectual ranks. At any rate, none of this group, nor any of the trade-unionists, deliberately abstained in the crucial divisions of November 1 and 8. In fact, there was only one deliberate Labour abstention on either of those dates, and that was the individual affair of Stanley Evans.[31] Aside from this case and an occasional Labour remark after the crisis, opposition MP's were remarkably united in public support of their leader's position that the Suez intervention was "an act of disastrous folly whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years."[32]

How effective was this virtually unanimous Labour opposition? The ultimate desire of parliamentary opposition—changing the government—obviously failed, and not from want of effort. After trying in the first few days to get Eden to change his policy, the opposition openly stated its desire to secure through the parliamentary process a new government and a new prime minister—presumably a coalition of some sort. This could be accomplished only by Conservative disaffection, and Labour openly appealed for help in this direction from those Conservatives known to have doubts about Eden's action. Here, in trying to overthrow the government, Labour was handicapped by the very partisanship its intense hostility had helped to create. Suez had already become a party issue when Gaitskell made his appeal to Conservative MP's. Furthermore, this appeal was first made while military action was still under way. However, the appeal was renewed after the cease-fire when Labour made its major effort to overthrow the Eden government on November 8. On that occasion, Labour's motion disapproving governmental policy was moderately worded and aimed particularly

[30] The fullest accounts of the difficulties of the Jewish MP's are in the *Jewish Chronicle* (London), Nov. 9, 1956, pp. 5, 8, 16, 23, and Nov. 23, 1956, p. 1.

[31] This lone Labour rebel abstained in the divisions of October 30 and November 1. Almost immediately his outraged constituency Labour party demanded and received his parliamentary resignation. *Midland Advertiser & Wednesbury Borough News*, Nov. 24, 1956, p. 1.

[32] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1454 (Oct. 31, 1956). Less firmly united in opposition were the five Liberal MP's, some of whom voted with the government on October 30, though the three Liberals actually voting on November 1 and all five on November 8 were in the opposition lobby.

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at the need to convene a Commonwealth conference. Speaking for the opposition and citing his own ample experience as a rebel, Aneurin Bevan asked Conservatives to choose between what he called the welfare of the country and the claims of party. He knew that it was never easy to part from colleagues, but now, he argued, was a time when the "solid façade of the party" should be broken.[33] This appeal failed. The number of open Conservative dissenters, as will be observed, was far too small for Labour's purpose.

Whether anything short of overthrow of the government was accomplished by Labour's intense parliamentary opposition is not easily settled. At the least, the debate was nerve-racking. This was not solely because the pitch of opposition attack was so high as to cause a suspension of the parliamentary sitting on one occasion and to lead one Labour woman MP to say that every Conservative member "can be branded as a murderer of every working-class boy who dies."[34] It was also because the parliamentary harassment of Eden was so prolonged. An important Conservative party leader went so far as to say that the strain which caused Eden to seek a Jamaica rest in late November had been "intensified by the personal and scurrilous attacks" of the opposition.[35] But even if this were true, and Labour thus contributed to the illness which in January caused Eden's resignation, it was hardly much of a parliamentary accomplishment. Its effect depended on the prime minister being ill to start with, and in any case it produced no immediate resignation and even subsequently its result was only the substitution of another prime minister (Macmillan) openly avowing support for Eden's action.

The one substantial possibility of opposition accomplishment lies in the controversial decision of the Eden government to cease hostilities in Egypt short of the desired object. At first, following the cease-fire, Labour leaders claimed a large share in forcing this decision. This was implied by Gaitskell, immediately after the decision, when he told a Labour-organized mass meeting that the cease-fire was "one of the greatest triumphs for democracy the world has ever known."[36] The credit was assigned to the protests of the British people, presumably stirred by the Labour opposition. More explicitly Gaitskell said a month later: "We have managed now to force the Government to cease fire."[37] And also in December 1956 Bevan asserted the same Labour belief in

[33] 560 *H.C. Deb.* 393 (Nov. 8, 1956).
[34] 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1625, 1745 (Nov. 1, 1956).
[35] *Daily Mirror*, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 2.
[36] *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 7, 1956, p. 12.
[37] 561 *H.C. Deb.* 1569 (Dec. 6, 1956).

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the efficacy of its opposition, although he went on to define this efficacy as making the government sensitive to United Nations demands.[38] Interestingly, however, even this reasoned claim for the opposition's role was not maintained by Labour in the years after Suez. This might have been either because belief in the parliamentary party's accomplishment was not, on sober afterthought, really convincing, or because it was simply unpopular to claim a part in stopping military action short of its goal. The Conservatives were only too willing to have Labour accept what they regarded as the blame, not the credit, for ending the Egyptian intervention. For the portion of the public which disliked the action chiefly on account of its failure, there was an obvious political potency in a "stab-in-the-back" legend. At any rate, in Gaitskell's 1959 restatement of his case against the Suez action he argued that, even if Labour had accepted the Conservative policy, the action could not have succeeded in the face of the inevitable reactions of the United States, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union.[39]

In the absence of a consistent Labour claim and, more importantly, of an official government admission of the evident change in policy, there can be no certainty about the effectiveness of the parliamentary opposition. Thus Sir Ivor Jennings, in the latest revision of his authoritative *Cabinet Government*, grants that the Suez case is a "more complicated and controversial" example than three other instances he cites of the principle that even a government with a large majority cannot neglect the feeling of the Commons.[40] The chief complication was that opposition pressure against continuing the Suez action coincided with United Nations resolutions, certain important Commonwealth reactions, Russian threats, international weakening of the pound sterling, and intense American efforts involving oil and dollars as well as moral suasion. Perhaps there was a consequential interaction: Labour's opposition encouraging outside pressures, and the latter strengthening Labour's case. Furthermore it is conceivable that the government, with a more united country behind it, would have had the nerve to face the consequences of continued defiance of outside opinion, especially since those consequences would have involved both military perils and prolonged economic sacrifices difficult to require of an openly divided nation.

With, however, so early an end to hostilities, the Conservative government, in succeeding years, had merely to defend itself against the attempt to exploit an already settled issue. Opposition opportunities

[38] 562 *H.C. Deb.* 1400 (Dec. 19, 1956). [39] 602 *H.C. Deb.* 55 (March 16, 1959).
[40] W. Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government*, Cambridge, Eng., 1959, pp. 478-80.

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were provided by the several steps necessary in the aftermath of military action, ranging from actual withdrawal of troops to the Anglo-Egyptian financial settlement of 1959. On such occasions, Labour raised, in particular, the vexed question of whether there had been Anglo-French collusion with Israel, or at least foreknowledge, concealed from the United States, of Israel's attack. In pressing for an answer to the collusion charge, the opposition regularly asked for a committee of inquiry, but there was no way for Labour to force such an inquiry on an unwilling government. All that could be done was to suggest that the truth could not be known without an inquiry and that, in refusing it, the Conservative leaders (notably Eden's successor, Macmillan) were concealing their own discreditable roles. As Gaitskell said, rather melodramatically for the 1959 Commons, "I believe that the guilty men are sitting on those benches. It is time that they were brought to trial."[41] But with the passage of time and the understandable desire of all but deeply committed partisans to consign the Suez fiasco to the past, there was little political capital to be made of the promise of an inquiry after a Labour election victory. The opposition's campaign against Suez simply dwindled away.

V. Conservative Party Support

The crucial political fact about the Suez crisis was the support of the government by Conservative MP's, including some who never wanted to go into Egypt and some who never wanted to come out. The nearly solid party voting meant that the parliamentary system did not operate in the classical nineteenth-century manner to defeat the government on grounds of either the Suez action or its failure. Yet here, if on any occasion, MP's might have been expected to break with their governmental leadership. Conservatives with anti-Suez convictions did certainly exist. Sir Lionel Heald's mid-September opposition to non-UN force was always assumed to represent from 25 to 40 Conservative MP's, whose views would not likely have been changed by the circumstances of the Israeli-Egyptian hostilities.

In this light, the paucity of open Conservative criticism is noteworthy. While hostilities were actually under way, only one Conservative MP indicated his opposition on the floor of the House, and he did so, not by his voting behavior, but by a bizarre question put to the speaker as to whether it would be "right and patriotic" to try to bring

[41] 602 *H.C. Deb.* 58 (March 16, 1959).

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the government down.[42] Otherwise, despite at least one heart-searching type of parliamentary speech, anti-Suez Conservatives were publicly inconspicuous during the seven days of military action. The party's normal majority did not suffer from abstentions in the censure vote of November 1. Nor was any critical blow struck by the two resignations from the government. These, by a minister of state for foreign affairs and by the Treasury's economic secretary, were announced as hostilities were ending.[43] Neither, though they involved important conscientious objections to Suez, seemed calculated to stop the military action or to start a group effort to overthrow the government. Similarly, even after the cease-fire, when on November 8 there were two Conservative anti-Suez speeches[44] and eight deliberate abstentions, the dissenters made no concerted effort to destroy the government. On the contrary, the number of open rebels was far too few even for psychological import. The fact that so many of the estimated 25 to 40 anti-Suez Conservatives adhered to the party line was bound to reduce the impact of the eight who abstained. The occasion amounted only to a display of especially strong personal feelings on the part of a few. It is doubtful that any of the dissenting Conservatives, including the abstainers themselves, really wanted to help Labour defeat the government. To do so would have required not only more than eight recruits, but also voting in the Labour lobby instead of simply abstaining—given the government's normal majority of 60.

Explaining why no serious Conservative rebellion took place reveals a good deal about the British party system. To start with, however, the bulk of Conservative MP's, not just the old 1954 Suez group, must be assumed to have supported Eden from conviction, even if with varying degrees of enthusiasm. No one questions the minority status of the anti-Suez Conservatives, although their number has sometimes been put as high as 50 or 60 rather than from 25 to 40. And this particular minority, because it was heavily liberal intellectual in character, was removed from the main imperial traditions of the Conservative party, particularly in the constituency organizations. Open rebellion would have been by a minority likely to remain so within the party. Moreover, the anti-Suez Conservatives had no popular leader with a large potential following in the party or in the country. Both resigning ministers were too junior for this role, and none of the older ex-minis-

[42] This was again William Yates, the government's most persistent Conservative critic. 558 *H.C. Deb.* 1716-17 (Nov. 1, 1956).

[43] For these resignations, by Anthony Nutting and Sir Edward Boyle, see the *Times* (London), Nov. 5, 1956, p. 4, and Nov. 9, 1956, p. 10.

[44] 560 *H.C. Deb.* 322-24, 369-70 (Nov. 8, 1956).

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ters critical of Suez was a major figure. In any case, none of these elder statesmen actually joined in the November 8 display.[45]

Launching a rebellion had other problems, too. The most general was the difficulty of publicly breaking with the principle of loyalty to one's leadership. This principle, characteristic of both major British parties, is plainly paramount in the Conservative code of public political behavior. Of course, it was reinforced during the seven days of military hostilities by a special argument against "letting the side down." Afterward too there was pressure, psychological as well as institutional, against deviant behavior which would help, if not Nasser, at least the socialist enemy within the gates. The fact that this enemy had openly appealed for Conservative rebel support, in a national broadcast by Gaitskell as well as in parliamentary speeches, made deviation even harder. It was not simply a matter of the anti-Suez Conservative alienating his parliamentary whips and his colleagues in the parliamentary party club. The deviating MP would also have to face the wrath of his Conservative constituency association, surely pro-Suez and in a position, through control of party candidate selection, to react meaningfully against an MP disloyal to the cause.[46] To make matters still more difficult, any open criticism of the Suez action was likely to imply that Eden's reasons for military intervention were false or hypocritical. To rank-and-file Conservatives, this would seem disloyalty with a vengeance.

That Conservative parliamentary lines so generally held is not, then, very mysterious. What is harder to get at are answers to questions about the effectiveness of any non-public pressure exerted by anti-Suez Conservatives. Despite the obvious failure to prevent Eden from taking action in the first place, the possibility remains that privately expressed back-bench opinion contributed to the government's cease-fire decision. Of course, there is no evidence from government sources of such successful pressure. More significantly, no claim for this kind of influence

[45] The "Political Diary" of an anti-Suez paper commented: "The few who have already rebelled feel a good deal of bitterness towards those elder statesmen—those incorruptible ancients—who egged them on and then retired from the fray.

" 'My boy,' they said in effect, 'I wish I could accompany you on your great adventure, but the truth is I shall do much more for the cause by keeping a watch on things at home. So over the top and good luck to you.' Then, with tears in their eyes—'Poor chap, I knew his father'—they quietly disappeared from the scene." *Observer*, Nov. 18, 1956, p. 9.

[46] This is exactly what constituency associations did do in relation to the eight Conservative MP's who actually deviated. At least four lost their seats, either through immediate resignation under pressure or through subsequent association reactions flowing from the Suez crisis. I have tried to deal with the significance of all these rebel cases, including the one Labour instance, in a separate study.

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has ever been made by any of the anti-Suez Conservatives, either in public or, I may add, in the private conversations seven of the known dissenters had with me. Yet there is a widely circulated story, published in a sensational journalist account and repeated in a scholarly work, that it was the threat by 40 back-bench MP's to vote against the government which caused Eden to halt the Suez attack.[47] This statement, while not necessarily incorrect, goes beyond the hard evidence on two counts. First, there is no record of anything so definite as a group threat of this sort, even though it is generally thought that the anti-Suez MP's did meet privately during the crisis and that some sent letters to the prime minister. This was in addition to criticism and doubt expressed at the usual party committee meetings, so that in one way or another the whips and the government were made aware of discontent in their ranks. But none of this necessarily amounted to a group threat. Secondly, even if there was such a threat, there is no proof that it affected government action. There is some suggestion to the contrary in the fact that eight assumed members of the group made their public demonstration of opposition on November 8, after the cease-fire. If they had been responsible for changing government policy through private pressure, it would not have been sensible immediately afterward to refrain from supporting the government.

There is one other important aspect of Conservative parliamentary behavior over Suez which should be described. That is the maintenance of governmental support after the crisis and during the period when Britain withdrew its troops (December 1956) from the canal zone and then agreed (May 1957) to use the canal on Egyptian terms. Naturally the anti-Suez Conservatives were content with these measures, both of which meant retreat from the Suez action's apparent goal. Now the government was straining the loyalties of its most intense pro-Suez supporters—roughly the group, also numbering at least from 25 to 40 MP's, who had opposed the 1954 evacuation agreement. For them there was no attraction in the government's face-saving claim that Britain had stopped a local war and caused the UN to intervene. What they had wanted was for British troops to finish the job of occupying the canal zone. However, the pro-Suez Conservatives could hardly

[47] The journalist account is by Merry and Serge Bromberger, *Secrets of Suez* (tr. from the French by James Cameron, London, 1957, p. 147), where it is alleged that R. A. Butler led the rebellion by threatening to resign with seven other ministers unless hostilities were stopped. The Bromberger statement that 40 Conservative MP's were behind such a rebellion is given as a fact, with *Secrets of Suez* cited as authority, by Peter G. Richards, a British political scientist, in *Honourable Members*, London, 1959, p. 249.

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serve this principle by parliamentary behavior designed to destroy the government. Not only were they, like the anti-Suez Conservatives of the crisis period, subject to the usual pressures of party loyalty, but even on the particular issue their interest could not lie in helping Labour to power. Consequently the pro-Suez Conservatives could be expected, once their private efforts to rally the majority of the parliamentary party against withdrawal had failed, to do no more than demonstrate their disagreement by abstention. As one of their leaders said, "I admit that it is a clumsy way and I say straight away that if I thought that by my abstention there was any chance of putting the party opposite in power, I should no more think of abstaining than I should think of singing a song instead of making a speech in this House."[48] On this basis, 15 Conservatives abstained over the troop-withdrawal in December, and, as another of them explained, this was calculated to be about the right number to display their seriousness of feeling without doing any real damage to the government.[49] How deliberately the number was calculated by the rebels is uncertain, since the persuasion of the whips might also have been responsible for keeping the total abstentions well below the supposed pro-Suez maximum of 40. The government had special cause, when Prime Minister Eden was resting in Jamaica and when its popularity for this and other reasons was shaky, to present as nearly united a front as possible.

Similarly in May 1957, when the still new government of Prime Minister Macmillan had to present its proposal for renewed British use of the canal, there were undoubtedly efforts to keep down the number of abstainers although there was no chance of the pro-Suez rebels causing the government's fall. They only wanted to press for what they called a stronger line in foreign policy. For this cause, 14 abstained and eight of these MP's took the slightly more drastic, but equally futile, step of resigning the government whip to sit as Independent Conservatives.[50] Aside from looking a little foolish, especially since all the independents who remained in parliament drifted back to the Conservative fold in little more than a year, the rebels here took no great risk. Their local associations, unlike those of the anti-Suez Conservatives, sympathized with their position, and even Prime Minister Macmillan's tolerance could have been predicted, since his original pro-Suez views gave him close ties with the rebels. The important political consideration, in any event, was that a rebellion should be so limited

[48] 561 *H.C. Deb.* 1302 (Dec. 5, 1956).
[49] William Teeling, quoted in *Evening Argus* (Brighton), Dec. 7, 1956, p. 7.
[50] *Times* (London), May 14, 1957, p. 10, and May 16, 1957, p. 12.

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in numbers as to leave the government securely in office. By May 1957 this was nearly a sure thing despite the humiliation which many Conservative MP's, not only the Suez extremists, felt over British acceptance of Nasser's terms. Almost all could be expected to vote on the basis of the alternatives presented by the final appeal of the prime minister: "whether the prestige and economic interests of Britain are better entrusted to a Socialist or to a Conservative Administration."[51]

VI. Non-Parliamentary Partisan Conflict

Exclusive concern with the parliamentary conflict over Suez would be misleading. The conflict was certainly extended to the general public, and in a way this was potentially the most serious feature of the party division over Suez. The opposition, without the parliamentary forces to bring down the government, tried to rally outside opinion either to accomplish its immediate object or, more feasibly, to lessen the government's popularity for some future electoral occasion. The parliamentary debates themselves were related to such purposes, and there were opposition broadcasts answering Eden's. Also the Labour party, together with the Trades Union Congress (which ruled out any general strike action), organized a "Law, Not War" campaign including mass meetings throughout the country. Most notable among these demonstrations against continued military action was a Sunday afternoon meeting in Trafalgar Square, attended by 30,000. At the very least, Labour rallied much of its own organized following in the constituency parties. Indeed the zeal of the latter, like that of the local Conservative associations on the other side, seemed to exceed even that of the parliamentary leadership. This was shown by the intense reaction of the local units to any signs of defection by their MP's.

Rank-and-file zeal of active party members is understandable. They were amateur volunteers, and therefore more purely interested than career politicians in party principle. And the Suez issue touched the ideological nerve-center, if not the economic interests, of each party. Devoted socialists, always suspicious of any cause requiring military force, were outraged by Eden's action. Devoted Conservatives, nurtured on imperialist and nationalist virtues, believed that patriotic duty compelled support for the government's cause. Exceptions there were, but not many at the hard core of each party's militants.

The press tended to carry this partisan difference further into the community. Even when British newspapers are not formally committed to a given party, they usually have a pronounced bias which,

[51] 570 *H.C. Deb.* 698 (May 16, 1957).

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unlike most of the American press, is revealed in news stories as well as editorials and so can be more consequential. On the Suez issue the seven national morning papers of mass-circulation, including the semi-quality *Daily Telegraph*, were split almost evenly, and in accord with usual party preferences. Four papers usually sympathetic to the Conservative cause, with a combined circulation of 8,313,357, were pro-Suez; and the other three (one Liberal and two Labour), with a combined circulation of 7,745,131, were anti-Suez. Roughly the same division existed among mass-circulation London Sunday papers, but tipped in circulation figures to the anti-Suez side. The London evening papers and the larger provincial dailies were less evenly divided, being more pro- than anti-Suez. But again the division was on regular party lines. The national quality press, with the *Times'* position ambiguous, was also divided by a kind of party preference, although Labour had no quality paper. In this field the Conservative *Sunday Times* was pro-Suez, but both the liberal independents, the (Sunday) *Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian*, were vigorously anti-Suez. Similarly the important quality weekly, the *Economist*, was anti-Suez. The appearance was of more independent intellectual support for the Labour than the Conservative position. Otherwise there was no important exception to the party character of the press's division. This, as in the cases of the parties themselves, made for two entirely divergent presentations, especially in the popular papers, where even the headlines were used for pro- or anti-Suez purposes. The *Daily Mirror*, largest in daily circulation, regularly called the military action "Eden's War," and campaigned with the other Labour and liberal papers for the prime minister's removal. On the other side, and next in total circulation, Beaverbrook's *Daily Express* took the lead in presenting the Suez intervention in the most favorable patriotic light.[52]

Besides the press, much of the rest of the articulate community took sides, although opinions cannot be readily identified with party preferences. Churchmen were conspicuous in expressing their views—more often, it appeared, against rather than for the action. University dons signed petitions, again apparently more often against than for. Other citizens, some more notable and some less, also took public positions through letters to newspaper editors. The letter columns, incidentally, were popular outlets for Suez opinions not only in the quality

[52] This summary of press opinion is drawn from a study of editorials appearing during the Suez crisis in all of the national daily and Sunday papers, in the important weeklies, and in provincial papers with circulations over 200,000, plus the few provincial quality papers with smaller circulations.

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press but in papers of all sorts, including local weeklies. The published record of the outpouring of popular feeling is thus extraordinarily full, and it gives a better indication than anything else of both the extent and the intensity of the division of the general public.

Measurement of the extent of this division, including that of the inarticulate public, is provided by the Gallup polls whose results are summarized in Table 1. Most striking is that less than half of all

TABLE 1

POLL RESULTS FROM THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION
(in per cent)

(1) AGREE WITH THE WAY EDEN HAS HANDLED MIDDLE EAST SITUATION:

	Interviewing dates		
Voting intention	*Nov. 1-2 1956*	*Nov. 10-11 1956*	*Dec. 1-2 1956*
All	40	53	51
Conservative	76	89	85
Labour	16	20	19
Liberal	25	46	46
Don't know	27	50	39

(2) RIGHT TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION IN EGYPT:

	Interviewing dates		
Voting intention	*Nov. 1-2 1956*	*Dec. 1-2 1956*	*Sept. 27-Oct. 1 1957*
All	37	49	48
Conservative	68	81	79
Labour	16	22	30
Liberal	24	30	40
Don't know	23	43	33

voters regularly followed the government, and that the division here too corresponded heavily with party, especially in the case of Conservative voters.[53] Among those intending to vote Conservative, support for the Suez action was overwhelming, but, particularly while the action was going on, the remainder of the voting public disapproved by a large margin. Yet it is also worth noting that in this sector, notably

[53] The high degree of coincidence between party voting and foreign policy views may be compared with American findings concerning this relationship. George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XV (Winter 1951-1952), pp. 601-23; Warren E. Miller, "The Socio-Economic Analysis of Political Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, II (August 1958), pp. 239-55.

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among Labour voters, the action was less unpopular after it was over (especially when it had been over for almost a year). This change, while not altering the essentially partisan character of the division, does conform to the belief of many Conservative leaders that their military intervention had a good deal more potential support in the working-class than the Labour party's anti-Suez solidarity indicated. This much Labour leaders were willing to grant after the event, explaining the break in the ranks of their followers as either emotional patriotism or, more specifically, a residue of the British soldier's contempt, during World War II, for Egyptians.

In the end then, while the opposition's campaign did exhibit a sharply divided country, Labour gained no popular strength as a result of the Suez crisis. Indeed, Labour appears actually to have lost popularity during this period. In a Gallup poll taken on November 10-11, 1956, just after the cease-fire, the Conservatives went ahead of Labour in percentage of voting intentions for the first time in a year.[54] There was no evidence here of success in the effort to force out the government on a wave of popular protest. Nor was any such evidence really to be found in the over-all record of by-elections. True, the Conservatives did lose one seat in February 1957, and others later, but in circumstances making the results difficult to compare with the 1955 general election. Meaningful calculations can be made only for those by-elections where number and party of candidates correspond with those in the same constituency in 1955. The results, when calculated for all such cases between the previous general election and June 1958, show no pronouncedly greater general swing against the Conservatives after Suez than the already large one existing in the several months before Suez.

VII. Conclusion

Some of the general implications of Britain's Suez experience in the conduct of a partisan foreign policy are not entirely certain, as pointed out, because of the absence of crucial facts and because of the inevitably special features of this or any particular crisis. However, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn.

First, it is plain that the Suez commitment was an executive decision made without the prior approval, formal or informal, of parliament. It may even have been a personal decision of Eden in consultation only with his closest advisers rather than with the cabinet as a whole. At any rate, before the commitment there was no consultation with the

[54] *News-Chronicle* (London), Nov. 15, 1956, p. 4.

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opposition, and no apparent enlistment of support from even the minority of Conservative MP's who had also indicated an earlier disapproval of the type of action now to be undertaken. Constitutionally this absence of prior legislative participation in decision-making does not violate British norms, as it might American, but politically it would seem an aberration for an executive to commit a democratic nation to war without learning the extent to which the country was prepared to support the commitment; or, knowing this support to be that of a bare majority, nevertheless to go ahead. This is not the foreign policy-making model ordinarily thought to prevail in modern Western democracies, although the critics of this working model, like Walter Lippmann,[55] would seem to prefer the unfettered executive discretion of responsible leadership.

Secondly, Eden's commitment, after being made so purely as an executive matter and in defiance of partisan opposition, did receive the crucial minimum of parliamentary support. The government was not defeated in the Commons. Furthermore, neither Labour's open opposition nor private dissident Conservative action has been established as the decisive cause of the later policy reversal. It cannot be said with any certainty that Eden's policy failed because of its but partial support by the political community and the general public. In fact, it was the very partisan nature of the division of opinion which sustained the government, and kept Conservative MP's who disliked Eden's action from trying to defeat their leadership. To do so would have risked either a general election, probably bringing Labour to power on its own, or some kind of coalition dominated by Labour. In such circumstances, there was not even any precedent for substantial revolt in the famous action of the rebels against the Chamberlain government in 1940.[56] Then, when over 40 Conservatives voted against their party leadership and many others abstained, not only was the normal Conservative majority so large that enough remained to prevent a technical defeat, but the admittedly severe blow at the government's prestige could not, given the wartime political truce, cause a general election or even anything beyond the reconstitution of the government as a coalition under different Conservative leadership and with minority representation for the opposition parties. The Suez crisis, on the other hand, involved the more usual political demands for loyalty, now perhaps stronger anyway than in 1940, and the Conservative party, like

[55] *The Public Philosophy*, Boston, 1955.

[56] *Times* (London), May 9, 1940, p. 6, and May 10, 1940, p. 6; 360 *H.C. Deb.* 1361-66 (May 8, 1940).

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the Labour opposition, remained cohesive in the accepted British political manner.

Thirdly, this partisan solidarity, making possible a partisan foreign policy, seems a nearly unique British feature. Other nations with less cohesive major parties might be ill-equipped to maintain such a policy. Even the United States, although its foreign policy is largely in the hands of an executive whose tenure does not require continuous legislative approval, would face a serious problem in trying to manage a partisan policy supported only by a single, American-style, uncohesive party. At some point the support of Congress would be needed and this might not be so nearly automatic as British party loyalty makes parliamentary approval.[57] In this respect, the American president may be more in need of prior political support for his actions than a British prime minister, and so be more "responsible" to public opinion. Responsibility to parliament means little if the majority always feels politically compelled to support decisions even when made solely by the executive.

Fourthly, Labour's experience in attacking the Suez action indicates that there can be more political disadvantages than advantages in a partisan opposition to government foreign policy, even to one which fails. The government was not brought down during the crisis, and its public credit did not appear to have been damaged in the long run. Opposition was handicapped by its unpatriotic appearance during military hostilities, and even afterward Labour was troubled by the charge that it had caused Britain's withdrawal—although no such accomplishment could be established and Labour ceased to claim it.

Finally, then, there is only the speculative possibility that the partisan opposition, supported by a large portion of independent "informed opinion," could have prevented the successful conduct of a considerably longer, more expensive war than Britain's seven days in Egypt. For instance, could several months of Suez action, inevitably involving British hardships from an oil shortage at least, have been sustained by almost purely Conservative support? To that question, perhaps the most intriguing of all in this analysis of a partisan foreign policy, the 1956 crisis supplies no answer.

[57] This seems close to Max Beloff's view of the relative influence of the American legislature. *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, Baltimore, Md., 1955.

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IMAGES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HELD BY JAMAICAN ELITE GROUPS*

By WENDELL BELL

REFLECTING the general concern about international relations felt in this country, social scientists have written a great deal recently about the images of Americans and of the United States which are held by foreigners. It is generally agreed that the attitudes of foreigners toward us are important factors in the success or failure of American foreign policy in the struggle against the threat of world communism. The quantity of material which is now available is drawn from diverse sources, including the informed judgments of experts, content analyses of newspapers, opinions of foreigners who are studying in the United States, polls of students and of the general populations of foreign countries, and interviews with political and other leaders in various countries.[1]

However, with a few exceptions, such as the excellent work being done at MIT's Center for International Studies by Ithiel de Sola Pool, Harold Isaacs, and others, most of the current studies of the foreign

* This is a revised version of a paper read at the annual meeting of the Pacific Sociological Society held in San Francisco in April 1959. I wish to thank the Social Science Research Council for a Faculty Research Fellowship which permitted the study of Jamaican elites of which this paper was a part. My thanks also to the Graduate School, Northwestern University; the Research Committee, University of California, Los Angeles; the Penrose Fund, American Philosophical Society; and the Research Institute for the Study of Man for grants-in-aid of the larger study. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the staff of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies; the use of the facilities of the Western Data Processing Center, UCLA; and the research assistance of Lora-Lee Bell, who performed the coding and tabulating of the questionnaire responses. I am indebted to Ralph L. Beals, Dwaine Marvick, and Richard C. Snyder for the comments which they made on an earlier version of this article.

[1] For example, see Ralph L. Beals, "The Mexican Student Views the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 295 (September 1954), pp. 108-15; William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril *et al., How Nations See Each Other*, Urbana, Ill., 1953; H. Paul Castleberry, "The Arabs' View of Postwar American Foreign Policy," *Western Political Science Quarterly*, XII (March 1959), pp. 9-36; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, especially ch. X, pp. 353-97; William H. Sewell, Richard T. Morris, and Oluf M. Davidsen, "Scandinavian Students' Images of the United States: A Study in Cross-cultural Education," *Annals, loc.cit.*, pp. 126-35; S. Walter Washington, "A Study of the Causes of Hostility Toward the United States in Latin America: Brazil," Department of State: External Research Paper No. 126, February 24, 1956; see also Washington's reports on Chile and Argentina, External Research Papers Nos. 126.1 and 126.2, respectively.

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views of America and Russia are not based upon systematic samplings of the opinions of *currently active elites in underdeveloped countries.* This is true despite the fact that the elites have an influence in their respective countries far exceeding their numbers and despite the real possibility that the underdeveloped nations are or will become the major arenas of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to overstress the importance of the elites in any society. They hold the power and make the decisions—whether they are representative or unrepresentative, responsible or irresponsible.[2] Their beliefs about and attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union may be crucial in determining the nature and extent of the commitments that their countries will make either to the non-Communist or to the Communist centers of power.

The significance of the underdeveloped countries for the relative world influence of America and Russia is indicated by these figures: in 1950, 54 per cent of the world's land area, 63 per cent of the world's population, and 70 per cent of the world's national political entities were contained in underdeveloped areas.[3] These countries which are emerging from traditional ways and from political and economic dependence are, like new consumers on the market, shopping around for the best buy, for the best model to use in shaping their emerging political and economic institutions. Whether they will choose some modification of Western democracy or of Russian communism—or whether they will have any choice at all—will depend on many factors, but large among these factors will be the opinions of their national leaders.

The purpose of this article is to describe the images of the United States and the Soviet Union which are held by the elite groups of an underdeveloped country and to explain some of the variation in responses in terms of the social positions occupied by the elites in question. The country studied was Jamaica, the largest member-state of the newly formed West Indies Federation.

I. Jamaica as an Underdeveloped Country

Jamaica is not ideally suited for a study of the opinions of elites in an underdeveloped country. Unlike many underdeveloped countries, Jamaica's indigenous inhabitants, the Arawaks, contributed nothing to its present population, the island is close to American shores, its people

[2] Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites*, Stanford, Calif., 1952.

[3] Lyle W. Shannon, ed., *Underdeveloped Areas*, New York, 1957, p. 11.

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speak English, it has a tradition of representative government, and it is frequently visited by American tourists.[4]

However, in other respects it fills the role very well. Its economy is predominantly agricultural, it suffers from chronic unemployment and widespread poverty, its land is often wasted or poorly utilized, it has a growing population, it lacks capital, it has relatively low per capita productivity, its people are dark-skinned (about 98 per cent non-white), it is in the final stages of transition from colonial to self-governing status, it is striving for economic advancement with some success, it contains a considerable proportion of illiterates (over 29 per cent of the population over age 5), its people are poorly educated (about 97 per cent have received only elementary schooling or less), and in style of living its elites are remote from the great mass of Jamaicans.[5] Thus, in many respects Jamaica is similar to other underdeveloped countries, and the findings of this study may suggest the opinions of the USA and the USSR held by the elites in other such countries.

II. Basic Data

The data reported in this article were collected during 1958. Questionnaires were mailed to a sample of 810 persons who occupy positions of prominence or power in Jamaican society. A random sample was selected from *Who's Who, Jamaica, 1957*,[6] but this sample was supplemented by additional names taken from the King's House Invitation List, which is a ranking of persons in Jamaica according to their official status, be they elected politicians, civil servants, religious leaders, bank officials, foreign trade commissioners, or whatever. Other lists, such as the Civil Service Seniority List and the List of Members of the House of Representatives, were also used to check the up-to-dateness of the Invitation List, but the latter was the basic frame of reference for the supplementary sample. Thus, the local *Who's Who* and official protocol were used to define operationally the "Jamaican elites," and to provide a point of entry into the power structure of Jamaican society.

A comparison of the sample with the responses to a question on the questionnaire which asked for the names of the ten most influential persons on the entire island indicates that practically all of the most

[4] W. A. Cover, *The Handbook of Jamaica*, Kingston, Jamaica, Government Printing Office, 1957; and George W. Roberts, *The Population of Jamaica*, Cambridge, Eng., 1957, p. 29.

[5] Roberts, *op.cit.*; and *The Economic Development of Jamaica*, Report by a Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Baltimore, Md., 1952.

[6] Clifton Neita, ed., *Who's Who, Jamaica, 1957*, Kingston, Jamaica, 1957.

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influential people on the island (as determined by respondent nominations) were included in the sample and thus were sent questionnaires. However, a few members of the second-echelon elite groups, and more of the third, may not have had a chance to be included in the sample either because they were not on the King's House Invitation List, because they had not filled out their forms for *Who's Who, Jamaica* (top-ranked persons were included in *Who's Who* whether or not they filled out their forms), or because of errors in putting together *Who's Who* (some of these were errors in the publishing process, since a handful of persons did not get in *Who's Who* even though copy had been prepared for them which was to be included).

As far as I was able to determine, seven persons out of the total sample of 810 had died, were critically ill, or had left the island permanently. Thus there were 803 qualified potential respondents. Of these, 238 returned questionnaires which were properly filled out—a response rate of 30 per cent.[7]

The questionnaires were mailed between May 27 and June 1, 1958. The first returns began coming in by May 31, and, after one follow-up letter, a second wave of questionnaires, and a final follow-up of personal telegrams, the last questionnaire to be returned was in by December 22. However, all but five of the 238 respondents returned their questionnaires before October 25, 1958.

The response rate is lower than one would desire, but the major types of elites are represented and the attempt to sample systematically was at least a partial success. Thus, the findings are important and useful additions to our present knowledge of the attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union held by leaders in underdeveloped countries, since such knowledge is generally based upon more impressionistic or more limited data than the data reported here. The distribution of respondents by type of elite position is shown in Table 1.[8]

[7] A detailed discussion of the probable biases in the sample of returned questionnaires and an empirical comparison of the sample with the universe from which it was drawn with respect to selected social characteristics will be available in a methodological appendix in Wendell Bell, *Jamaican Elites: A Study of Political Change, Leadership, and Social Mobility*, forthcoming research monograph.

[8] The respondents, of course, often have more than one type of status, but in Table 1 each individual has been counted just once. Elected politicians and nominated officials, for example, may in fact be businessmen, teachers, ministers, doctors, or barristers as well, but they have been classified in Table 1 only by their status as members of the political elites. This is also true of civil servants. Members of the non-political elites are classified according to their major activity. Thus if a person is primarily a businessman, he is classified among the business elite even though he is also a solicitor. Of course, the number of overlapping elite positions is an important datum in its own right and is subjected to analysis in work which is now in progress.

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TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF ELITE POSITION

Type of Elite Position		*Number of Cases*
Political elites		101
Elected politicians	20	
Nominated officials	13	
Civil servants	68	
Business elites		72
Labor leaders		2
Ministers		10
Teachers		15
Magistrates		3
Doctors (and top hospital personnel)		23
Barristers and solicitors		8
Others		4
	Total	238

III. THE FINDINGS

Which side are they on? The Jamaican elites overwhelmingly favor the United States over the Soviet Union as an actor on the world scene. This can be seen from their responses to the question: "As you understand the general positions taken by the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to the world situation, which do you feel has been morally right more often in recent years?"

The Soviet Union has been right more often	1%
Both about the same	16
The United States has been right more often	83
Total	100%
Number of cases	(227)
No answers	(11)

Of the 188 Jamaican leaders who feel that the United States has been morally right more often than has the Soviet Union, 47 per cent emphasize a love for the principles of democracy, 32 per cent a fear and hatred of Soviet methods, and 22 per cent a suspicion of Soviet motives.[9] This was determined from an analysis of the respondents' replies to an open-ended question which asked them to explain their answers to the above check-question.

[9] Since a respondent may give more than one reason, the total of the percentages may exceed 100 per cent. However, each reason given by the respondents was classified just once.

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Those respondents classified as emphasizing a love for the principles of democracy specifically mentioned the maintenance of public liberties and representative government within the United States and the lack of it within the Soviet Union; or they mentioned the United States' democratic ways contrasted with the undemocratic ways of the Soviet Union as a participant in the world community of nations. With respect to democracy they said:

> The USA recognizes as a policy the freedom of the individual to do what he thinks that he ought to do, and the USSR's policy is just to the contrary in that persons must do only what suits the political party in power.
>
> What the USA and democracy stand for is the only right answer. The code of ethics of the USSR is completely removed from our way of thinking.
>
> The USA is one of the champions of the rights of the individual.
>
> The United Nations more or less expresses the essence of world opinion, and USA decisions have been more in accord with United Nations findings.
>
> The USA is a democracy; the USSR is a dictatorship. The USA's views represent the will of the people more than the USSR's views.
>
> The USA allows free expression of the views and ideas of people.
>
> The people can't be wrong as often as a ruling few can.
>
> The USA is for freedom of speech, religion, and politics, and is against enslavement of weaker and smaller nations.
>
> Don't be silly, we do not wish to be slaves again.

This is not to say that there are no "except for's" or "in spite of's." There are. Our domestic racial prejudice is seen as a blemish on American democracy, and the picture of the United States as dealing with other countries democratically is considered to be marred by our stubbornness in refusing to recognize Red China.

A second set of responses seems enough different from the set on democracy to warrant a separate category. These responses refer specifically to the lack of humanity of Soviet methods when compared with those of the United States. They differ from the above replies in that they invoke general humanitarian or moral principles rather than specifically democratic ones and they refer to means or methods of exercising control. Disapproval of Soviet methods at home and abroad felt by the respondents was expressed in the following statements:

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The USSR's blood purges of individuals who voice any form of disagreement could not happen in the USA.

The Soviet Union has resorted to violence and executions in order to maintain its point of view in other countries.

Brain-washing is immoral.

The USSR feels that its way of life is the only way, and it uses all means to enforce that way whether people wish it or not.

The Soviet Union has been more coldly calculating, accepting the view that any behavior vis-à-vis capitalist states is justified.

Soviet methods are based on expediency rather than on moral standards.

It is interesting to note in passing that 20 of the respondents mentioned Soviet actions in Hungary and six cited Russia's obstructionist actions in the United Nations to support their contentions that Soviet methods are not based upon humanitarian principles.

Related to both democratic principles and inhumane methods are the comments about Soviet and American motives and goals. These comments reveal a picture of the Soviet Union as trying to dominate the world scene, to impose its ideology on others, and to extend its power and influence, contrasted with a picture of the United States as seeking to preserve the integrity of other peoples and to aid them economically for altruistic reasons rather than out of self-interest. For example:

Russia has a lust for world power.

The Soviet Union wants to dominate the world.

The USA does not have territorial aspirations.

The motive behind the actions of the USA has not been a selfish motive, except so far as preservation of world peace is beneficial to the citizens of the USA, and this is equally beneficial to everybody.

Actions leading to domination and suppression of weaker nations seem to be mainly the work of the USSR.

Five respondents thought the USA has been morally right more often than the USSR because America is a Christian country, while Soviet leaders do not believe in God. Only one mentioned the recent American effort toward desegregating the races as a point in favor of the USA.

The reasons given by the three persons who said that the Soviet Union has been morally right more often than the United States were:

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Racial prejudice in the United States; the Soviet Union does not have it. [Mentioned twice.]

The USSR's socialistic policy is humane.

The USA has been aggressive rather than defensive on the world scene, but the Russian attitude has been conciliatory throughout—prima facie at least; whether the Russians are fundamentally sincere about it is a much deeper question.

The respondents who believe America and Russia to be about the same when it comes to moral rightness are inclined to fall into one of two groups: (1) The "plague on both your houses" type, which is exemplified by the respondent who said, "The USA's McCarran Acts and McCarthyism have been almost as odious as Russia's negative policy at world conferences!" And (2) the "everything is relative" type, which included five respondents who agreed that "it all depends on what you are taught to believe." There was also some pairing of reasons already cited in the earlier categories.

Moral rightness by the dates questionnaires were returned. From Table 2 one can see that those respondents who returned their questionnaires during the earliest period possible had the smallest relative number saying that the United States had been morally right more often than the Soviet Union, 70 per cent so reporting. This percentage increased to 89 for the questionnaires returned between July 17 and August 26, stayed relatively high through October 9 and then lowered to 75. One explanation for these variations may be that they reflect changes in the world scene and current actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. With this in mind, we constructed a day-by-day record of events which we hypothesized would affect attitudes toward

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN MORALLY RIGHT MORE OFTEN THAN THE SOVIET UNION, BY DATES QUESTIONNAIRES WERE RETURNED

Dates Returned	*Per Cent Saying That USA Is Right*	*Number of Cases on Which Per Cent Is Based*
May 31 to June 17	70	(47)
June 18 to July 16	87	(76)
July 17 to August 26	89	(47)
August 27 to October 9	85	(45)
October 10 to December 22	75	(12)

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the United States and the Soviet Union. We selected the dates shown in Table 2 as cutting points, because particularly important and relevant events occurred then, and it appeared to us that shifts in attitudes would be correlated with them. A word of caution must be given here. There is no way of telling for certain from these data what effect international events, as they were reported in news sources available in Jamaica, were having on the attitudes of Jamaican elites; thus the time-series analysis is largely speculative. However, it is offered as a possible explanation by one who was in Jamaica during much of the period under consideration and who was deeply involved at work and socially with Jamaican elite groups.

In local newspapers, on Radio Jamaica, in magazines and elsewhere (there is no television in Jamaica), many items of information relevant to attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union appeared during May. American and Canadian business concerns made definite commitments to bring new industries to Jamaica. Russia's demonstration of its lead in rocketry by the successful launching of its Sputniks while American rockets were still earthbound remained in the news. The Lebanon crisis was building up; it was announced that the Miami Weather Bureau had been ordered to keep secret its long-range hurricane forecasts; and a colored Jamaican cleric who claimed to have been subject to an illegal and unprovoked assault by a white passenger on a bus in Florida because he would not sit in the "colored section" had his complaint rejected by a Florida judge (an example of a type of story that is often reprinted in Jamaican newspapers). Of these and other items in the news during May and early June, two, more than any others, may have accounted for the *relatively* unfavorable attitudes toward the United States from May 31 to June 17. One was the strain in American relations with the West Indies Federation caused by a dispute about the location of the West Indies federal capital in Trinidad, and the other was Vice-President Richard M. Nixon's tour of Latin America and subsequent events.

The new West Indian nation selected for its ultimate capital site a United States naval base located at Chaguaramas in Trinidad. The United States had received the base during World War II as part of the lend-lease agreements with Britain, and fifty American destroyers were given to the British government in return. (The latter were often described in Jamaican and British news sources as being of "doubtful strategic value.") Limitations of space preclude a presentation of the details of the case here, but one can understand that the United States was put in the difficult position of having to choose between giving

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up a naval base which represented a considerable investment and which was of possible strategic importance or hurting the prestige of the newest nation in the Western Hemisphere. After consultation with the United Kingdom, the United States chose the latter course. The government in Jamaica put up a howl, and was further embarrassed some weeks later when it became clear that the American decision on Chaguaramas was final (at least for the immediate future). Opinion was divided, but many members of the Jamaican elites resented the way that the United States handled this situation.

Also in the news during this period was the Latin American tour of Vice-President Nixon. Referring to the tour in the *Sunday Gleaner*, Gordon K. Lewis wrote: "The 'good neighbour' policy could hardly have received a more humiliating rebuff; and this is of first class importance for West Indian foreign policy in the years to come. For if the new Federation identifies itself too closely with American ideology it runs the risk of being regarded in Latin America as a Yankee instrument."[10] In general, Jamaican leaders were more amused than upset by Latin American rejection of American political leadership and the criticism of the State Department and the Pentagon implied in the hostility directed at Nixon. However, the fact that Eisenhower sent a contingent of U.S. Marines to the Caribbean in the middle of May, "to be held there in readiness for possible aid to the Venezuelan government in protecting U.S. Vice-Pres. Richard M. Nixon and his party,"[11] did not go unnoticed in Jamaica, and, for some, amusement turned to derision.

On the other hand, Nagy's execution after a secret trial on June 17 was a grim reminder of Russian brutality in Hungary in 1956 that may have resulted in the increase in responses favorable to the United States by June 18. The favorable responses continued at a very high level through the last half of July and August after the U.S. Marines had landed in Lebanon, and through September after the 7th Fleet sailed into China seas in a clear indication of American determination to support policy with action, to honor commitments with deeds. This was serious business, and, however ill-advised it may have seemed to the Jamaicans, it was a far cry from the image of the United States as a bumbling giant in Latin America. The Chaguaramas and Nixon incidents were not forgotten, but they assumed a less important place.

The respondents who returned questionnaires after October 9 were

[10] Gordon K. Lewis, "The U.S. and the Americas: How Not to Make Friends," *Sunday Gleaner* (Kingston), May 25, 1958, p. 10.

[11] Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., *Book of the Year*, 1959, p. 418.

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less likely to feel that the United States was morally right than were those who had returned them between June 18 and October 9. The reasons for this shift are not entirely clear, but by October 9 the Lebanon and Quemoy crises were over, and in the eyes of many Jamaicans the United States was primarily interested in executing a tactical withdrawal from both Lebanon and Formosa. By October 24 the Soviet intention to lend money to Egypt to finance the Aswan Dam project was announced, and it followed closely on West Indian-USA talks on possible American aid to the West Indies, about which one participant was reported to have quipped, "If only we could uncover a Communist nest!"[12] Presumably, American aid would then be forthcoming in ample quantities to "fight a bogey." The talks ended with no commitments being made.

Moral rightness by selected social characteristics. In Table 3 attitudes toward the United States are shown by a number of social characteristics of the respondents. There is little difference in attitudes by age, but the youngest—those under age 40—are least favorable to the United States.[13] Women are less favorable than men. Occupational rank based on a modified version of the McGuire scale makes no difference.[14] Highly educated respondents are less favorable than are those with little education. Low incomes make for somewhat less favorable attitudes. Agnostics, atheists, and independents have the least favorable attitudes to the United States, followed by Jews, and then by Protestants. Catholics have the most favorable attitudes to the United States.

Respondents who prefer the People's National Party (PNP), the party in power in Jamaica at the time the study was made and therefore the one which received the severest blow to its prestige as a result of the Chaguaramas episode, are less favorable to the United States than are those who prefer the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP).[15]

[12] *Daily Gleaner*, October 7, 1958. Jamaica receives relatively little in the way of grants and loans from the United States. During the 1957 fiscal year the United States gave the entire West Indies Federation only $1,290,000, compared with $316,257,000 for Korea, $99,243,000 for Taiwan, $18,466,000 for Japan, $17,039,000 for Brazil, $8,873,000 for Hungary, and $4,503,000 for Haiti, to mention but a few examples. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States Government*, June 1958 Quarter.

[13] It should be borne in mind that the "least favorable" attitudes for any sub-group which are discussed here are *relative* to the attitudes of other sub-groups, and that in no case does the percentage of elite respondents favoring the United States fall below 55 per cent. Thus, the majority of persons in every sub-group still feels that the USA has been morally right more often than the USSR.

[14] Carson McGuire, "Social Status, Peer Status, and Social Mobility," a mimeographed memorandum for research workers based upon procedures used in studies for the Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. 1948.

[15] The differential character of the PNP when compared with the JLP may account

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TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN MORALLY RIGHT MORE OFTEN THAN THE SOVIET UNION, BY SELECTED SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Selected Social Characteristics	*Per Cent Saying That USA Is Right*	*Number of Cases on Which Per Cent Is Based*
Age		
55 and over	81	(68)
40-54	86	(109)
25-39	78	(50)
Sex		
Men	85	(211)
Women	62	(16)
Occupational Rating		
1 (highest)	84	(130)
2	80	(81)
3 and 4 (lowest)	81	(16)
Education		
Graduate school	75	(47)
Completed college	83	(42)
Some college	85	(34)
Secondary or training school	84	(88)
Elementary only	100	(15)
Annual Income		
£2000 and more	86	(96)
£1999 and less	77	(111)
Religion		
None	55	(11)
Catholic	96	(24)
Jewish	69	(13)
Protestant	85	(171)
Political Party Preference		
None	86	(67)
People's National Party	75	(102)
Jamaica Labour Party	91	(64)
R's Perception of His Financial Mobility		
R. better off than father	83	(164)
R. same as father	91	(33)
R. worse off than father	81	(26)
Type of Elite Position		
All political elites	81	(94)
Elected politicians	89	(19)
Nominated officials	92	(13)
Civil servants	76	(63)
Business elites	91	(68)
Ministers	90	(10)
Teachers	53	(15)
Doctors	77	(22)
Barristers and solicitors	88	(8)
Foreign Countries Lived in for at Least One Year		
2 or more	78	(95)
1	82	(62)
None	90	(69)

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Those persons who think that they are either better off or worse off financially than their fathers were during their youth are somewhat less favorable to the United States than are persons who think their financial status is the same as that of their fathers.

Ranked from least favorable to most favorable attitudes toward the United States, the different types of elites are: teachers, doctors, political elites, barristers and solicitors, ministers, and the business elites. However, within the political elites the members of the Legislative Council and other nominated members of the policy-making elites, and to a lesser extent the elected politicians, are as favorable to the United States as are the business elites. But the civil servants are less favorable.

Finally, from Table 3 it can be seen that living abroad for extended periods results in less favorable attitudes toward the United States on the part of the Jamaican elites.[16]

Although the differences shown in Table 3 for the most part are not large, they reveal that America is least favored by the respondents who are *young; women; highly educated; supporters of the PNP; teachers, doctors*, or *civil servants; cosmopolitan* (as measured by foreign residence); *Jews, agnostics, atheists*, or *independents; financially mobile* (mostly upward); or *of relatively low incomes.*

None of these sub-groups are pro-Russian, in that none contain a majority of persons who think that the USSR is morally right more often than the USA. They are simply somewhat less favorable to the United States than are other sub-groups, who overwhelmingly favor the USA. Yet these variations may be clues which can be profitably regarded as warning signals.

In general, the above configuration of variables appears to define, although imperfectly, segments of the leadership in Jamaica which are particularly committed to rapid social, economic, and political change.

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for this difference. The PNP is more likely than the JLP to appeal to the younger person, the highly educated person, and the salaried professional rather than the businessman. Such persons are likely to be friendly to but critical of many policies of the United States. Also, the ideology of the PNP reflects "progressivism," which will be discussed below. This is not to suggest that the PNP is Communistic. It is not. In Jamaica there are very few known Communists, but they are not persecuted. Generally, they exercise their rights like other citizens without fear or prejudice. Nevertheless in 1952 the PNP removed from its ranks a leftist group which had achieved considerable power in the party.

[16] Where the number of cases permitted, education was introduced as a test variable between each of the other independent variables and attitudes toward the USA. In all cases except one, the relationships remained about the same. In the case of income, it was found that among poorly educated respondents high incomes resulted in more favorable attitudes toward the USA, but among the better-educated respondents high incomes resulted in less favorable attitudes toward the USA.

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They feel that they have a mission to perform for their country. They push for ordered, rationalistic plans of economic development, education and social welfare for the common people, Jamaican and/or West Indian nationalism, modernization, materialism, and socialism. They are deeply dedicated to the welfare of the common people, to representative government, and to the maintenance of public liberties, but they become impatient and irritated with the masses when the people reject their candidates at the polls or their representatives elsewhere.

Sharing in this "progressive" ideology are the younger members of the elite groups, women who belong to these groups in their own right (such as the ones included in this sample), the highly educated elites, elite supporters of the PNP,[17] teachers, civil servants, and those who fall in the cosmopolitan, non-religious, mobile, or salaried and relatively low-income elite categories. It is less clear why Jews should be included, since they are primarily members of the business elites and as such may be expected to have conservative attitudes generally. Also, it is somewhat surprising to find doctors in this group, since many of them are foreigners. Ordinarily, one would expect lawyers to be among the "progressive" group (in the sense in which the term "progressive" is used here), but the lawyers in Table 3 who are not classified with the political elites are, with one exception, associated with commercial interests and, like the business elites, are prone to reject certain elements of the "progressive" ideology—especially those concerning socialism.

The policy implication to be drawn from these data is that particular attention should be given to the "progressive" elites in underdeveloped countries, because their moral commitment to the humane goal of economic advancement for their country may lead them to abandon, at least temporarily, the goal of political democracy. Thus, their attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union may be far from expressions of stable allegiances, but they may represent a constant weighing of the actions of the two major powers in terms of their country's hopes of achieving the equally legitimate, but often incompatible, goals of speedy economic betterment and political democracy. The attitudes of

[17] The development of the PNP in Jamaica appears to be an ideal case of Lucian Pye's generalization that political parties in non-Western societies tend to take on a world view and represent a way of life. The PNP has been much more preoccupied with national sovereignty than has the JLP, and has developed further toward being a genuine social movement. Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics*, XX (August 1958), pp. 468-86. A description of the membership and ideology of the PNP appears in C. Paul Bradley, "Mass Parties in Jamaica: Structure and Organization," unpublished paper, Flint College, University of Michigan, Flint, Mich.

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the "progressives" toward the United States may be contingent upon such circumstances, especially upon the amount of frustration resulting from the discrepancy between the economic progress their country is making and that which they believe it should be making.

Which side do they think is winning? In spite of the fact that the respondents generally think that the United States has been morally right more often than has the Soviet Union, they generally believe (usually with some regret) that the Soviet Union is more efficacious in dealing with the peoples of underdeveloped countries than is the United States. This can be seen from their responses to the question: ". . . which one is more effective in winning over to its point of view the people living in the so-called underdeveloped countries of the world?"

The Soviet Union is more effective	56%
Both about the same	20
The United States is more effective	24
Total	100%
Number of cases	(222)
No answers	(16)

The answers to the open-ended question, "Please explain why you think so," clearly reveal the conflict between democratic processes and efficient, lasting, and rapid economic advancement in the minds of many of the respondents. They feel that, for the so-called "backward" nations, democratic institutions and large-scale economic reforms are to some degree mutually exclusive. Of the respondents hung up on this dilemma, some give priority to political democracy (and are more likely to say that the USA is more effective) and others give priority to economic advancement (and are more likely to say that the USSR is more effective).

Of the 125 persons who said that the Soviet Union is more effective than the United States, the largest percentage, 42 per cent, held that communism offers greater material benefits and opportunities for economic advancement to the peoples of underdeveloped areas than does the United States, but they often added that these peoples in all probability must be willing to sacrifice some degree of individual freedom in order to achieve economic reforms. For example:

> The Soviet Union offers a better way of life via socialism to the suffering people in underdeveloped areas.

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Communism seems attractive to the peoples of underdeveloped areas for material gains, but they may have to sacrifice freedom for better economic conditions.

I am scared that a poverty-stricken people prefer a regime that levels everybody to one that enables only some to get rich.

The USSR flatters, holds out promises, rouses passions against the democracies, and then steps in with economic improvements in quick order to convince a conditioned elite that the country is improving.

In the Soviet Union there is no capitalist interest. Benefits are shared among the people. This is not the case with the USA.

The majority of countries are "have nots" and as such are more easily influenced by appeals to passion and for radical change by fraud or force, if necessary.

In underdeveloped countries there is illiteracy, unemployment, hunger, and starvation. To share and share alike by taking from the rich has tremendous psychological effect.

Because of the peoples' despair in underdeveloped countries, they respond to the alleged [economic] advantages of communism.

Thirty-four per cent of the respondents who believed the Soviet Union to be more effective than the USA referred to the superior propaganda operations of the Soviet Union with the assertion or implication that the Communist claims are false. Mention of propaganda as a factor making for effectiveness was often accompanied by comments about the uneducated (and thus gullible) and poverty-stricken masses in these countries:

The propaganda machine of the USSR holds out false promises of utopia.

The people are ignorant and susceptible to specious arguments and deceitful promises.

The Soviet propaganda is effective initially, but after that domination, fear, and ruthless policing succeed in keeping them subjected.

The illiterate and poverty-stricken people accept Russia's teachings readily and are less mindful of America's positive contributions to development.

Because people in underdeveloped countries fall easily to propaganda and usually feel that their poverty is due to lack of opportunities or to the efforts of people higher placed who deny them what should come to them.

Because Soviet propaganda is very forceful and well directed.

Fourteen per cent of the respondents who felt that the Soviet Union is more effective than the United States believed that the actions of the Soviet Union toward the underdeveloped countries are unrestrained

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by moral considerations, and that the Soviet Union can be completely expedient in the matter of extending Soviet power. Although such actions are considered effective, they are highly disapproved by these respondents.

Other reasons were also given. Twelve per cent of the respondents who felt the USSR is more effective said that there is no color prejudice in the Soviet Union as there is in the United States (Little Rock is mentioned as an example), and that since most of the underdeveloped countries are populated by colored peoples, they will not listen to America. Ten per cent referred to American reliance on dollars which are doled out with such an air of patronage that the recipients end up hating the United States. Among the miscellaneous responses were four praising the achievements of the USSR—including the Soviet supremacy in the rocket race.

Thirty-five per cent of the respondents who felt that the United States is more effective than the Soviet Union showed an appreciation of American aid and its ability to win friends in the underdeveloped countries. Respondents saying this often added that United States aid, whether given directly in dollars or indirectly in research, education, or health services, is seldom used for gaining internal control of a country but is given democratically, while Soviet aid is often used for purposes of political intrigue in an attempt to foster a new "Soviet colonialism."

The majority of the other reasons cited dealt with American democratic ways with references to Puerto Rico and the Philippines, or with Soviet totalitarian ways with references to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. These comments generally were similar to those given in justification for choosing the United States in answer to the "morally right" question which was discussed earlier.

For the most part, the explanations of the respondents who maintained that the United States and the Soviet Union are the same in effectiveness were combinations of the reasons already discussed, paired so as to offset each other. However, six of the respondents pointed out that the degree of effectiveness varies by area, owing to differential intensity of effort and the different histories and backgrounds of the people involved. They felt that the Soviet Union is generally more effective in the East and the United States in the West.

Effectiveness by the dates questionnaires were returned. From Table 4 one can see that there is some variation in opinions concerning the relative effectiveness of the USA and the USSR in underdeveloped countries by the dates on which questionnaires were returned. Thus, if

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TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO FEEL THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE UNITED STATES, BY THE DATES QUESTIONNAIRES WERE RETURNED

Dates Returned	*Per Cent Saying That USSR Is More Effective*	*Number of Cases on Which Per Cent Is Based*
May 31 to June 17	57	(44)
June 18 to July 16	50	(74)
July 17 to August 26	64	(47)
August 27 to October 9	58	(45)
October 10 to December 22	58	(12)

our earlier reasoning is correct, there is some variation by international events as they were reported in sources available in Jamaica. The percentage of respondents who thought the USSR is more effective than the USA was 50 or more at each time period. However, the lowest percentage impressed with Russia's effectiveness occurred between June 18 and July 16, just after the reminder of the Russians' barbarous treatment of the Hungarians (the announcement of Nagy's execution), and the highest percentage occurred between July 17 and August 26, just after the U.S. Marines had landed in Lebanon. It is curious that in the view of the Jamaican elites the high point of Russian effectiveness occurred at the same time as the high point of moral rightness of the United States (see Table 2). From the responses to the open-ended questions, it appears that the United States was thought to be morally right in its action in Lebanon by many Jamaicans, but that the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda was considered to have been thereby strengthened in many underdeveloped countries where the American side of the situation might not be fully reported.

Effectiveness by selected social characteristics. Table 5 shows that the younger respondents are a little more likely than are those over 40 to think the USSR is effective; women are more likely to think so than are men, as are the lowest compared with the highest occupationally ranked respondents, and low-income compared with high-income persons.

Catholics are most impressed with Soviet effectiveness, followed by Protestants and Jews, with agnostics, atheists, and independents being the least impressed.

Differences in perception of relative effectiveness by political party are not great, but adherents of the People's National Party are most

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TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO FEEL THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE UNITED STATES, BY SELECTED SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Selected Social Characteristics	*Per Cent Saying That USSR Is More Effective*	*Number of Cases on Which Per Cent Is Based*
Age		
55 and over	55	(65)
40-54	54	(108)
25-39	64	(49)
Sex		
Men	55	(206)
Women	75	(16)
Occupational Rating		
1 (highest)	48	(127)
2	65	(79)
3 and 4 (lowest)	81	(16)
Education		
Graduate school	62	(47)
Completed college	56	(41)
Some college	56	(32)
Secondary or training school	52	(86)
Elementary only	60	(15)
Annual Income		
£2000 and more	48	(96)
£1999 and less	61	(106)
Religion		
None	20	(10)
Catholic	68	(24)
Jewish	55	(11)
Protestant	56	(169)
Political Party Preference		
None	52	(61)
People's National Party	60	(95)
Jamaica Labour Party	56	(62)
R's Perception of His Financial Mobility		
R. better off than father	57	(163)
R. same as father	42	(31)
R. worse off than father	63	(24)
Type of Elite Position		
All political elites	54	(92)
Elected politicians	58	(19)
Nominated officials	42	(12)
Civil servants	55	(62)
Business elites	54	(67)
Ministers	44	(9)
Teachers	80	(15)
Doctors	65	(23)
Barristers and solicitors	50	(6)
Foreign Countries Lived in for at Least One Year		
2 or more	54	(92)
1	54	(63)
None	61	(66)

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likely to think that the USSR is effective, followed by adherents of the Jamaica Labour Party and those with no political party preference, in that order.

Respondents who see themselves as being worse off financially than their fathers are somewhat more likely than those who think they are better off to say the Soviet Union is more effective than the United States. Those who see themselves as having about the same financial position as their fathers are least likely to take this view.

There is considerable variation in the perception of the relative effectiveness of the Soviet Union and the United States among the different types of elites. In order of their likelihood of viewing Russia as more effective than America, the different types of elites are: teachers, doctors, business and political elites (tied), barristers and solicitors, and ministers. Among the political elites, the elected politicians and civil servants are more likely to say that Russia is effective than are nominated officials.

Lack of foreign residence is correlated with saying Russia is more effective than the United States, but the differences shown in Table 5 are small.

The very highest and the very lowest educational groups have the largest percentages who think the USSR is more effective when compared with the intermediate educational groups, but again the differences are slight.

Summarizing Table 5, one can observe that the Jamaican elite groups which are most likely to believe that the USSR is more effective in underdeveloped countries than the USA include *the younger persons; women; relatively low-prestige elite occupations; the highest and the lowest educational groups; elite members with relatively low incomes; Catholics; the PNP; the financially mobile; teachers, doctors, and elected politicians;* and *the non-cosmopolitan elite members.*

Note that the "progressives," as defined earlier, are well represented among those persons who believe that the Soviet Union is more effective than the USA. They are least likely to select the USA in the "morally right" question and they are least likely to select the USA in the "effective" question (compare Tables 3 and 5). This pattern of correlation with the two effect variables can be seen for age, sex, income, political party, the respondent's perception of his financial mobility, and—to some extent—type of elite position. It would also be true for education, if it were not for the fact that such a large percentage of the persons with only an elementary education regard

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the Soviet Union as more effective than the United States. It is not true of foreign residence, and this is contrary to the other findings if cosmopolitanism is a valid measure of "progressivism," but then other factors specific to foreign residence may account for this.

A striking exception to this pattern of correlation is found in the case of religious preference. Ninety-six per cent of the Catholics, generally not "progressives" as defined here, said that the United States has been morally right more often than the Soviet Union, but 68 per cent of them also thought that the Soviet Union is more effective than the United States. This corroborates what many writers have suggested: active, noncomplacent anti-Communists will be found among the Catholics more often than among any other sub-group.

IV. Summary and Conclusion

This article reports and attempts to explain images of the United States and the Soviet Union which are held by elites in an underdeveloped, but rapidly changing, country—Jamaica, West Indies. Questionnaires were filled out by 238 political, economic, religious, educational, social, and other Jamaican leaders during 1958. Images of the two major powers were determined from the responses to two questions, one concerning the relative moral rightness of their general positions with respect to the world situation and the other concerning their relative effectiveness in winning over to their point of view the people living in the underdeveloped countries.

The results are that the respondents overwhelmingly view the United States as being morally right more often than the Soviet Union. The responses to the open-ended questions show that political democracy is a powerful, motivating force. It is far from a dead issue. It is a live and important value. Liberty, justice, and political equality are symbolized by the United States; and, if we can generalize from these findings, they are the hope which America offers the peoples of backward nations.

The image of the Soviet Union is also clear. It is a picture of inhumanity in the methods used to maintain order and control at home and abroad, of a leadership which is coldly calculating, expedient, and void of moral restraints in the achievement of ends which it "religiously" believes in. It is a picture of dedication to the extension of power, influence, and ideology, of domination without consideration for the integrity of other peoples. No such stigma attaches to the activities of the United States.

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However, this is not the complete picture. Only about a fourth of the respondents believe that the United States is more effective than the Soviet Union in dealing with the people living in underdeveloped countries. These respondents see the United States as giving economic aid to poor countries without attempting to establish a new imperialism and with a true interest in the welfare of other peoples.

But others have different beliefs. Over half of the respondents think that the Soviet Union is more effective in this respect than the United States. They believe that the large-scale economic reforms so necessary in the underdeveloped countries may be difficult to achieve under a system of political democracy, given the economic and social conditions which prevail in underdeveloped areas, including the lack of an informed, educated citizenry. Communism, the respondents say, offers greater material benefits and opportunities for economic advancement to underdeveloped countries than does the United States, at the probable cost of a sacrifice of representative government and public liberties. Further, they say that the USSR is more effective than the USA, because Soviet propaganda is often false (thus more seductive and persuasive) and usually forceful and well directed, and because in acting to achieve control and domination, the Soviet Union is relatively unrestrained by moral considerations and can be completely expedient.

To the detriment of the image of the United States are the comments of some respondents concerning our racial prejudice, refusal to recognize Red China, McCarthyism, dollar diplomacy, and the air of patronage and superiority which we often display toward poor countries. But these comments are in the minority.

An analysis of variations in the images of the two major powers by the time the questionnaires were returned reveals that such variations may be correlated with relevant international events. Further work along this line could be done profitably, probing more deeply than in this study to determine the nature of the causal relationship. A continuing index of favorableness or unfavorableness to the United States among elites in various parts of the world would have theoretical as well as practical significance.

Although the attitudes of the Jamaican elites are generally pro-American, they did vary with respect to certain social characteristics. America is least favored on the "morally right" question by respondents who are young; women; highly educated; supporters of the PNP; teachers, doctors, or civil servants; cosmopolitan; Jews, agnostics, atheists, or independents; financially mobile; or of relatively low incomes.

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This is theoretically interesting, because this configuration of variables appears to define elites who are "progressives." They are particularly committed to rapid social, economic, and political change. They feel that they have a mission to modernize their country. They identify with and are loyal to the collectivity rather than to themselves as individuals or to some sub-group or social class. But their selfless dedication to their country may be combined with impatience when they are confronted with obstacles to the achievement of their goals, whether such obstacles are to be found in an illiterate and uninformed peasantry which has the vote or in the lack of sufficient loans and grants or trade from a foreign source. Further study should be directed to the conditions which produce this pattern of traits in the elites of underdeveloped countries. Also, the generality of "progressivism" and its analytic utility as an explanatory concept in this context should be investigated.

This finding is of practical significance, because these elites may be a particularly sensitive weather vane in determining the direction of pro- or anti-American feeling in underdeveloped countries. The attitudes of the "progressive" elites may be most contingent upon the changing realities of their countries' situation in the world, and the "progressives" may be most willing to sacrifice political democracy for rapid economic progress. Of course, this interpretation is highly speculative and should be checked further in Jamaica as well as in other underdeveloped countries.

The relationships between the two questions designed to reveal the images of the United States and the Soviet Union and any other given variable are generally the same. That is, if one sub-group is less likely than another to select the United States on the "morally right" question, it is generally less likely to select the United States on the "effective" question as well. However, a striking exception exists in the case of the Catholics. Almost to a man, and more than any other religious group, the Catholics among the Jamaican elite groups believe that the United States is morally right more often than the Soviet Union, but over two-thirds of them, more than any other religious group, also believe that the United States is less effective than the Soviet Union. This reversal of the general pattern raises a theoretically relevant question. Is it due to the fact that the Catholics are most in conflict ideologically with the Communists throughout the world, while at the same time their attitudes most reflect the appreciation of the Catholic Church for the efficiency and efficacy of an organization with a structure similar to its own? As others have pointed out, the Catholic Church and the Communist Party are both international or-

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ganizations, large in scale, with an authoritarian and centralized decision-making hierarchy, and well-indoctrinated cadres of zealous and dedicated leaders at all levels. This may explain the attitudes of the Catholics toward the effectiveness of the Soviet Union, and it appears to be a hypothesis worth further testing. The practical implication is that the Catholics may usually be counted on to be active, noncomplacent anti-Communists.

In general, Jamaican elites have favorable images of the United States and unfavorable ones of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that over half of them feel that the Soviet Union is more effective than the United States in winning over to its point of view the people living in underdeveloped countries. Many of the reasons given to support this latter belief, such as false propaganda and expedient and immoral actions, do not reflect favorably on the images of the Soviet Union held by Jamaican elite groups, since these groups generally consider political democracy and humanitarianism to be good things. Up to a point, the perceived lack of effectiveness of the United States may serve to strengthen favorable attitudes toward us and permit us to be more effective in strengthening others' beliefs in the democratic and humanitarian principles on which we stand. Our actual effectiveness may be increased by our apparently ineffective, but democratic actions.

Our own image of ourselves is also involved here. Do we want to be considered effective in the way Russia is? Do we want to have others see us as capable of achieving political control of underdeveloped countries, using any methods, no matter how unpalatable, to extend our influence, and having to police other peoples ruthlessly? Of course not. To do these things would violate our own image of ourselves. Thus, with few exceptions, the image which we would like to display to the world is about the same as the image which Jamaican elite groups have of us. If this finding can be generalized to other underdeveloped countries, then American democracy is not doing so badly in competing with Russian communism in underdeveloped areas as many persons have recently claimed.

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THE SOVIET POWER PLAY AT CHANGKUFENG

By MARTIN BLUMENSON

POWER politics and opportunism go hand in hand. Picking the right time to act involves a clear perception of the alternatives, a close estimate of the risks, and a clever gamble on the odds.

The Russians have shown themselves adept at the game. Their use of force or the threat of force has been unusually astute. They try to move when the deck is stacked in their favor.

The pattern of Russian power politics seems to have changed very little over the course of the years. The technique applied in a remote corner of the world more than twenty years ago appears to be still in use today. A look at what happened along the Siberian-Korean border at Changkufeng is therefore instructive, not only in terms of Soviet procedure but also as an illustration of how the Russians wage limited war.

I

The Changkufeng incident was a clash during the summer of 1938 between Russian and Japanese military forces. It was one of many conflicts between Soviet Russia and Japan along their common Asiatic border during the latter 1930's. One of the most bitter collisions and one of the largest in scope, the clash at Changkufeng almost led to a full-scale war.

The warfare there has usually been regarded as the result of Japanese aggression. It is usually seen as a convincing victory for Russian arms.

This version and this point of view, both as to the causes of the incident and as to the outcome of the battle, have been accepted because, until recently, only Soviet sources were available—for the most part, contemporary accounts of the conflict appearing in the Soviet press.

The Japanese account of the incident is quite different, as might well be expected. Though it may not be entirely objective and without bias, it is plausible. It is particularly plausible because of our climate of opinion today. Quite different from that of two decades—even a single decade—ago, our frame of reference makes us less prone to call the Japanese the villains, the aggressors, simply because the Rus-

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sians said they were. Furthermore, what adds credence to the Japanese account is the striking picture that emerges of Soviet policy and tactics in action.

In this light, the Changkufeng incident reveals how meaningless military victory in a local situation is when it is not, or cannot be, supported by political means. To be resolute on a restricted field of battle is not enough to win, unless both contestants have decided to keep the conflict limited. In the absence of such agreement, tacit though it may be, the calculated bluff is the method of play. The danger of the game lies in the risk of aggravating the local situation into an unlimited conflict. In this case, as Henry Kissinger has put it, a limited war can remain limited only if at some point one of the opponents prefers a limited defeat to an additional investment of resources.

Traditionally, the simple, and perhaps most basic, virtue of the soldier is his readiness to repel invasion of the national frontier. To do otherwise is to abandon honor. At Changkufeng the Japanese obeyed this military impulse. And though the military battled fiercely for honor and country, they could not win. The cards were stacked against them.

Triumph on the battlefield may therefore not necessarily result in victory. For victory in a local situation may be too expensive in the context of national policy. And the will to win on the part of the military may have to be subordinated or nullified in the interests of more vital national objectives. For the military, this is a difficult decision to accept, a galling, hurtful decision that goes against the grain. It was no less so at Changkufeng in the late 1930's than it was, for example, in Korea in the 1950's.

Similarly, it is difficult for the policy-makers to restrain the military. For a precondition of successful warfare is that the military be motivated by an undeviating desire to win. To do less than support the military on the political level, therefore, is in the nature of a betrayal. To what extent the Japanese gamble at Changkufeng was based on this consideration is an interesting speculation.

As for the Russians, their gamble at Changkufeng was a limited one. They were not playing for unlimited stakes. They were not ready for World War II. Had the Japanese taken the unlikely step of enlarging the limits of the conflict in terms of the resources they were willing to expend against the Russians, they would have, by that act, necessarily broadened their objectives. The Russians would have quite certainly backed down. But Japanese action of this sort was most un-

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likely. Given the context of their policy orientation, the Japanese could not have chanced an unlimited war. In contrast, the Russians were in the enviable position of being able to increase the expenditure of their resources without broadening the limited focus of their goal.

Thus, the limiting factors at Changkufeng were less binding on the Russians than on the Japanese. And despite the fact that the conflict remained limited, both in resources and in objectives, this advantage remained in Russian hands, an advantage that made the gamble a shrewd one.

II

The immediate background of the Changkufeng incident was the growing hostility between Japan and Soviet Russia over the Japanese invasion of China—Manchuria in 1931, China proper in 1937.[1] The Soviets strengthened their border defenses in Siberia. The Japanese joined Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact and thereby placed the Soviet Union in the classic military dilemma of facing potential enemies on two separate fronts. Japan thus insured herself against direct Soviet action and intervention in support of China.

But Germany in the pre-World War II years was deeply involved in European affairs. Their dilemma notwithstanding, the Russians gave China a larger measure of direct aid during the course of the Sino-Japanese war than any other state. More, the Russians aided China indirectly by immobilizing a large segment of Japan's military power in Manchukuo and Korea, where Japanese troops were on guard against a possible Russian attack. It was these troops who were involved in the Changkufeng incident.

By 1938 the Japanese listed 2,400 separate frontier conflicts as having occurred. When the Japanese deplored the ambiguous demarcation of frontiers, the Russians countered by suggesting that the Japanese avoid trouble by returning home. Mutual recrimination and vituperation ranged from the absurd to the serious.

A recent account of the Changkufeng incident, though refraining from placing the blame directly on the Japanese, repeats the Russian accusations, gives the Russian point of view: that intimidation on the part of the Japanese was not effective as a diplomatic weapon with the Russians, that the Japanese government should have forced "the Kwantung and Korean armies to respect the existing frontier," and

[1] See Harold M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, New York, 1942, pp. 610-11.

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that the Japanese military authorities were trying to "drag Japan into war with the U.S.S.R."[2]

Another explanation of the incident also takes this line; one of the sources used is a report of the incident by the Russian general Gregori Stern.[3] According to this account, the war with China in 1937 and 1938, more prolonged and difficult than had been anticipated in Tokyo, "largely precluded a unilateral Japanese war on Russia." Though Foreign Minister Litvinov told Ambassador Davies that such a war had become virtually impossible, the Soviet press expected the Japanese to attack Russia to compensate for their reversals in China. As the war in China picked up momentum in mid-1938, the elite of the Japanese military forces, the Kwantung Army, was rusticating in Manchuria. "Apparently to heighten its fighting esprit and relieve the tedium, the Kwantung Army began to enlarge on its policy of needling the Russians. It was not long before the Japanese went too far."[4] Casual clashes near the strategic Poset Bay at Changkufeng got out of hand. Whether the Kwantung Army purposefully set off the Changkufeng incident or whether the incident simply grew out of increasing local hostilities is not clear. Though the Russians were not prepared for the engagement, they drove Japanese forces off Russian territory and won a military victory.

This account does not jibe with the Japanese explanation. A monograph written by former officers of the Japanese army for the U.S. Army's Office of the Chief of Military History presents quite a different picture.[5] It is worth looking at.

The picture clearly shows Russian aggression. It also illuminates the reaction of Japanese military and political authorities to that aggression, on both local and national levels. It illustrates the precarious balance that obtains when the prosecution of national policy is threatened by a local development. It demonstrates that it may not be enough, in a complex political situation, for the military to make the traditional response to a threat launched against national security. It presents the Russians as skillful, clever practitioners of the art of limited war.

[2] Harriet L. Moore, *Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945*, Princeton, N.J., 1945, pp. 98-101.

[3] Clark W. Tinch, "Quasi-War Between Japan and the U.S.S.R., 1937-1939," *World Politics*, III, No. 2 (January 1951), pp. 174-99.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[5] "The Changkufeng Incident," prepared in 1956 by the USAFFE and Eighth Army Historical Sections, is part of a series entitled *Japanese Studies on Manchuria* and is one of several dealing with small wars and border problems. Written by Japanese, it was translated and edited by Americans.

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III

The Changkufeng incident, according to the Japanese, concerned a Russo-Japanese dispute over a few miles of the boundary separating Korea and the Soviet Maritime Province. Just south of the point where the frontiers of Manchuria, Korea, and Siberia meet, about 150 miles southwest of Vladivostok, Russians and Japanese fought over the question of whether the border followed a river or a ridgeline.

The Tumen River flows generally southeastward between Korea and Siberia. Near the village of Yangkuanping the Tumen turns to the west and makes a broad semicircular bend. Four miles below the village the river completes the loop; near the village of Podgornaya it resumes its southeasterly flow. (See Figure 1.)



FIGURE 1

In making its bend the Tumen goes around a hill mass on its east bank, a series of hills extending generally between the villages. A straight line connecting the villages would more or less trace the ridgeline of this high ground. About in the middle is the highest point, some 450 feet above sea level. It is the treeless hill of Changkufeng.

Immediately east of Changkufeng is Lake Hasan, a narrow elongated body of water—less than a half-mile wide, more than a mile long—paralleling the ridge.

These were the salient features involved—from west to east, the

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Tumen River, the Changkufeng ridgeline, and Lake Hasan. The dispute was whether the Korean-Siberian border between Yangkuanping and Podgornaya followed the ridgeline or the river.

A border was first delineated as a result of the Conventions of Peiping in 1860, when the Chinese Empire ceded to Czarist Russia the Maritime Province of Siberia. In the following year a Russo-Chinese commission signed a border pact, drew maps, and erected markers to define the frontier. Because wording was sometimes ambiguous, because map markings were often unclear, and because wooden boundary posts rotted away, another border commission met in 1886. This commission worked out a boundary in a paper known as the Hunchung Border Protocol. In the Changkufeng area the boundary followed the ridgeline rather than the river line.

Chinese military maps of the region in 1909 and Russian Army General Staff maps of the area in 1911, though not altogether coinciding, generally set the line of demarcation much farther east—in fact, east of Lake Hasan. These boundaries may have represented little more than recognition of the rising power of Japan in the early twentieth century, a Japan now ensconced in Korea after its wars with China (1895) and Russia (1904). But no treaties or agreements between governments authenticated the cartographic tracings of the military.

Somewhat later, in the immediate post-World War I period, the border came generally to be recognized as lying along the ridgeline—the only place south of the juncture of Korea, Siberia, and Manchuria where the river did not serve as delineation.

In the summer of 1938 the Russians contested the point.

Their logic was compelling at first glance by virtue of its very simplicity. It ran something like this: elsewhere the Tumen River marks the boundary, so why not between Yangkuanping and Podgornaya as well? How much simpler it would be!

They chose a good time to press the point. Japan, having occupied Manchuria since 1931 and having embarked on conquest of China, was, in the summer of 1938, in the midst of launching its Wuhan operation, a drive to seize the central Chinese cities of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow. With most of its military strength tied up in this large-scale operation, Japan was in a poor position to meet a challenge from another power.

The Russians' goal? Aid to China and embarrassment to Japan. Perhaps also they wished to test their weapons, their tactical doctrine—or the Japanese. Perhaps what a Soviet defector later claimed is true: Marshal Blucher, Soviet Commander in Chief of the Autonomous Far

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Eastern Army and former adviser (in the 1920's) to Chiang Kai-shek, provoked the Changkufeng incident because he believed that war with Japan was necessary.

Speculation and the mysterious intricacies of Soviet diplomacy apart, the Russians had at least one excellent and clearly understandable motive for wishing to move the border from the ridgeline westward to the river. This reason was local and military. They desired the high ground at Changkufeng, the terrain that dominates both sides of the ridge, the eastern and western approaches.

If the Japanese occupied the ridgeline, they had observation of Russian territory and commanded the eastern approaches to Korea in that area. The presence of Lake Hasan, lying athwart those approaches, was a further obstacle to Russian military encroachment.

If the Russians controlled the high ground, they dominated the land westward to the river. For military reasons, the Japanese would have to retire behind the Tumen, which would in effect become the frontier—the *de facto* border—between Korea and Siberia.

In developing the situation around Changkufeng and exploiting it, the Russians banked on Japanese involvement in China. The Japanese, the Russians could well figure, were captives of their political aims and their military commitments there. On the other Russian front, Germany was busy that summer of 1938 with the crisis that was to be temporarily resolved in the autumn at Munich. For the Russians, the time was propitious.

IV

The incident started on July 6, 1938, when three Soviet horsemen reconnoitered the vicinity of Changkufeng. No Japanese troops were present. Several days later, about a dozen Russian soldiers appeared briefly on the hill. A few days afterward Soviet troops numbering some forty men began constructing positions on the western slope. By the latter part of July, several hundred Russians had dug trenches not far below the crest of the hill and had strung three rows of wire entanglements. A red flag flew at the top of the hill.

Japanese border patrols, which usually traveled along the west bank of the Tumen River for convenience, had notified the headquarters of the Japanese Army in Korea of the Soviet activity on Changkufeng. The army on July 11th transmitted the information to the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo.

After three days of deliberation, the military authorities in Tokyo decided against using force at Changkufeng. Involved in the Wuhan

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operation and aware that the Army in Korea was not up to the standards of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, they wished to avoid aggravating the incident. Imperial Headquarters instructed the Army in Korea to adopt a cautious attitude while an attempt was made to settle the problem through diplomatic channels; it requested the Foreign Ministry to lodge an official protest with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Foreign Office was not slow to reply to the protest. The Changkufeng area, the Soviets advised, belonged within Russian territory according to maps in their possession attached to the Hunchung Protocol of 1886.

Apprised of the diplomatic reaction, Imperial Headquarters on July 16 instructed the Army in Korea to concentrate forces near the border to prevent trespassing. Warfare, however, was to be resorted to only on order from Tokyo.

The commander of the Japanese 19th Division, General Suetaka, responsible for the Changkufeng area, had already, as a precaution, stationed a small part of his division on the west bank of the Tumen opposite Changkufeng. He requested the army commander for permission to concentrate the entire division there.

The army commander had done nothing because he expected momentary transfer to another assignment. His replacement arrived on July 15. It was he, General Nakamura, who received on the following day authority from Tokyo to concentrate forces near Changkufeng. By July 19 an infantry regiment (four battalions), artillery, and engineers were on the west bank of the Tumen.

Across the river, the Russians on Changkufeng continued to work, improving their field fortifications daily. This was what several Japanese intelligence officers saw when they donned white Korean clothes and traveled along the west bank of the Tumen in an oxcart. No Korean natives were on the hill, though they usually conducted religious rites there during the summer months, and the Japanese interpreted this as an ominous sign.

Concerned over the progress of Russian field works, Nakamura warned Tokyo on July 20. If no hope could be expected from diplomatic negotiations, he suggested, military action should be initiated immediately, for delay would increase the difficulty of dislodging the Russians.

Two days earlier, on the 18th, Ambassador Shigemitsu had called on Foreign Commissar Litvinov to demand the restoration of the *status quo*. Though he received a flat refusal, it seemed a bluff, for no indications of a Soviet intention to go to war were apparent. Thus the Japa-

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nese might act at Changkufeng with little concern that the Russians would retaliate on a large scale. Yet Imperial Headquarters dared not gamble. Conscious of the demands of the Wuhan operation, still hopeful of diplomatic results despite Litvinov's rebuff, fearful that the opposing military forces might carelessly aggravate the conflict, it ordered the units along the Tumen to be withdrawn several miles. The situation was to be watched quietly. Force was not to be used.

During the next few days, with diplomacy at an impasse, the Japanese military authorities debated the question of Soviet intentions. If the Russians were bluffing, the Japanese could use force and keep the conflict local. If the Russians were ready to go to war, the Japanese could not oppose them effectively—not with the simultaneous demands of the Wuhan operation. In the final analysis, it was the Russians who would determine the limits of military conflict at Changkufeng.

Banking on the probability that the Russians were unwilling to engage in large-scale operations over Changkufeng, Imperial Headquarters changed its mind on July 26. The military decided to gamble, but cautiously. The forces that had been withdrawn from the river bank into assembly areas several miles away were to return to the Tumen opposite the hill. They were to remain on the alert and await further developments.

Developments were not long in coming.

V

On the morning of July 29 several Russian soldiers appeared on top of Shachaofeng, a hill little more than a mile north of Changkufeng, and began to dig trenches on the western slope—on the Korean side of the frontier, according to the Japanese. The 19th Division commander, Suetaka, ordered border guards to disperse the Soviets. He also alerted a battalion of regular troops to be ready to reinforce the border unit should the Russians counterattack.

Early that afternoon in a heavy rain, about 120 Japanese border guards crossed the Tumen, climbed the slope of Shachaofeng, and drove off the Russians. They then withdrew to positions considered by the Japanese to be more than half a mile inside their territory.

According to the Soviet version, the Japanese attacked a patrol of eleven Russian frontier guards who were at least 300 yards behind the boundary. Five guards were killed, six wounded.

Despite dense fog and intermittent rain, which hampered observation, the Russians later that afternoon moved up from Changkufeng

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about 80 infantrymen and several tanks and drove the Japanese border unit off Shachaofeng. The Russians then deployed in defensive positions—at least half a mile inside Korea, according to the Japanese. Poor visibility prevented Suetaka from moving up the reinforcements he had alerted.

When Suetaka thereupon requested permission to give battle, Nakamura, the army commander, sent a carefully worded reply. He granted permission, but he added: "You ought to be satisfied with driving them back across the border. Take great care not to enlarge this conflict."[6] Nakamura then telegraphed Tokyo to inform Imperial Headquarters of his action.

That night Suetaka began to deploy a regiment across the river. Heavy rains, ferrying problems, and traffic congestion slowed the movement. Yet by the morning of July 30, two infantry battalions, two border garrison companies, half a battery of mountain (pack) artillery, and an engineer regiment were on the east bank of the Tumen. A field artillery battery west of the Tumen was ready to give supporting fire.

Even as Suetaka was making his preparations, a message arrived from Tokyo authorizing a resort to force. With this approval, Suetaka planned a night attack against Changkufeng itself. But he strictly ordered "not one Japanese soldier" to cross the border.

The Russians in the meantime had also reinforced their troops. According to Japanese estimates, at least 300 Soviet soldiers occupied Changkufeng—with two antitank guns, eight machine guns, a dozen automatic rifles, and twenty hand-grenade launchers. The Japanese discovered later that the Russians had laid minefields in front of their positions and that about twenty artillery pieces east of Lake Hasan were in support. More troops and tanks were nearby.

The Japanese attack went as planned. After several hours of desperate fighting before dawn on July 31, the Japanese reached the summit and drove the Russians off. Heavy rain began to fall after daylight, and apparently because of lack of observation the Soviet artillery ceased to fire. The Japanese consolidated on Changkufeng and secured the ridgeline leading to Shachaofeng. They had no need to venture beyond to Shachaofeng, for artillery fire alone forced the Russians there to withdraw.

The Japanese estimated Soviet losses at close to 300 men, obviously an exaggeration. They buried 30 bodies. They captured a few weapons

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

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—two antitank guns, ten machine guns, and some other trifles. But seven Russian tanks had been knocked out—all, the Japanese claimed, well within Japanese territory.

Russians who escaped by swimming across Lake Hasan later claimed that Japanese artillery and mortar fire pursued them, the shells falling well within Russian territory. Their last view of Changkufeng was the sight of Japanese soldiers waving their sabers on top of the ridgeline—on the wrong side of the border, it seemed to the Russians.

Suetaka requested permission to move more troops across the river to Changkufeng in case the Russians tried to regain the high ground. Nakamura disapproved. He thought the affair was at an end.

VI

The Russians were far from finished. They began an immediate build-up, and on August 1 they attacked with hastily assembled troops while more than 130 Soviet fighter and bomber planes struck Japanese positions. Though the ground attack was unsuccessful, the Japanese estimated that 3,000 Soviet troops with artillery and armor support were in the area.

These ground and air attacks had their effects on Army Headquarters in Korea and on Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo.

In Korea Nakamura now approved Suetaka's request for more troops. While Suetaka moved additional forces across the river, Nakamura ordered a brigade headquarters, four infantry battalions, and an artillery battalion to move from duty stations in North Korea to assembly areas west of the Tumen. The movements were completed by the evening of August 2.

Meanwhile, Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo had come to a decision on August 1. It formulated a policy: prevent enlargement of the incident. It determined a method: let the forces on the spot settle the issue.

What this meant was not precisely clear. But a clue was apparent in a message from Imperial Headquarters to the Army in Korea: Japanese troops were to occupy the vicinities of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng temporarily. And when the Minister of War asked for and received clarification, the meaning was unmistakable. The military authorities were going to "make every effort to effect a local settlement of the issue even though the Japanese may have to withdraw from the line which the U.S.S.R. claims to be the frontier in the vicinity of Changkufeng."[7]

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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The Minister of War explained the decision in similar terms at a conference of five Cabinet members that afternoon (the Premier and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Navy, and Finance were the others present), adding that he intended to refer the matter to diplomatic agents.

Accepting this solution, the Cabinet officials decided on a three-point program: (1) enlargement of the incident was to be avoided, and diplomatic negotiations were to be undertaken to settle the issue on a local basis; (2) there was to be no further Japanese military action unless provoked by the Soviets; (3) if negotiations failed, the conditions and the situation were to be maintained as they then existed.

It was difficult to maintain the situation, for the Russians continued their attacks on August 2 and 3, though unsuccessfully. Russian air attacks continued from August 2 through August 7—a total, by Japanese estimates, of approximately 700 Russian aerial sorties, at least 110 each day. These attacks were directed not only on the Changkufeng area but also against targets deep in Korea and in Manchuria.

The Soviet planes were unopposed, for Tokyo disapproved a request from Nakamura to use Japanese air power. Likewise, when Suetaka, with additional forces at hand, began to plan an offensive into Siberia as the best means of defense, Imperial Headquarters, still determined to localize the conflict, ordered the planning canceled.

The Russian ground attacks during the first three days of August were serious. Together with the air attacks, they seemed to indicate to the Japanese a firm intention on the part of the Russians to regain the dominating ground at Changkufeng. Shigemitsu therefore talked again with Litvinov on August 4. He found the Soviets disposed to cease fighting, provided that conditions were satisfactory, and he cabled this report to his foreign office.

Earlier that day in Tokyo, the foreign office, concerned with the "very tense situation," judged it a matter of "utmost urgency" to secure an immediate cessation of hostilities. The Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs therefore requested the Russian chargé d'affaires to call on him. The conversation was not altogether satisfactory, but it was somewhat encouraging at least. "If the Japanese Army will suspend offensive operations," the Russian diplomat told him, "the fighting will cease spontaneously."[8]

Ignoring the misstatement of fact about the character of the Japanese resistance, overlooking the implication that Japanese aggression had

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

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started the conflict, the Japanese foreign office took comfort in Russian willingness to halt the battle. In the hope that an armistice was possible, the foreign office instructed Shigemitsu to "pursue concrete negotiations" for a ceasefire.

Shigemitsu found the USSR unshakable in its position: the Japanese must stop their artillery fire and withdraw from Soviet territory. This meant withdrawal behind the Tumen River.

With the Japanese obviously trying to halt the warfare by diplomatic means, the Russians resumed their attacks on Changkufeng on August 6, attempting, again without success, to wrest the high ground from the Japanese.

Again on August 7, Shigemitsu met with Litvinov. Despite Litvinov's apparent desire to localize the Changkufeng incident, he insisted on the same conditions for a truce.

At Changkufeng, the warfare continued as the Russians launched attacks on the 7th, 8th, and 9th. The fighting was heavy, casualties high.

By this time, despite their enunciated policy of localization, the Japanese had not only added to their forces at Changkufeng but were shifting their military dispositions in Manchuria to strengthen their over-all defenses against the USSR and to relieve pressure on the Army in Korea. Nakamura's chief of staff had visited the Changkufeng area, and he confirmed the necessity on military grounds of getting more troops to the trouble spot. Tokyo ordered the Kwantung Army to move the 104th Division, which was enroute from south Manchuria to south China, to the Hunchung area in northeast Manchuria instead. And when Suetaka asked for long-range guns, Imperial Headquarters directed the Kwantung Army to send several batteries, plus machine guns. Nakamura sent replacement troops from Seoul, and ordered the remaining elements of Suetaka's 19th Division, which were still dispersed at duty stations in Korea, to concentrate in an emergency mobilization for war. The Changkufeng incident was getting out of hand.

The Soviets were also reinforcing their units at Changkufeng. By August 10 the Russian ground strength was estimated at 27 infantry battalions, supported by anywhere from 40 to 100 artillery pieces and an uncertain number of tanks. In comparison, the Japanese had committed 12 infantry battalions and 33 guns.

Locked in a desperate struggle, Russian and Japanese forces both approached exhaustion. On August 8 the Japanese intercepted a message sent by the local Soviet commander to higher headquarters. Russian losses, the message stated, were severe; they could be expected to double

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if the fighting continued. This boosted Japanese morale, but the Japanese needed more than that to sustain hope of retaining possession of the hill. They needed more troops, for the weight of the numerically superior Russian forces was having its effect. Though the Japanese still held the high ground, the situation became so critical on August 10 that Suetaka's chief of staff took a most unusual step. Bypassing normal communication channels, he sent a message directly to the chief of staff of the Japanese Army in Tokyo. "Appropriate diplomatic measures," he telegraphed, "are immediately imperative."[9]

On that day in Moscow, Shigemitsu acquiesced to the Russian conditions. He agreed to a cessation of hostilities effective at noon, August 11, the detailed settlement to be made by the forces on the spot.

At twenty minutes after eleven on the morning of August 11, Nakamura received this word from Imperial Headquarters. The information reached Suetaka at five minutes before twelve. At the designated time the fighting stopped.

That afternoon Suetaka appointed a colonel to conduct the front-line truce talks. In contrast, the Russians sent General Stern, chief of staff of the Far East Army. The delegates met east of Changkufeng in a Soviet breastwork that day, once again on August 12, and finally on August 13.

There was really nothing much to discuss, for on the afternoon of August 11 Imperial Headquarters had directed the Army in Korea to move the 19th Division back across the Tumen River to the west bank. The result of the negotiation was unequivocal: the Japanese accepted the border line claimed by the Soviets. The Russians retained the high ground east of the Tumen River. By midnight of August 13 the east bank of Tumen was clear of Japanese troops. The Tumen River had become the *de facto* border.

For this the Japanese had committed in battle about 10,000 men. They officially admitted losing 158 killed, 740 wounded. A medical tabulation showed 517 dead, 922 wounded—almost 1,500 casualties—but the actual figures were probably higher.

In opposition the Russians probably committed around 20,000 troops. The Japanese estimated Soviet losses as somewhere between 4,500 and 7,000. The Russians officially admitted 263 killed, 611 wounded. Marshal Blucher, who lost the battle, was later reputed to have died in a political prison in Moscow at the end of the year.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

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The Japanese had won on the military front. They had lost in the political arena.

The Japanese failed because of their own military estimate. Committed in China, they could not chance an enlarged conflict on the Russian frontier.

The Russians had come to the same conclusion, and they acted. Seizing upon the opportunity, the Soviets were ruthless in exploiting the Japanese dilemma. The Russians held the initiative, for they could, if they wished, have expanded the scope of the military conflict as the Japanese could not.

A shrewd political and military estimate of the Japanese situation, an astute sense of timing, and an effective use of military action wedded to diplomatic firmness as twin agents in a policy of force—this was the Soviet technique.

For the Japanese to resist on the same terms would have meant changing their decision of commitment in China. Winning at Changkufeng, they decided, was not worth the gains of the Wuhan operation. By that political choice, the Japanese deprived their military forces at Changkufeng of the fruits of victory. They accepted defeat to keep the incident local and limited—as the Russians had wagered they would.

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Research Note

ON UNITED NATIONS ECONOMICS*

By J. HERBERT FURTH

THE United Nations has made a vital contribution to economic intelligence and analysis through the publications of its Bureau of Economic Affairs as well as those of its regional commissions. The prestige of its professional staff is so high that their pronouncements find a respectful audience all over the world. This well-merited recognition, however, burdens the staff with heavy responsibilities. An academic economist may well indulge in political advice or economic forecasting, even though proficiency in economic theory guarantees neither sound political judgment nor the possession of prophetic gifts. It is different with staff members of a public agency, and especially with those of one of the foremost international institutions. Any advice they give should be based on generally accepted theories and values rather than on controversial hypotheses or partisan opinions. And, since they are as unable to foresee the future as other human beings, they should withstand the temptation to make predictions.

It is a pity that the staff of the Bureau of Economic Affairs and of some, at least, of the regional commissions have not adhered to these common-sense rules. The annual *World Economic Survey*, prepared by the Economic Survey Branch of the Bureau of Economic Affairs, is a case in point. Time and again its authors have made unjustified theoretical and factual assumptions which have led them to incorrect evaluations of present and probable future economic conditions. Four such instances may be cited.

The *World Economic Survey* for 1956 (dated May 20, 1957) mentions the "persistent dollar shortage of the postwar decade" (p. 10) and clearly attributes it to "a chronic tendency towards deflation and a surplus in the [US] balance of payments" caused by an "advance in productivity" which "raises capacity . . . more rapidly than it increases demand" (p. 11). In fact, there had been no chronic tendency toward deflation in the United States throughout the postwar period, there had been no over-all surplus in the United States balance of payments

* This note reflects the author's personal views and must not be interpreted as representing the opinion of the Federal Reserve Board.

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since the days of the Marshall Plan, and United States productivity had not advanced more rapidly than that of other industrial countries. If there had been a persistent dollar shortage, it could therefore not have been due to the factors mentioned in the *Survey*. Moreover, the last traces of any "dollar shortage" that might previously have existed disappeared a few months after the publication of the *Survey*.

The *Survey* for 1957 (published in mid-1958) appeared convinced that the United States recession of 1957-1958 would not be "as brief or as mild as in 1948/49 or 1953/54" and that in fact the "full effects may not be felt until 1959" (p. 3). Unfortunately for the authors of these predictions, the recession had already passed its turning point at the time of publication, and the United States economy was entering upon one of its most rapid recoveries, which was to carry industrial output and national income in the first half of 1959 far beyond any previous peak.

The *Survey* for 1958 repeats and expands two erroneous theses that had already been stated in previous *Surveys*. The first concerns the alleged adverse effects of anti-inflationary policies in general, and the second the alleged inability of such policies to eliminate balance-of-payments deficits of less-developed areas in particular.

The rest of this note will be devoted to a critical analysis of these two theses.

Inflation and Deflation

The 1958 *Survey* intimates that the world recession of 1957-1958 was not only "fashioned by ordinary market forces" but was also "shaped by restrictive, anti-inflationary government policy" (p. 3). It obviously disapproves of the widespread "fear of a long-term threat of inflation" which leads to "an interesting contrast . . . in current thinking on the relative dangers of inflation and deflation: the tendency is to fear the worst with respect to inflation but to hope for the best as regards deflation" (p. 4).

In particular, the *Survey* believes that fears of inflation were unjustified in 1955-1957, since these years produced "a growing general excess of capacity rather than excess of demand." This proves, in the opinion of the *Survey*, that the price rises did not originate in "excess demand" (p. 5). The *Survey* recognizes the dangers of "creeping inflation" but stresses the alternative dangers of "restraining the rate of economic growth as a means for preventing inflation. Crawling deflation also has it dangers, no less than does creeping inflation" (p. 6).

The *Survey* devotes considerable space to an attack on "the thesis

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that creeping inflation can be eliminated by crawling deflation." In this connection, it points out that "contrary to a widespread illusion about the magnitude of the 1955-1957 boom—fed in part by the self-same fear of inflation—the true dimensions of the expansion were modest indeed. . . . Insofar . . . as rising prices stem not from a global excess of demand for goods and services over total available capacity but from mutually incompatible demands of labour and business for higher earnings or from temporary bottlenecks in specific basic industries that are subject to fluctuating demand, policies which check the long-term rate of growth may tend to aggravate rather than to alleviate long-term inflationary pressures" (p. 6).

The authors do not produce any evidence for the intimation that any responsible government has recently practiced, or any responsible "traditional" economist has advocated, a policy of "crawling deflation." Since "expansionist" economists usually attack the policies of the United States and Germany, it may be pointed out that the supply of money rose between the end of 1956 and the end of 1958 by 3½ per cent in the United States and by 27 per cent in Germany.[1] It is difficult to see how policies that have permitted such an expansion of the money supply could be called "crawling deflation."

Apart from setting up the straw man of "crawling deflation," the *Survey* misunderstands the purposes of anti-inflationary monetary and fiscal policies. These policies are not designed to retard long-term growth, but to restrict *monetary* demand to a level compatible with sustainable economic growth on the basis of a country's *real* resources. The restraint may at times be too lenient or too severe; it may therefore at times permit inflationary developments and at others keep monetary demand below the level compatible with full employment. Such defects are unavoidable in any type of human action. However, as the record shows, there is no inherent bias toward excessive tightness; on the contrary, the persistence of inflationary pressures in most countries of the free world (including the United States) demonstrates that the bias tends rather to be in the direction of excessive ease.

The references to the experience of 1955-1957 do not support the basic arguments of the *Survey*. The fact that between 1955 and 1957 economic growth was only moderate, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, may actually be attributed to the absence of idle resources; under conditions of "full employment," inflationary pressures manifest themselves in price increases rather than in "real" economic

[1] *International Financial Statistics*, July 1959, pp. 248 and 116.

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growth. Developments in that period were thus characteristic of an inflationary situation rather than of excessive monetary tightness.

Similarly, if that period indeed witnessed excessive investments rather than an excessive rise in consumer demand, such a development would have indicated an excessive monetary *ease*, which tends to favor investment at the cost of consumption, rather than excessive monetary tightness. It might be that the investment boom of 1955-1957 could have been checked in such a way as to avoid or further mitigate the moderate recession of 1957-1958 if *monetary* policy had been *more* restrictive and *fiscal* policy, insofar as it affects consumption rather than investment, *less* so. During that period, however, the attacks of "expansionists" on anti-inflationary policies centered on the alleged excessive tightness of monetary policy; I do not know of any "expansionist" economist in the United States, and least of all on the United Nations staff, who at the time favored tighter monetary policies as the price of a relaxation of fiscal policy.

Inflation in Less-developed Areas

The *Survey* for 1958 believes that the balance-of-payments problems of less-developed areas are particularly unsusceptible to solution by means of anti-inflationary policies. It states that underdeveloped countries have a higher "income elasticity of import demand" than developed countries and therefore cannot grow at the same rate as the developed countries if they want to keep their international accounts in balance. "Should the under-developed countries . . . seek to expand at the same rate as the developed countries, they would then be faced with a permanent and growing deficit in their balance of payments; their imports would expand faster than their exports in direct proportion to the relative import elasticities of demand of under-developed and developed countries. . . . a permanent and ever-growing gap may be generated in the balance of payments without any internal inflation in the deficit country or deflation in the rest of the world. Any permanent disparity in the income elasticities of import demand of trading partners may generate a permanent gap in the balance of payments, even with all countries maintaining stable prices and all expanding at the same rate" (pp. 8-9).

The *Survey* recognizes that an international deficit has some connection with internal economic developments. However, it believes that "in the circumstances under consideration it is not the discrepancy between savings and investment which generates the deficit in the balance of payments. Instead it might be said, with greater accuracy, that

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it is the conditions which generate the deficit in the balance of payments that lead to the discrepancy between savings and investment. Given the disparity between income elasticities of import demand, uniform rates of growth are consistent only with an imbalance between exports and imports and therefore with an imbalance between savings and investment. Should the deficit country under these circumstances seek to close its trade gap by increasing the rate of saving or decreasing its investment, it could result only in a state of inadequate effective demand, leading to a reduction in its rate of growth or perhaps even in the absolute level of its economic activity. Conversely, should the surplus country seek to eliminate the trade surplus by increasing its investment or reducing its saving, this would lead only to excessive effective demand and to price inflation" (p. 9).

The authors are right in believing that this notion "is one which traditional economics has found difficult to accept" (pp. 8-9). In fact, the whole theory is based on the fallacy that the "income elasticity of import demand" of a country is an unchangeable datum, which is unaffected by domestic or international economic and financial policies and developments. Whenever such an absolute rigidity is assumed in an economic system, it is easy to deduce the appearance of imbalances pervading the entire system. Since economic data change continuously, any assumed impossibility of adjusting a basic economic relation to these changes must necessarily result in disequilibrium.

The *Survey* does not produce any statistical support for the assumption that such import elasticities are indeed unchangeable. Not only is such a concept unlikely on theoretical grounds—since it presupposes, among other things, a complete lack of response to relative price changes—but actual experience shows that such elasticities change as continuously as the economic data that affect them. For many years, we have been told that the import elasticity of the United States was lower than that of the rest of the world, and that therefore the "dollar shortage" was an inevitable fact of economic life. In 1957-1959, United States imports rose while its exports declined sharply, although the recession in the United States was more serious than in the rest of the world. Apparently there was a considerable shift in import elasticities in both the United States and the rest of the world.

Experience also shows that the most divergent rates of economic growth are compatible with balance-of-payments equilibrium. Nobody has yet contended that the import elasticities in Germany are basically different from those in France. Nevertheless, Germany was able to reach a rate of growth equal to that of France while generating a large

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trade surplus, in contrast to France's large trade deficit. The reason can be found mainly in the differences between the monetary and fiscal policies of the two countries, without any need to refer to differences in import elasticities. When France adopted appropriate anti-inflationary policies, its balance-of-payments deficit disappeared.

In general, while economists may succeed in constructing theoretical *models* in which balance-of-payments difficulties are the cause rather than the effect of domestic imbalance, it has been possible in every single *historical case* of continuous and serious balance-of-payments problems to discover domestic inflationary pressures—and, in particular, public or private expansion programs exceeding the country's domestic and external resources—as causal factors.

Experience shows, moreover, that both sustainable rapid economic progress and a sustainable rapid rise in imports are consistent with, and probably even encouraged by, the maintenance of domestic financial equilibrium. The case of the Latin American republics may be taken as an example.

Between 1911-1913 and 1956-1958, imports into Latin America increased from $1,306 million to $8,545 million at current prices, or by 554 per cent, as shown in Table 1. Assuming that the price level in 1956-1958 was roughly three times as high as in 1911-1913, this means that the volume of imports increased by nearly 120 per cent. This increase is somewhat higher than that of the volume of imports in the free world at large, which (with proper adjustments, eliminating the countries of the present Soviet empire from 1911-1913 data) rose barely 100 per cent in that period.

Six Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) experienced increases in the *money value* of imports by less than 400 per cent; this means that the *volume* of imports either declined, or rose by not more than about one-half.

Six other countries (Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela) experienced increases in the money value of imports of more than 1,500 per cent; this means that the volume of imports rose more than four times.

The remaining eight countries (Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru) belonged to an intermediate group.

These data show that it is impossible to speak of uniformly low import or export potentialities of less-developed areas. Five- to seven-fold increases in the volume of imports over 45 years should be sufficient

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TABLE 1

FOREIGN TRADE OF LATIN AMERICA, 1911-1913 AND 1956-1958

Country	*Imports* (Annual averages)			*Exports* (Annual averages)		
	1911-13[1]	*1956-58*[1]	*1956-58* (1911-13 =100)	*1911-13*[1]	*1956-58*[1]	*1956-58* (1911-13 =100)
Argentina	444	1,224	276	449	971	216
Bolivia	21	79	376	35	68	194
Brazil	298	1,358	456	336	1,372	408
Chile	123	396	322	141	459	326
Colombia	23	502	2,183	29	521	1,797
Costa Rica	9	98	1,089	10	82	820
Cuba	126	812	644	154	758	492
Dominican Republic	8	137	1,713	11	141	1,282
Ecuador	10	102	1,020	14	129	921
El Salvador	6	109	1,817	9	122	1,356
Guatemala	9	145	1,611	13	115	885
Haiti	9	47	522	16	38	238
Honduras	4	73	1,825	3	70	2,333
Mexico	96	1,119	1,166	147	779	530
Nicaragua	6	76	1,267	6	62	1,033
Panama	10	108	1,080	3	34	1,133
Paraguay	7	33	471	5	35	700
Peru	27	365	1,352	42	303	721
Uruguay	51	189	371	56	159	284
Venezuela	19	1,572	8,274	25	2,268	9,072
Total	1,306	8,545	654	1,505	8,487	564

[1] In millions of dollars.

SOURCES: 1911-1913, *Foreign Commerce Yearbook*, 1939, pp. 312-13; 1956-1958, *International Financial Statistics*, July 1959, pp. 20-21.

to satisfy the requirements of the most demanding model of economic development, not to speak of the 27-fold rise in Venezuela.

It is remarkable, moreover, that all of the countries in the first group have a long history of devaluation and exchange control, while all countries in the second group, with the exception of Colombia, have maintained a large measure of domestic financial equilibrium and exchange stability. While these data do not prove the existence of causal relationships, they strongly suggest that maintenance of internal equilibrium is a major element in the attainment of sustained economic growth. The case of oil-rich Venezuela may be considered exceptional, but countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay are at least as rich in natural resources, labor skill, managerial abilities, and capital funds as any of the other "stable" countries, and were in 1911-1913 far more developed than most of them. Their economic

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history confirms the view that unwise "expansionist" policies, rather than a peculiar constellation of import or export elasticities, resulted in their domestic disequilibrium and the atrophy of their foreign trade.

If we assume (presumably with the authors of the *Survey*) that increases in imports can be taken as a rough indication of increases in domestic incomes, we must conclude that only those countries which have managed to maintain or restore a reasonable degree of domestic financial equilibrium have also been able to sustain rapid economic development over the long run. Economists who, clothed in the authority of the United Nations, belittle the importance of efforts to maintain domestic financial equilibrium in less-developed areas or regard such efforts as inimical to rapid economic growth, thus give advice that is contrary to the best interests of those areas, and in fact hamper the very economic progress which they intend to serve.

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Review Articles

PHILOSOPHY, BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, AND THE NATURE OF MAN

By KENNETH E. BOULDING

Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, 333 pp. $4.75.
Christian Bay, *The Structure of Freedom*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1958, 419 pp. $7.50.

TWO works of a very different order, but of about the same caliber, inspire these reflections. The first, *The Human Condition* by Hannah Arendt, is primarily philosophical and "classical" in its outlook. The second, *The Structure of Freedom* by Christian Bay, is predominantly "behavioral" political science, drawing its inspiration from the social sciences, and especially from social psychology and its neighboring fields, rather than from traditional political philosophy. The two works differ somewhat in subject matter. Dr. Arendt's book has a fashionable but rather misleading title. Its main theme is a classification and evaluation of human activity, rather than of the human "condition." Dr. Bay's likewise has a fashionable title—"structure" is a good word among the social scientists, just as "condition" is among the modern philosophers. Dr. Bay's title is reasonably descriptive of his work: his primary interest is a classification and evaluation of types of human freedom. The two works, for all their apparent diversity of topic and their great diversity of method and background, have something in common. Human activity is presumably what we do with our freedom: the opposite of freedom consists of restraints on human activity. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if each work shows some relevance to the other.

I

At the core of Dr. Arendt's work is a threefold classification of human activity into labor, work, and action. Labor is activity which in modern organizational theory would be called "homeostasis." It is the simple replacement of the inevitable wear and tear of moth, rust, and decay. Dishes get dirty and must be washed, breakfast is absorbed by the body and must be replaced by lunch, clothes wear out and must be

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renewed, people die and so babies must be born and children educated in the knowledge of their forebears. Dr. Arendt takes a low view of labor, as thus defined; she regards it essentially as brutish and uncreative, a mere curse of Adam imposed on mankind by the exigencies of mortality, both of men and of things.

The second category, work, stands somewhat higher, though not much, in her scale of values. She makes a good deal of linguistic distinctions between "the labor of our body and the work of our hands." Work is the activity of *homo faber*, the artisan, making new shapes out of inchoate matter, not merely replacing the broken pot of his ancestors (which would be labor), but making new pots, palaces, pictures, and perhaps even philosophies, out of the sheer lust of creation rather than out of any idea these things might be good for something or somebody. Work is evidently better than labor because it does not merely replace the old, but makes something new: hence it has something of the quality of art, as indeed the word "artisan" suggests. Nevertheless Dr. Arendt takes a somewhat Greek view of this activity, feeling that it is not the noblest activity of man, but is tainted with its essentially plebeian origin.

Man's fullest and noblest activity is her third category, which she calls "action." I confess I am not wholly clear where work leaves off and action begins. I get a certain impression, which may be unjust, that action consists mainly of political hell-raising and war-making in the manner of the Iliad and the Odyssey, combined possibly with heaven-raising and church-making. At any rate, action is political, intellectual, heroic, dramatic, exalted, noble and, to my humble way of thinking, possibly paranoiac. Action is peculiarly characteristic of what Dr. Arendt calls the "public realm." The great business of work is to create what she calls the "world," which is the physical stage of action. I must admit I occasionally got the impression that the main business of *homo faber* was to be a kind of stage carpenter for a princely masque, making the stage and scenery and properties among which the hero performs his "action."

II

Dr. Bay's book likewise is threaded on a threefold classification—it seems to be almost impossible for writers in the European tradition to avoid trinitarianism in some form. Here the distinction is made between psychological freedom, social freedom, and potential freedom. Psychological freedom seems almost to be equated with mental health, or at least with the ideal of the psychoanalysts. It is Bosanquet's "being our-

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selves" or Fromm's "spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality" (p. 84). Insofar as freedom is the absence of limitations, psychological freedom presumably consists in the absence of certain unnecessary and avoidable *internal* limitations, such as the kind of inner compulsions which arise out of traumatic experiences in childhood. Dr. Bay follows psychoanalytic theory, especially Henry Stack Sullivan's version, fairly closely.

Social freedom means "the relative absence of perceived external restraints on individual behavior" (p. 88). By contrast with psychological freedom, therefore, it concerns itself with the external rather than the internal limitations on human activity. The great enemy of social freedom is coercion, and especially physical coercion. Coercion however may be both private and social, and presumably the main justification for social coercion is that it is necessary to deal with the still more limiting private coercion which would take over if a degree of social coercion were not present.

Potential freedom is a more difficult and uncertain concept. The necessity for it arises out of the recognition that man not only may be coerced, but may be manipulated, and that manipulation in some sense is just as much a limitation on the autonomy of human action as is coercion. We are led by the nose as well as pushed around, and this also in some sense is a limitation on freedom. Dr. Bay recognizes of course that some degree of manipulation is necessary and inevitable in any kind of social intercourse; parents manipulate their children, teachers their students, employers their employees, and politicians their electorate. In spite of this near universality of manipulation, however, Dr. Bay is interested in defining some kind of legitimate bounds to it, which he finds in the idea of maximizing resistance to "special interest manipulation." I am afraid I find this a very unsatisfactory answer to the question of defining the legitimate limits of manipulation. One maximizes resistance, of course, by being dead, or at least deaf and blind, and in some sense all interests are "special," otherwise nobody would be interested in them! Nevertheless, the question which Dr. Bay has raised is a very important one, and it is no doubt more important to raise the right questions than to give the right answers in an enterprise of this kind.

III

It is curious that in spite of the fact that these two books are very different in spirit, method, and subject matter, their formal pattern is highly similar. Both begin with an introductory chapter which states the

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problem; both follow with a general section which brings out the underlying value positions of the authors, and then with three chapters on their fundamental trichotomy—labor, work, and action, in the case of Dr. Arendt; and psychological, social, and potential freedom, in the case of Dr. Bay. One hesitates to push the trinitarian analogy too far, but it is tempting to think of labor as in some sense the father and ground of all action, as psychological freedom is the father and ground of all freedom. Work then is the "Son," the embodiment of freedom in the historical institutions of society. And action is the "Holy Ghost" of human activity, the continual outworking of the human spirit looking toward the future, as potential freedom likewise looks to what man may be rather than to what he is.

The difference between the two works may be judged by a brief glance at their respective indexes. In each case I have noted the items receiving ten or more citations. In the case of Dr. Arendt these are Aristotle, Augustine, Christianity, City State, Contemplation, Etymology, Homer, Marx, Middle Ages, Nietzsche, Plato (42!), Rome, Slavery, Adam Smith, Socrates, and Thought. In the case of Dr. Bay they are Anomie, Anxiety, Authoritarianism, Bentham, Coercion, Defensiveness, Ego, Freedom, Frenkel-Brunswick, Freud, Fromm, Frustration, Godwin, Hobbes, Human Nature, Human Rights, Identification, Institutions, Kluckhohn, Lasswell, Locke, Maslow, Merton, Need, Neurosis, Parsons, Power, Psychological Freedom, Rationality, Repression, Riesman, Rousseau, Security, Self-esteem, and H. S. Sullivan. It is clear that Dr. Arendt has had her potential freedom limited by a good classical education, whereas one suspects that Dr. Bay is debarred from certain forms of contemplation, if not of action, by his evident membership in the sect of social scientists. In a sense, therefore, each of these books complements the other, to the degree at least that each reveals the deficiencies and virtues of the intellectual matrix from which they have been drawn. I must confess that in reading each I longed for the other, or at least for the other point of view. I read Dr. Arendt's book first, and as I breasted the limpid ocean of classical learning and philosophical lore, I longed for a little solid ground of social science. Then, being thrown up on Dr. Bay's rather forbidding and, I fear, infertile and dry shores, I found myself longing for the cool philosophical depths. Perhaps it is impossible to expect any one mind to encompass both the humanist and the social-scientific body of knowledge and wisdom, and I can certainly make no claims to do so myself, my claim to objectivity being based on an equal ignorance of both areas. But I am convinced that this union must be effected if much progress is to be made in the knowledge of

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man and society, even if we must make a rule that nobody can write a book in this area until he is fifty and has two Ph.D.'s.

IV

What, I ask myself, is the matter? Why is it that each of these books considered as a unit leaves me with a profound sense of dissatisfaction, in spite of the obvious competence of the authors in their respective fields? Both authors *are* competent, both write fluently, and there is the additional embarrassment that one is a lady and the other is a personal friend of the reviewer. But I have read both books with a mounting sense of frustration and irritation. Dr. Arendt's book, to be unchivalrously blunt, is glorified table talk, for which a classical education is an incomparable preparation. On almost every page, however, it implies assumptions about the nature of man for which no good evidence is presented. There is little awareness in it of the great movement in the social sciences of the last hundred years: Adam Smith and Karl Marx are about as far as she gets toward the twentieth century. Her value system likewise seems to me to have inconsistencies in it. (Whose doesn't? the reader may well reply!) But I cannot reconcile her very strong distaste for "labor"—that is, for the simple homeostatic activities of daily life—with her sensitive and sympathetic appreciation of the Christian value heritage. Surely even eating and drinking have something sacramental about them in the Christian scheme, and the idea that "laborare est orare" is a noble Christian contribution to the dignity of the daily round and the common task. Here perhaps we see a conflict between the Greek value system and the Jewish, which even today is a deep rift in our culture.

Again, granting her strong preference for "action" as against the more humdrum human activities, it is hard to account for her extreme distaste for space exploration, which would seem to be the present century's equivalent of the Odyssey. The pale light of a past golden age pervades the book, and there is little awareness of the grandeur and terror of the present. The three categories of labor, work, and action may have been fine in a pre-technical society, but even as categories of human activity they do not seem to fit the more complex world of today, with its innumerable grades of managerial activity, its gradual replacement of human labor, and even of "work," by machines of varying degrees of intelligence. Still less, it would seem, can these categories serve to rate human activity on a scale of values.

It is clear that I should turn with pleasure to the up-to-date modernity

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of Dr. Bay, not only because he is a great deal more explicit about his personal value system than is Dr. Arendt, but also because this value system is closer to my own and seems more in consonance with the needs and realities of today's world. Dr. Bay loves freedom and hates coercion and oppression, he is a champion of human rights, free expression, and the full development of the personality. If, following E. M. Forster, I can only give two cheers for Dr. Bay, it is mainly because of a certain lack of content and poverty of concepts. In spite of the fact that this is a long (though rather repetitious) work, I finished it with the feeling that a great many things had not been said which were relevant to the problem. In considerable measure this arises out of the limitations of the social sciences themselves. Like everyone else, social scientists tend to confine themselves to operations where they have a reasonable chance of success and can show results. They tend to limit themselves, therefore, to the simpler and less subtle aspects of human behavior. In their experimental work likewise they are apt to take material close to hand, rather than a careful sample of the human race. College sophomores and adolescent campers are for the social scientist what the fruit fly is for the geneticist; social scientists experiment on bank presidents as rarely as biologists on whales. It may be more dangerous, however, to generalize from the sophomore to the bank president than from the fruit fly to the whale. It is both a strength and a weakness of good social science that it establishes careful and exact generalizations from rather small samples of the "human condition." The care is all to the good, as opposed to the rash generalizations of the philosophers; the smallness of the sample, however, means that the conclusions are not always very significant. There is also a dangerous tendency to assume without proof that all human beings are really very much alike, and that what is true of a small sample of one culture is therefore true of the whole.

The great unanswered question of the social sciences, and the greatest lacuna in Dr. Bay's work, is that of the impact of genetic factors on human behavior and on social dynamics. It is perhaps because of the fear of racism that these questions are so seldom asked—though in fact genetics knows nothing of the "race" concept except as a very crude aggregate of gene distributions. One does not have to believe in "race," however, to think that individual human behavior is a complex growth pattern governed both by the individual's unalterable genetic heritage and by the constant formative impact of his experience. There is no way in the present state of knowledge of separating out these two elements, but neither one can be denied influence. If we admit this, then

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we must also admit that the dynamics of gene distribution in populations, and the change in gene distribution in time through mutation, gene loss, sexual selection, and the like may have a profound long-run influence on the kinds of people and the kinds of societies. Until we know more about this—and we now know practically nothing—we can hardly establish any firm generalizations about the distribution of psychological freedom, for instance, or about the institutions which may be necessary to cope with "original sin," or whatever it is in the human organism that moves it toward moral corruption. One does not even know whether to be optimistic or pessimistic—whether to adopt Dr. Bay's rather cheerfully eighteenth-century view of the perfectibility of man, or Reinhold Niebuhr's gloomy view of man's utter corruptibility. Plenty of evidence can be marshaled on both sides, and it would seem not only that man is constantly tempted to make God in his own image, but that each writer makes man and society in his own image also.

The other great lacuna in Dr. Bay's work, which is again characteristic of the social sciences, is in the treatment of "symbolic systems"—the great theologies and ideologies which sweep like storms through history, with so much both of bliss and bane in their wake. Dr. Bay is so much a child of the Enlightenment that he cannot really take very seriously the symbolic systems in which are embodied the religions, patriotisms, and political idealisms of mankind. By contrast, Dr. Arendt takes them too seriously—for instance, she takes both Marxism and atheism seriously, as challenges, in a way that rarely occurs to a thoroughgoing American, to whom Marxism is an obscure and out of date economic and social theory that seems inexplicably popular in some outlandish parts of the world, and atheism is just another sect, or Church of Your Choice, like the Ethical Culture Society. (It took America to turn religion, the source of so much exaltation and anguish, into another consumer good.) If the philosopher's treatment of these matters is too personal and fanciful, without any solid empirical base, the social scientist's treatment of them is one of complete neglect. The social scientist is not altogether to be blamed for this. Social science looks for regularities and invariances, without which science is helpless. It is happiest with the more regular and mechanical aspects of social institutions and behavior. There may indeed be a mechanics of symbolic systems, but we do not know much about it: it is a mechanics characterized, if it exists, by wild step-functions, discontinuities, and unpredictabilities, where "a little more, and O! how much it is, a little less, and ah! what worlds away!" What social scientist could detect by his methods the difference between, say, the little groups around Jesus, Mohammed, or even Hitler

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in their very beginnings and innumerable similar little groups of which nothing has ever been heard? It is at this point that one feels most deeply the inadequacy of scientific method applied to man and society, or, at least, of such crude scientific methods as we now have.

It is at this point also that one feels a certain lack of content in Dr. Bay's (and the social scientist's) ideal of self-expression. Self-expression, yes, but *what* self? The human organism is so complex symbolically that it is capable of burgeoning in a thousand different directions; it is not like an acorn, which can only become an oak, but a seed which has equally within it the capacity for development into saint or into devil, or more likely into a commonplace, dull suburbanite leading a life of quiet desperation. The heroic, diabolic, and divine aspects of human life escape Dr. Bay's calm and sensible eye, yet it is these aspects which are crucial to the discussion of freedom. Perhaps the real difficulty is that freedom is a very negative concept. It is the absence of restraint, as saving is the absence of consumption. These negative concepts, however, are treacherous; it is as hard to say what we are prevented from doing as it is to say what we abstained from consuming: it is like asking someone, "What didn't you have for dinner last night?" If we try to translate the problem into positive terms, however, and talk about psychological, social, and potential *power* rather than freedom, the question of the *content* of this power cannot be avoided: power to do *what* is the crucial question. And this lands us squarely in the old problem of the nature of man, which we are certainly not going to solve in a brief article or even in two substantial books.

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POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND POLITICS

By SIDNEY VERBA

Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958, 475 pp. $7.50.
Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1959, 175 pp. $4.00.
Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1959, 374 pp. $7.50.

THROUGHOUT the history of the study of politics, theories of political society have been based on theories of human nature. Thus the study of the psychology of political behavior lies firmly within the tradition of political thought. But a gap has developed between our theories of individual political behavior and our theories of how political society (or, to use the current term, the political system) operates. If we are to develop a science of politics—that is, a science that deals with the total political process on both the individual and the system level—we shall have to close this gap.

Studies of the psychology of political behavior have asked a number of the right questions about the nature of Political Man: Is he rational, or does he behave the way he does because of social and psychological pressures he knows little about? Does he vote the way he does because of his social class, because his friends vote that way, or because his father voted (or didn't vote) that way? Does he know anything about the issues of politics? Does Political Man lust unceasingly after power? Or is his political lust merely the sublimation of some primitive childhood lust? These are important questions, and studies of the psychology of politics have given us important and fascinating answers to some of them. But though much is said on the various social and psychological influences that lead to a particular voting choice, there seems to be little concern over who won the election—i.e., what the effect of all this is on the political system. Moreover, the converse question of the impact of the political system on individual political behavior has received less attention than it deserves. By sticking too close to the non-political forces that impinge on the individual and by ignoring for the most part the interrelationship between an individual's political behavior and the political system in which he lives, the study of political behavior has divorced itself somewhat from the study of politics.

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At the other extreme from the studies of the roots of individual political behavior are the theories of the operation of political systems. These theories are characterized by high-level generalizations about the equilibrium of political systems or the structure and functions of political institutions. Individual members of the system are taken into consideration only insofar as they occupy some system-determined role. The pressures that determine their behavior, their individual needs and objectives, are ignored. In this way, the theories of political systems tend to be abstract and, like the psychological theories of political behavior, divorced somewhat from politics.

Both of these trends—the study of individual political behavior and the study of political systems—are in the right direction and both have, in this writer's opinion, produced significant results. But work in both these fields would be more fruitful if their directions could be co-ordinated. If the two levels of analysis can be brought closer together, we will have taken a significant step forward on the long road toward a scientific theory of politics.

I

The three new books from the Free Press that are reviewed here deal with the level of individual political behavior, but all three make significant contributions to the linking of political behavior with the political system. These books do not present new studies of political behavior, but attempt to bring together and evaluate much of what has been done in the field. As such, they are useful in defining the present state of our knowledge and in suggesting what remains to be done.

American Voting Behavior, edited by Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, contains a series of essays on four voting studies—three American and one British.[1] There are critiques of the studies as well as suggestions for further research. The authors include "sociologists, psychologists, market forecasters, political theorists, economists and humanists." As a study of a particular significant body of research, the book stands in the same tradition of "continuities in social research" as the studies of *The American Soldier* and *The Authori-*

[1] P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, 1948; B. R. Berelson and P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Voting*, Chicago, 1954; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides*, Evanston, Ill., 1954; and R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie, *Straight Fight*, London, 1954.

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tarian Personality.[2] But in comparison with these earlier efforts, *American Voting Behavior* seems rather thin. Though several of the essays are extremely perceptive and provocative, the contributions are in the main too short and rather narrowly focused. The wide range of interests on the part of the various authors and the lack of any apparent order in the presentation of the essays give the book a disjointed quality. Yet, because it deals with a significant body of research and because a number of the essays raise significant theoretical and methodological questions, this is an important book.

Herbert Hyman's *Political Socialization* is an inventory and analysis of those studies that deal with adult political behavior as the product of childhood learning and socialization. The adult forms of behavior whose roots in childhood he seeks are "*participation* or involvement in politics, and granted the involvement, whether the *goals* of action are towards radical or conservative ends *and* towards democratic or authoritarian forms" (p. 15). He treats the substantive findings on the influence of age on political behavior, the influence of various socializing agencies on the attitudes of youth, and the interaction between parental attitudes and the wider environment in developing political attitudes. There is a careful consideration of the methodological problems involved in isolating the various influences. The book is an impressive essay in secondary analysis.

Political Life by Robert E. Lane is the most ambitious and broadest of the three books we are considering. The study, as the title suggests, covers the range of the individual's political life—participating in elections and in political organizations, trying to influence government officials, following political affairs in the media, and discussing politics. One advantage of Lane's definition of political life is that it emphasizes the wide choice of political activity open to the citizen above and beyond his vote. After cataloguing the various forms of participation, Lane presents an exhaustive study of the literature on the factors, both social and psychological, that influence participation. He surveys the roles of conscious and unconscious needs and of primary and secondary groups in patterning political behavior. For each topic, Lane presents a set of general hypotheses suggested by the data. Though many of these hypotheses are premature and insufficiently supported—the fault lies in the data, not in Lane, who is aware of

[2] Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier,"* Glencoe, Ill., 1950; and Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality,"* Glencoe, Ill., 1954.

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the limitations—they are provocative and suggest numerous relationships deserving of further study.

II

On one thing all three books are agreed: the image of Rational Political Man is a false one. The citizen is rare who participates in politics on the basis of thought-out principle or calculated interest. Issue-oriented voters—i.e., voters who perceive that their needs are best served by a particular political party and who vote on the basis of that perception—are the exception. The image that replaces Political Man is that of Apolitical Man. What are the characteristics of Apolitical Man? He understands little about the issues of politics. (Lane cites a finding by Kornhauser that 73 per cent of a sample of urban workers agreed with the statement that "Politics and government are so complicated that the average person cannot really understand what's going on"—p. 170.) He votes or participates, not as a calculating rational citizen, but as a member of a social class or ethnic group. (The voting studies of Lazarsfeld and associates stress the high correlation between voting intention and social group.) Furthermore, he tends to vote as his closest associates vote—as his father customarily voted, as his current family votes, as his friends and fellow workers vote. (This, too, is a finding of the Lazarsfeld voting studies and is supported by findings reported in Hyman and in the essay by Riecken in *American Voting Behavior*.) The image created is of an individual responding rather blindly to a host of social pressures, but unconcerned with the political aspects (interests, issues, principles) of his participation. Or the image of Apolitical Man can be made even more apolitical by pushing the analysis one step further to seek the roots of political behavior in pre-social and unconscious needs. (According to C. W. Wahl, one of the contributors to *American Voting Behavior*, ". . . secondary identifications, such as our choice of political party, . . . are primarily expressions of individual needs to secure gratification of suppressed wishes for a certain type of parental image; a type that will vary depending on the nature and circumstances of the past parental relationship"—pp. 263-64.)

The model of Apolitical Man is not false, but it is certainly incomplete. Neither the social-pressure model nor the unconscious-need model leaves much room for political forces, yet political forces, strange as it may seem, still play a significant role in determining political behavior. Most of the studies surveyed in the three books

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under discussion support the "apolitical" model, but each also contains significant material that indicates its inadequacy. It is true that a large proportion of citizens vote as their social groups vote. But analysis of individual voting choice in terms of social pressure does not explain why some groups generate pressures in favor of one party and some in favor of another, nor does it explain change in voting rates for the various parties from election to election. As Key and Munger point out in their essay in *American Voting Behavior*, salient *political* issues that differ from election to election make certain social groups relevant in some elections and not in others. An individual's social characteristics may help to determine his vote, but an individual has many social characteristics. In one election he may vote as a Catholic, in another as a worker, and in another as a person of Polish descent. Similarly, the larger political scene influences the pattern of political behavior transmitted in the face-to-face group. Children, as Hyman stresses, are exposed to an outside environment as well as to parental influence, and this outside environment can intervene in the process of attitude formation. This outside environment contains such crisis political events as war and depression, as well as—which may be more significant—such long-term social changes as an increase in the length of schooling or a change in what is taught in school. Furthermore, the political norms of the outside community will influence the degree to which familial political behavior is transmitted from generation to generation. Thus, the Elmira voting study found that Republican parents were more able than Democratic parents to transmit their voting preference to their children because their views were not in conflict with the predominant political views of the Republican community. Similarly, in Democratic Cambridge, Massachusetts, children of Democratic parents were more likely to follow the parental lead in voting than were children of Republican parents. (See Hyman, pp. 112-15.) The model of the voting choice must be extended to include political pressures on social groups—political pressures that are then translated into group pressures on the individual voter. A promising model that would include such social forces is suggested by Luce in his essay in *American Voting Behavior*.

Thus, even if the individual voter does not choose a party on the basis of policy but merely follows the trend of his social group, politics come in somewhere along the line. And if the average citizen does not measure up to the model of the "rational citizen," this may be because we have made the requirements too stringent. The issues in elections are so complex and, especially in a two-party system, the

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programs of the parties so ambiguous and similar that rational choice, in the strict sense of choosing the best alternative from all those available on the basis of the perception of one's needs, is impossible. If rational choice is impossible, we must, as Parsons suggests in his essay in the Burdick and Brodbeck book, be satisfied with an *adequate* choice. Choosing as one's peers and close associates choose may be such an adequate choice. It is reassuring to vote in this way, and—politically speaking—usually expresses a demand, if not for a particular set of policies, then for a policy direction favorable to one's group. In fact, rational choice in the strict sense may be difficult, if not impossible, in most political situations. Rational decision assumes knowledge of all possible choices, accurate calculation of the probable results of each choice, and a calculation of the value of each to the decision-maker. Such information is usually impossible to obtain, or quite expensive in terms of time and effort. Given the limited effect the average voter can have on the outcome of an election and given his many other non-political interests, it would probably be quite *irrational* to attempt *too* rational an approach to politics. It may not be worth it to be *that* good a citizen.[3]

If the social-pressure theories are inadequate for understanding how a political and electoral system operates, the psychoanalytic theories are even more inadequate. While no one can deny the important effects of unconscious strivings on social acts, there is a great gap between this type of interpretation and the understanding of political systems. In the first place, on the level of individual analysis, psychoanalytic theories cannot explain and predict political choices. A psychological pressure usually has the curious ability of working in opposite political directions in different people. Lane, for instance, points out that "deprivation in respect and affection at an earlier age" leads to a power orientation to politics. But this power orientation can be manifested in one of two ways: the individual may submit to power and become completely passive and politically apathetic, or he may deny power to all others and become rebellious and domineering (Lane, pp. 125-26). Renneker, in Burdick and Brodbeck, stresses the importance of the father's political orientation in determining the son's political behavior. In the cases he cites, sons reacted in one

[3] In this connection, see James March and Herbert Simon, "The Cognitive Limits of Rationality," in *Organizations*, New York, 1958, ch. 6. Their discussion of the difficulties of rational choice in administration is relevant to the problem facing the average citizen. If the administrator, whom we assume has more information and greater motivation to make rational choices, is limited in his rationality, we must not expect too much from the man in the street.

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of three ways to their fathers' political views: "(1) Blind perpetuation as a symptomatic manifestation of failure of maturation. (2) Total rejection as a symptomatic manifestation of neurotic rebellion against father. . . . (3) Confrontation and testing of various portions with the facts of changing reality of the self and the external world" (p. 400). It would be hard to predict political behavior from such models.

Before we can predict how psychological pressures will manifest themselves politically, we must have more information—particularly on how the political system structures political alternatives. It is true, as Lane points out, that some people joined the American Communist Party to satisfy neurotic aggressive needs or to accommodate deviant sex roles (p. 121), or, as Renneker suggests, to react against the conservative politics of the "negative father" (Burdick and Brodbeck, pp. 408-9). But such a reaction depends upon the existence of a radical Communist Party as a political alternative. Otherwise such neurotic pressures might lead to support of a right-wing radical party, to withdrawal from politics, or to some other reaction. The psychological source would be the same, but the political behavior and the consequences for the political system would be quite different. Furthermore, though such neurotic pressures explain Communist Party membership for some people, a large proportion of American Communist Party supporters come from radical families, and, of course, in other countries such affiliation can have a much more concrete economic basis. The type of analysis suggested by the psychiatric contributors to *American Voting Behavior* may be adequate for understanding the political behavior of some individuals—the authors' patients, most likely—but it is less useful in explaining the outcome of elections and how a political system operates.

The emphasis on the implicit, psychoanalytic roots of political behavior has led to an underestimation of the more direct and manifestly political influences on political attitudes. This is especially the case in studies of political socialization. Most studies of the effects of family background on politics have stressed latent political socialization in the family—socialization into non-political attitudes and roles that have political side-effects. Thus the emphasis has been on the amount of affection a child receives in the family or the degree to which the family is dominated by the father. These influences are then related to such implicit, personality-oriented attitudes as authoritarianism or self-confidence. Data presented by Hyman, however, suggest that these

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latent patterns of socialization may not be as important as the more manifestly political ones. Thus, the adult pattern most clearly differentiated in childhood is party affiliation. Furthermore, while there is little evidence of an implicit personality-oriented authoritarianism among children, studies have found that manifestly political authoritarian attitudes (say, opposition to civil rights) are more highly developed at a young age. "The data suggest . . . that perhaps such 'implicit authoritarianism' may emerge from factors present in the experience of *adults* and that ideological aspects of authoritarianism may be transmitted directly, without benefit of fundamental reorganization of the personality" (Hyman, p. 47). The area of manifest political socialization—the perceptions children develop of politics, political figures, and political authority, and the values they are taught relative to participation in politics or obedience to laws—certainly deserves further careful exploration.

III

One reason why the influence of the political system on political behavior has been inadequately considered is that in most studies the relevant political system has remained constant. For example, with a few exceptions in the Hyman book and an essay in Burdick and Brodbeck, all the material in these three books is based on studies in the United States.[4] This is a serious limitation. Without material from other political systems it is difficult to tell to what extent the hypothesized relationships between psychological or demographic variables and political behavior are specific to the American political system. The effect of the political system is obscured by the fact that only one system is considered. Take the relationship between class and political activity. Lane cites material to support the well-known proposition that rates of participation in politics vary with such social-class indices as occupation and education. Those with higher education or in higher occupational groups participate more frequently in politics. In an interesting chapter entitled "Why Lower-Status People Participate Less," he suggests a number of explanations for this phenomenon. The explanations are in terms of the characteristics of the demographic groups: lower-status people are less self-confident, their level of political skill is lower, they have a smaller stake in the issues of politics, lower-status women have less leisure time, and so forth. But it may be that the

[4] Though *American Voting Behavior* is based on one British and three American voting studies, there is, with the exception of the essay by Milne, almost no comparison of the material on British and American voting behavior.

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institutional structure of the American political system plays a major role in determining this relationship between status and participation. A study of the rates of participation in Norway indicates that there is no regular relationship between level of education and participation in politics, and that the relationship between occupation and participation is in striking contrast to that in the United States. Workers and farmers in Norway are the most active groups, white-collar workers the least. Angus Campbell and Stein Rokkan, who cite these findings, attribute the difference between the two countries to a difference in the party structure. In the heterogeneous American parties, generalized status factors count for more than they do in the Norwegian parties, which have a more homogeneous class base.[5] Further comparative studies might indicate what other relationships between social and psychological variables, on the one hand, and political behavior, on the other, are specific to a particular system. It may well be that some of the hypothesized relationships between psychological attributes and political activity are specific to the American political system and that in other systems another type of personality is more likely to be recruited into politics.

Comparative studies would greatly increase the precision of our explanations of political behavior. Too often we make *post hoc* explanations of a set of data, and this type of explanation is often too facile. A plausible interpretation can be given, no matter how the data come out. Higher-income people are more active in politics? Of course! They have a higher stake in society, they have greater skills, they have "middle-class values." Lower-income people participate more? Naturally! They have greater relative deprivation, they need social services, they are discontented. If, however, we could find different relationships between income and political activity in different societies, we might begin to isolate those variables in the political and social structure that intervene between class and political behavior. In a system in which income and activity were found to be inversely related, we could attempt to see which factors are present of those believed to be important in determining the direct connection usually found between income and activity, and which factors are missing. In this way we could begin to isolate strategic variables. The analysis of political systems that deviate from our general rules would be a fruitful task.

[5] Angus Campbell and Stein Rokkan, "Factors in the Recruitment of Active Participants in Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Survey Data for Norway and the United States," *International Social Science Journal*, forthcoming.

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IV

I have tried to show that the effect of the political system on the individual must be considered if one wants to explain political behavior. Conversely, study of the sources of individual political behavior should increase our understanding of political systems. People may orient to politics in terms of their neurotic needs or in terms of their attitudes toward political issues. What is the effect on the political system—on its stability, its cohesion, its ability to adjust to new demands—of different percentages of each type? What is the effect on the political system of intense party affiliation, of large differences among groups in perception of the political process, of differences in political values between elite and mass? The answers to these sorts of questions would illuminate the effects on political systems of different types of political behavior.

The apolitical models of voting, by concentrating on the determinants of individual voting choice, often underrate the political effects of voting. In the apolitical model—in which rational choice is difficult because of the complexity of the issues and the similarity of the parties, and in which people will vote for the same candidate for the most diverse of reasons—the vote seems to have little political function. Voting may perform a cathartic or tension-releasing function for the individual. Or, if it performs some function for the political system, that function is basically an affirmation of loyalty—an important function, but one that hardly differentiates the electoral process from loyalty ceremonies in non-democratic states.

But the meaning of the vote from the point of view of the individual may not be the same as the meaning of the vote from the point of view of the political system. The vote, as several of the authors in *American Voting Behavior* point out, is a simplified decision and the choice to support a particular party can have a wide variety of sources. (See the essays by Wahl and Fiedler in Burdick and Brodbeck.) But this does not mean that the vote has little significance. On the contrary, it is just this simplification that represents the political significance of the vote. It is the function of a political party system—especially a two-party system—to force the wide diversity of voters into the folds of one of the two major parties so that the infinite variety of individual interests and needs can be co-ordinated in a stable political system.[6]

[6] See the essay by Parsons in *American Voting Behavior* on the subject of individual voting choices in a two-party system. In stressing the difference in the meaning of the vote on the level of individual choice and on the level of the political system, he makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the interrelationship between individual political behavior and the political system.

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Similarly, the denigration of the significance of the vote because the individual has difficulty in choosing which party rationally to support misses the political impact of voting. In a two-party system it is to be expected that both parties will have similar policies. They will usually be courting the same "swing" voters. It may be that one ought not to compare the policies of one party with the policies of the other *vis-à-vis* a group of voters. Rather, one should compare the policies of *both* parties *vis-à-vis* a group of voters with the policies that both parties would have adopted if that particular group did not have the vote. Thus, both Labour and Conservatives court the working-class vote in Britain and their policies overlap to some extent. But the policies of both major parties toward the working classes would be quite different if workers had not received the vote in the late nineteenth century. The important point is that both parties adjust their policies to please significant blocs of voters. If this reduces the difference between the parties, it does not diminish the political significance of the vote. Furthermore, the vote affects more than party platforms. As Lane points out, in areas where Negroes can vote, they tend to be treated better by the police, to have better schools, and to be the beneficiaries of civil rights legislation (p. 338). Government officials can tell constituents from non-constituents.

V

In their preface, the editors of *American Voting Behavior* ask, "Where do we go from here . . .?" and the other two books implicitly pose the same question. If they do not answer that question, they do give a fairly good answer to the more important one: "Where are we?" From the vast amount of material these books bring together, it is clear that we have come a long way in our study of political behavior. But perhaps we have progressed too fast or too haphazardly. In reading these books, one is almost overwhelmed by the number of interpretations of political behavior. "The dilemma of the social sciences is not . . . a paucity of statistically significant correlations, but . . . an overabundance of moderate but significant ones currently lacking acceptable causal explanations and thus failing to suggest which relationships are basic."[7] We have yet to isolate the strategic correlates of political behavior or to find the strategic connections between political behavior and the political system.

These works make several suggestions for future research that might reduce the gaps in our knowledge. They can be mentioned only briefly

[7] R. Duncan Luce, "Group Voting Patterns," in Burdick and Brodbeck, *op.cit.*, p. 333.

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here. For one thing, studies of political behavior might pay more attention to the political correlates of that behavior—". . . the nature of the individual's identification with the community and the nation, the character of his identification with political party, his perception of the political world, his general orientation toward complexes of policy questions, his conception of his role as a voter and as a citizen."[8] Furthermore, though there are obvious advantages in the representative sample, much can be done with special samples or oversamples of groups with particular political significance—"swing" voters, groups experiencing cross-pressures, or political elites. (See the essay by Rossi in Burdick and Brodbeck.) As Key and Munger point out, "The answers one gets depend in part on the kind of questions he asks" (p. 299). Much questioning is still to be done.

[8] V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "The Case of Indiana," in *ibid.*, p. 299.

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GROUPES DE PRESSION EN FRANCE ET AILLEURS

By JACQUES FREYMOND

Henry W. Ehrmann, ed., *Interest Groups on Four Continents*, Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, 316 pp. $6.00.

Jean Meynaud, *Les Groupes de Pression en France* (No. 95, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris, Armand Colin, 1958, 371 pp.

QUE l'étude des groupes de pression ait fait, au cours de ces dernières années, de réels progrès hors des Etats-Unis, et plus particulièrement en Europe, nul n'en doute. Il suffit pour s'en convaincre de lire deux ouvrages parus en 1958. Dans l'un, Jean Meynaud, professeur de science politique aux universités de Lausanne et de Genève, s'attache à l'examen des groupes de pression en France, tandis que l'autre, publié sous la direction du professeur Henry W. Ehrmann, couvre un champ plus vaste en donnant un aperçu de l'état des problèmes dans les quatre continents.

I

Jean Meynaud, au moment où il entreprenait cette étude, connaissait le nombre et la dimension des obstacles qu'il allait rencontrer. Il savait qu'il pénétrait sur une terre encore loin d'être défrichée et que, si bien équipé qu'il fût lui-même, les instruments de travail dont il pouvait disposer étaient singulièrement insuffisants. Tout cela il le dit dans son introduction: A "l'insuffisance de la documentation" s'ajoute "la faiblesse," "l'inexistence de la théorie politique." C'est pourquoi cet audacieux très sagement limite ses objectifs: il s'agit avant tout, dans cet ouvrage, de "faciliter l'établissement des études monographiques et la formulation des normes méthodologiques qui permettront de les dépasser." On saura gré à l'auteur de cette réserve qui, loin d'être imposée par l'ignorance, est au contraire le produit d'une longue et fructueuse recherche conduite par un esprit pénétrant. Cette étude est d'un homme admirablement informé de l'histoire de son pays, et capable aussi bien de procéder à une analyse poussée des structures sociales que d'apprécier l'influence plus subtile des jeux politiques. D'où l'articulation si claire d'un ouvrage qui, après avoir défini le phénomène de pression et circonscrit ce "groupe de pression" aux contours imprécis, donne un remarquable tableau d'ensemble des divers types d'organisation, des

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éléments de leur puissance (structures internes—techniques d'action—statut social), des facteurs de tactique (voies d'accès—distribution des intérêts), pour terminer par un examen de la place des groupes de pression dans la vie politique, auquel il ajoute même un essai d'application des critères et des cadres de références qu'il a élaborés aux groupes internationaux.

Jean Meynaud avait voulu créer une base de départ pour d'autres études plus poussées. Il y a pleinement réussi. Car son ouvrage n'est pas seulement une excellente introduction à l'analyse de la vie politique en France. Plus encore que des renseignements de faits ou un essai de classification des divers types de groupes de pression, de leur importance relative et des modalités de leur action, il a fourni une méthode d'investigation et d'évaluation. Tous les "political scientists" qui, à l'avenir, aborderont le sujet, trouveront dans cet ouvrage le meilleur guide et tout ce qu'on peut souhaiter, c'est qu'ils y mettent autant de clarté et de sens des nuances que celui qui leur ouvre ainsi la voie. Ce livre, en effet, est marqué par la probité intellectuelle de son auteur et par une culture qu'on ne trouve pas toujours chez les spécialistes de science politique. Jean Meynaud ne prétend pas découvrir un phénomène nouveau. Il rappelle que les sociétés politiques des siècles précédents ont, elles aussi, subi l'influence de groupes de pression dont les historiens ont parfois reconstitué l'action. Loin de chercher à réserver une espèce de monopole de ce type d'étude aux "political scientists," il pousse au contraire à une collaboration interdisciplinaire, car il sait bien que rien ne serait plus faux que d'isoler une catégorie de phénomènes pour leur attribuer une influence prépondérante ou exclusive. Très justement, il dénonce la tendance actuelle à tout expliquer par le *lobby* érigé en mythe. "Il est toujours tentant," écrit-il, "de partir à la recherche du facteur unique d'explication d'une situation complexe: la commodité acquise grâce à l'effort de simplification l'est au détriment de la plénitude et plus simplement du réalisme de l'interprétation. Si importante soit l'étude des groupes de pression pour la compréhension des phénomènes, elle ne constitue qu'une partie de la tâche à remplir pour une analyse complète et équilibrée du système politique" (p. 347). C'est le bon sens même.

II

Interest Groups on Four Continents a été, on le sait probablement, préparé dans des circonstances particulières. Il s'agit d'un ouvrage collectif qui contient les rapports préparés pour la "Round Table" tenue à Pittsburgh en septembre 1957 par l'Association internationale de Science

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politique. On y trouve par conséquent, après le mémoire introductif de Henry W. Ehrmann, rapporteur général, les rapports nationaux sur l'Australie (W. A. Townsley), la Finlande (Lola Krusius-Ahrenberg), la France (Georges Lavau), l'Allemagne (Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber), la Grande-Bretagne (Samuel E. Finer), le Japon (Kiyoski Tsuji), la Suède (Gunnar Heckscher), les Etats-Unis (Samuel J. Eldersveld), la Yougoslavie (Jovan Djordjevic). Un compte-rendu des débats qui se sont déroulés à Pittsburgh constitue la dernière section du volume.

Si l'ouvrage de Jean Meynaud prétendait constituer un point de départ pour l'étude des problèmes dans un pays, celui dont Henry W. Ehrmann assume avec autorité la direction, entend présenter, par une coupe à travers les divers pays considérés, un état de la question. On pourrait penser que dans ces conditions, ce livre pèche par le manque d'unité qui caractérise les ouvrages collectifs. Ce n'est pas le cas. Certes les rapports nationaux reflètent et même soulignent l'inégalité du développement de la recherche d'un pays à l'autre. Entre les résultats obtenus aux Etats-Unis d'un côté, et ceux sur lesquels peuvent s'appuyer le rapporteur australien ou son collègue finnois, la différence est sensible. "On the subject of pressure groups," écrit W. A. Townsley, "the first studies have yet to be made" (p. 9). De son côté Lola Krusius-Ahrenberg conclut son essai par cette remarque: "In spite of the influence they exercise, the pressure groups have thus far not been subject to scientific study and there is almost no literature dealing with their power and activities or with the question of their place in the political structure of Finland" (p. 58).

Mais la diversité des situations n'a pas constitué un obstacle majeur à l'entente nécessaire sur la manière d'aborder le sujet. Cela, on le doit très particulièrement à la méthode de travail adoptée par le rapporteur général. Henry W. Ehrmann, qui pouvait s'appuyer sur l'abondante littérature américaine sur le sujet et sur l'expérience pratique qu'il avait acquise lui-même par ses recherches sur la politique du patronat français,[1] a su, en effet, fournir les définitions fondamentales, circonscrire le sujet et proposer un plan d'investigation acceptable qui dans l'essentiel a été suivi non pas seulement pour la rédaction des rapports nationaux, mais également lors des discussions qui ont eu lieu à Pittsburgh. Aussi n'est-il pas surprenant que les participants aient exprimé leur satisfaction du succès assez exceptionnel de cette conférence et leur désir de mettre leurs collègues moins privilégiés qu'eux au bénéfice des résultats qui avaient été ainsi obtenus. On ne saurait que les remercier. L'ouvrage,

[1] Henry W. Ehrmann, *Organized Business in France*, Princeton, N.J., 1957.

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en effet, constitue une excellente mise au point qui donne à chacun la possibilité de prendre conscience du travail accompli, des progrès à faire et des directions dans lesquelles s'engager.

III

Car il reste du chemin à parcourir, même aux Etats-Unis. Sur ce point, chacun s'accorde. En ce qui concerne l'identification des groupes de pression par exemple. Il suffit de se reporter au compte-rendu des débats de Pittsburgh pour se rendre compte de l'incertitude qui règne encore à ce sujet même parmi les spécialistes. Les définitions, pourtant, ne manquent pas, auxquelles les uns et les autres peuvent se référer; celle de David Truman par exemple, ou celle proposée par Jean Meynaud qui, comme le note Henry Ehrmann, sont assez proches l'une de l'autre.[2] Mais le désaccord apparait au moment où l'on commence à discuter de leur application concrète, de manière à bien préciser ce qui distingue un groupe d'intérêts d'un parti politique, ou à définir les caractères de la pression.

C'est sur ce point précis, en effet, que les résultats sont les plus maigres. S'il est, à notre avis, possible d'identifier les groupes d'intérêts et même de marquer ce qui les distingue des partis politiques—quoique la limite ne soit pas toujours facile à fixer—il est beaucoup plus difficile de démontrer comment s'exerce la pression et surtout d'en fournir une preuve tangible. On peut bien établir des listes d'organisations diverses dont les statuts ou dont les déclarations des dirigeants révèlent les intentions. On peut même bâtir des schémas d'organisation, pour ne pas parler d'organigrammes, qui, mettant à jour le réseau des relations personnelles, dévoileraient du même coup les canaux par lesquels s'exercent les influences des groupements d'intérêts sur l'opinion, sur les partis, sur le législatif, sur l'administration ou sur le gouvernement. Mais le tableau le plus convaincant n'apporte rien de plus que des présomptions; de même la reconstitution des mécanismes par lesquels peut s'exercer la pression. Si l'on veut fournir la preuve qu'une pression a été réellement exercée, il faut disposer d'un dossier nourri de faits, et ces faits sont difficiles sinon parfois impossibles à établir. Sans doute est-il possible de raisonner par analogie et, grâce à une analyse poussée des structures

[2] "Any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes" (Truman). "Associations of various juridical forms which upon the basis of common pools or attitudes endeavor to impose a certain number of positions and demands by all means at their disposal, but especially by pressure on the public authorities" (Meynaud). Ehrmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 236-37.

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économiques, sociales et politiques, grâce à une reconstitution serrée des circonstances de tels évènements, d'établir un réseau d'hypothèses fort valables. Mais encore faut-il se rappeler qu'il ne s'agit là que d'hypothèses à vérifier. Or il n'est pas certain que la vérification donne les résultats qu'on attendait. Les recherches faites en histoire économique et sociale, les nombreuses études consacrées aux origines des guerres mondiales ont conduit à réviser certaines théories décidément trop simplistes dont une connaissance trop générale du déroulement des faits avait facilité l'élaboration. Ainsi en est-il, par exemple, de la théorie léniniste de l'impérialisme.

Aussi faut-il souhaiter que le nombre des monographies consacrées à des groupes de pression ou à l'histoire de groupements d'intérêts, d'organisations professionnelles ou d'associations de types divers ne cesse de croître. Sans se faire pourtant trop d'illusions. Les ouvrages de Jean Meynaud et surtout de Henry W. Ehrmann qui nous apportent de nombreuses informations intéressantes et inédites sur le patronat français, nous permettront-ils non seulement d'en suivre la politique, mais encore d'en mesurer l'influence au moment où se prennent certaines décisions politiques? Cela n'est pas certain. Une recherche que nous avons été amenée à faire sur un problème particulier, celui de la Sarre, nous a contraint tout d'abord à apprécier l'hermétisme des responsables, puis à modifier notre hypothèse de départ pour nous amener ensuite à constater qu'en fait la considération des intérêts politiques que présentait le rattachement économique de la Sarre à la France avait prévalu sur celle des intérêts économiques et que dans l'ensemble de la période considérée, les réactions du secteur—assez important—de l'industrie française touché par l'évolution de la question sarroise avaient été à la fois confuses et contradictoires.

Les industriels français, d'autre part, ont dû accepter finalement le Plan Schuman auquel ils avaient fait une opposition vigoureuse. Ce qui rappelle, comme le note Jean Meynaud, "que l'action des groupes de pression n'aboutit pas nécessairement au succès" (p. 269). Ce qui nous rend également attentifs au fait que les pressions des divers groupements d'intérêts ou des associations ne s'exercent pas toujours dans le même sens, que l'opinion, que les partis sont le plus souvent agités par des courants contradictoires et que de ce fait l'exécutif retrouve une relative liberté de décision et d'action. La multiplication des monographies, si désirable soit-elle, ne nous mène donc qu'à mi-chemin. Car c'est l'évaluation du rôle des groupes de pression dans la vie politique et de leur influence relative dans la conduite des affaires de la nation qui reste l'objectif final de toute étude les concernant.

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IV

Que dire alors de l'étude des groupes internationaux, si ce n'est qu'elle est à peine esquissée? Les historiens sans doute ont apporté déjà d'importantes contributions, très particulièrement pour la période antérieure à 1914. On trouve également des renseignements utiles dans certaines des monographies qui ont été consacrées à des grandes compagnies internationales et à leur politique à l'égard de certains petits Etats ou de leur propre gouvernement. Mais il ne s'agit là, en fait, que de recherches assez fragmentaires et trop souvent marquées par le désir de démontrer. Aussi peut-on dire vraiment que l'essentiel reste à faire. Mais là de nouveau on se heurte au problème presque insoluble que pose l'accessibilité aux sources. Quelles sont en effet les grandes "corporations" qui sont disposées à ouvrir leurs archives au "political scientist"? Comment étudier de manière scientifique les relations des grandes compagnies pétrolières avec les Etats du Moyen-Orient? Les gouvernements sont-ils d'ailleurs plus disposés à fournir les documents? Encore faudrait-il qu'il y ait des documents ou que ces "documents" rendent compte des négociations qui bien souvent ne sont pas consignées dans un procès-verbal.

Les grandes "corporations" ne sont d'ailleurs pas les seuls groupements d'intérêts internationaux. Jean Meynaud, très justement, signale le vaste champ d'investigation qu'offrent les organisations internationales non gouvernementales. Il est bien probable, en effet, que la recherche puisse être poussée avec profit dans cette direction. Les organisations non gouvernementales représentent des intérêts extrêmement divers sans doute, mais identifiables. Elles peuvent avoir des objectifs plus ou moins précis, mais elles n'en cherchent pas moins à exercer une influence selon des méthodes et des techniques dont il n'est pas sans intérêt de prendre connaissance. Il est très certain qu'un examen attentif de leur action, celle par exemple des grandes organisations syndicales internationales, à l'intérieur des Etats ou au sein des organisations internationales permettrait de combler certaines lacunes dans notre connaissance et dans nos méthodes d'analyse des relations internationales.

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THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By ERNST B. HAAS

National Studies on International Organization, a series of volumes prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and published by the Manhattan Publishing Company, New York. $3.00 each.*

Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, *The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1958, 221 pp. $5.00.

THE Carnegie Endowment's monumental series of national studies of the United Nations constitutes a pioneering departure in the field of international organization. This is the first systematic attempt to assess the UN in terms of the expectations of some of its member governments and publics. So important is this effort that it cannot be adequately evaluated merely by summarizing and criticizing the sepa-

* The series includes:

La Belgigue et les Nations Unies, prepared by the Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1958, 372 pp.

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L'Etat Souverain et l'Organisation Internationale, by Maurice Bourquin, 1959, 237 pp.

The Nations and the United Nations, by Robert M. MacIver, 1959, 186 pp.

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rate volumes or the "official" summaries by Bourquin and MacIver. It must be put into the perspective of the present state of international relations theory, and more particularly the theory of international institutions and their development. Hence I must ask the reader's indulgence for a preliminary discussion of these theoretical matters; we can ignore them only at the risk of missing the long-range importance of the volumes under review.

I

Despite the public self-lacerations of contemporary theorists of international relations, I have the impression that an increasing amount of satisfaction and confidence is evident in our theorizing. Subconscious—and conscious—fathers are being slain by the legion. Between the two world wars the dominant theory centered on collective security, international law, and the fruitful cohabitation of states in the League of Nations, considered as a civilizing paterfamilias. The death gasp of this theory probably came with the publication of Walters' comprehensive *History of the League of Nations*,[1] which repeated the old lament: the League would have been the perfect Utopia if the principle of collective security as propounded by the heroic Davids (the small powers and idealistic statesmen) had prevailed against the cynicism of the old Goliaths (the major powers and realistic statesmen). The decline of this perspective is evident in the excellent recent summation of collective security principles and practices written by Fernand Van Langenhoven, himself a veteran Belgian international lawyer and diplomat associated in League days with the Davids.[2] Here the lesson of the United Nations functioning within the Cold War setting is translated into a "realistic" doctrine of collective security in which little of the global character of the system remains and regional organizations become supreme. The wheel of theory seems to have come full circle.

But here we find a paradox within a paradox: as "realistic" doctrines reasserted their claim to pre-eminence in the study of international relations, interest in supposedly utopian international organizations

[1] F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 2 vols., London and New York, 1952.

[2] F. Van Langenhoven, *La Crise du Système de Securité Collective des Nations Unies*, Brussels, Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1958. Characteristically, small states have furnished some of the outstanding theorists of international law in past epochs: Grotius for the incipient system of numerous secular sovereign states; Vattel for the system of dynastic absolutist monarchies; Bynkershoek for small mercantile republics. It is of more than symbolic significance that the outstanding theoretical work on modern international law, De Visscher's, was also produced by a Belgian.

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increased rather than shrank. It is symptomatic of this interest that "pure" realistic theory of Hobbesian parentage is giving way to different preoccupations already. International organizations are being subsumed to general equilibrium theory, to systems theory, to structural-functional analysis, to historical sociology, to decision-making theory, to field theory. We are integrating the study of international institutions into the general study of international relations, a development which would be entirely wholesome if the study of international relations were not simultaneously developing in a direction in which its theory is becoming all but unrecognizable.

A searching critique of these efforts has recently been presented by Stanley Hoffmann.[3] I find myself in complete agreement with his evaluation of these departures. Each contains an overdose of abstractness and generality, too abstract and general to be readily applicable to the specific tasks of a theory of international relations. Each sacrifices contextual comprehensiveness to generality which rests on deduction from one-dimensional first principles, whether they be those of "power," the "international system," or the "international equilibrium." But each has the enormous merit of seeking to incorporate data and speculation from various social sciences into the study of international relations—probably too indiscriminately. Finally, some of these departures aim at a much greater degree of methodological precision than earlier efforts in our field, which can only be welcomed insofar as the material can absorb the methods. And to this extent I share the growing self-confidence and self-satisfaction.

The members of this anti-idealist and anti-realist tendency toward theory building, despite their obvious differences, agree at least on one major proposition: the universe to be explained by a theory of international relations is too complex to be fitted into one model. Alternative models—corresponding to various historical or theoretically conceivable "systems"—must be designed and their implications deduced. Since certain of these models invariably feature the roles of contemporary international organizations, they very properly seek to link the study of international organization with more generalized schemes. But in so doing they run the risk of infecting the narrower area with the shortcomings of the larger. If we grant that only fragmentary theoretical propositions can now be stated, addressing themselves to the explanation of such limited aspects of international relations as imperialism, balancing, collective security, or peaceful change,

[3] Stanley H. Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI, No. 3 (April 1959), pp. 346-77.

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the models proposed must first be examined as to their utility in the specific context of international organization. This I shall now do with respect to the work of Kaplan and Liska.[4]

Liska seems to conceive of all international relations as an equilibrium on the basis of the usual imputed norms of state behavior typical of the classical balance-of-power theory. International organizations merely provide a crucial institutional framework for imposing new and external restraints upon state conduct. The resulting over-all "equilibrium" is made up of partial equilibria, in the structure of the organization, in the commitments of its members, and in its functional and geographic scope. Equilibrium, if it means anything at all, must imply that something balances something else, thereby preventing unilateral action or facilitating joint action based on compromise. In Liska's scheme I fail to see what existential factors are demonstrably in balance. *Is* the "system" in "equilibrium," or *should* it be? Such mundane considerations as human calculations of advantage along the whole range of motivations entering into policy-making remain obscure in the scheme, which seems to operate on the basis of remote, automatic, and opposing forces moving dialectically in an eternal dance designed to retain "equilibrium." The very aesthetic of Liska's scheme makes it too ambitious for a partial model of international relations and too mechanical to explain the interaction of foreign policies within international institutions.

Among the various models proposed by Kaplan two seem to be relevant to our present task. But the question of whether rules of conduct which guide state behavior are of a systemic nature or rest on the perceptions of interests by individuals and groups remains obscure here, too. Among the models described by Kaplan we find the "bipolar system," which corresponds roughly to contemporary regional organizations, and the "universal system," which would mirror the United Nations *if* that institution were to function in literal obedience to its Charter. Kaplan then proceeds to state the rules of conduct which must be observed if these "systems" are to last and he develops hypotheses explaining when and how each system satisfactorily performs regulatory and integrative roles. The rules of conduct are none other than the legal strictures and diplomatic accommodations evident from any

[4] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, New York, 1957; George Liska, *International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957. See also Hoffmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 362-63; C. P. Kindleberger, "Scientific International Politics," *World Politics*, XI, No. 1 (October 1958), pp. 83-88; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Scientific Study of International Relations," *Yearbook of World Affairs*, XII (1958), pp. 10-12.

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comprehensive study of these institutions. The hypotheses have the great merit of illustrating transitions from one kind of system to another and of pinpointing behavior patterns which are dysfunctional with respect to the preservation of each system. But it requires a rigorous intellectual effort to relate these models to what we already know about international processes; and after the effort is made, the hypotheses seem merely to paraphrase the already familiar. The "systems" seem to live according to their own inner logic, rather than to the perceptions of their members; and if they do, I despair of their relevance to concrete theorizing. If, on the other hand, they live because the inner logic is successfully "internalized" by the members and thereby made operational, causal (or empirical) theory must still explain the internalization. This Kaplan fails to do.

Neither effort can therefore be accepted as providing the kind of limited-purpose theory for international organizations which can immediately be made to dovetail with our hopes for a theory of international relations. Yet I persist in creeping up on such a theory from behind; this indirection compels continuing attention to studies of international organization which seek to generalize by remaining true to the empirical material, while avoiding the pitfalls of reification apparent in equilibrium and systems analysis.

This is precisely what Hoffmann proposes in his fusion of Aron's "historical sociology" with Quincy Wright's notion of the "field."[5] Historical sociology would give us comprehensive descriptions of international "systems" at selected periods in history. These descriptions would include typologies of states in terms of their internal politico-socio-economic arrangements and their mutual relations internationally. Comparison of the systems could then be carried on under the guidance of such concepts as legitimacy, consensus, balancing, peaceful change, authority. The comparisons presumably would yield the inductively obtained laws of a theory, perhaps not dissimilar from Kaplan's deduced hypotheses. The notion of the "field" enters the scheme in that it can guide us to the kinds of factors which are to be correlated without creating the built-in assumption of "a plan, an equilibrium, an organization, or a community."[6] These include the capabilities of the states and alliances, the ideological forces active in and among them, the relationship of domestic institutions and policy to foreign policy, and

[5] Hoffmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 367-77; Raymond Aron, International Sociological Association, *The Nature of Conflict*, Paris, UNESCO, 1957, ch. 3; Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, New York, 1955, pt. v.

[6] Hoffmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 370-71.

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the assessment of the actual interplay of all these factors. This assessment, Hoffmann correctly cautions, should not distort the causal role of either domestic or international institutions. In terms of our problem, it should be neither overly "realistic" nor "idealistic."

This caution contains the key to what may prove to be a useful empirical theory of international organization. Let us grant that the post-1945 world is a "system" in the sense that three more or less stable blocs have assumed mutually unsatisfactory postures and subordinate to them economic, social, cultural, political, and military policies at the domestic and the international levels. At the same time these blocs remain members of a global institutional structure with its own rules and programs, thus creating patterns of interaction. The regularity of the pattern—if any—constitutes the United Nations "universal system," time-bound though it certainly is. The members of this system, considered as individual nations or as regional blocs, seek to attain their separate and mutually unacceptable goals by channeling varying portions through the United Nations structure: international organization is first an expression of national aims. But if there is any interaction at the global level, these aims cannot be satisfied simultaneously because of the institutional nature of the system. Compromise ensues and its substance may be considered as the world program of our era: orderly emancipation of colonies, mediation and conciliation in political disputes, technical assistance, capital investment, and possibly enforcement measures—though this is dubious. But since a given "input" of national or bloc initiative does not produce a clearly predictable "output" of policy, to adapt David Easton's terms to the discussion of international affairs, I hesitate to apply equilibrium notions to this system.

An empirical theory of international organization would then attempt to describe the evolution of the system in terms of the global tasks and programs which devolve upon it because of the tensions in the policies of the members. Under what conditions is there an increase in the global task? Under what circumstances a diminution? Is contact between global agencies and nationally significant individuals and groups enhanced or reduced through given tasks? Are national loyalties and expectations affected? Or, more generally, in what way is the evolution of the global task connected with the birth of a different international system, more nearly approaching government as we usually understand it?

As soon as this question is raised, the preoccupation with attitudes, motivations, and processes interacting so as to acquire systemic quali-

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ties must give way to attention to institutions. Institutions provide the means for the implementation of global tasks and the availability of certain means is likely to transform ends. Legal rules and techniques for changing them, the interaction of United Nations organs studied with greater attention to decision-making categories, attitude studies of key international officials, budgeting, and personnel policy here come into their own. And if Hoffmann's plea is accepted that the comparison of systems be undertaken on the basis of concepts generally used in contemporary political and social theory, we may be on the threshold of a modest empirical theory of international organization which is neither too ambitious nor too esoteric to fit into a general scheme of international relations.

II

Translating such an approach into reality clearly involves the comparative study of contemporary international organizations in terms of categories which command some general acceptance in discussions of socio-political dynamics. A complete view of the material would require equal attention to regional organizations of all types; but here I shall confine myself to sketching the ingredients of a *comparative* study of the United Nations system compatible with the theory outlined above.

But what is to be compared? One dimension involves time: the system must be analyzed at various points in history in order to determine whether it has changed its nature. If so, a second dimension involves the varying functions of the system, or the various ingredients of the global task assumed by its different units: which of these functions have developed and which have atrophied? What is the relationship between function and systemic evolution? Finally, the nature of the participating nations must be compared on the assumption that their attributes, whatever they may be at any one point, have a considerable influence on the development of the system.

Since international organizations are invariably created by states possessing a national consciousness, a national way of life, and national aims expressed in their foreign policies—policies including the creation of the United Nations itself—it may be well to start the investigation with a typology of nationalism. Here we are concerned not with the ontology of various nationalisms, but with the content of national beliefs as representing the totality of values and interests spilling over into the arena of institutionalized world politics. By studying the content of national beliefs, we are choosing a shortcut for the creation

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of a more elaborate typology of various socio-political cultures and their policies. Thus we might specify that in 1945, for instance, *x* number of states professed a "liberal" nationalism, *y* number a "Jacobin" variety, and *z* number an "integral" nationalism, to use C. J. H. Hayes's still useful classification of ideological content. This relationship may then be compared with the ratios obtaining in 1955, for example, and the ideological "field" in which the UN operates might thus be delimited. A UN composed overwhelmingly of "Jacobin" or "integral nationalist" members would seem unlikely to exercise much influence on world affairs.

After having stated the ideological contours of the system, our scheme proceeds to establish the pattern of national expectations at the time the UN system was formally set up. What were the "inputs" of national policy in 1945? Every effort to create new legal rules and new institutions to regulate world politics is an attempt to create a new status quo, the status quo represented by the constituent act of creation—in this case, the UN Charter. But this Charter obviously represented the confluence of a variety of expectations and its acceptance clearly did not eliminate differences in aims and interpretation on the part of its drafters. Hence various possible conceptions of the status quo must be thrown into relief.

Three such conceptions can be historically identified. The "Wilsonian" conception of a status quo predicated the successful functioning of a collective security system on satisfying a minimum of accepted national aims, usually summed up as "national self-determination," or giving each nation its state and guaranteeing its frontiers. Opposed to this notion we find the "Churchillian" status quo, implying the satisfaction of the security aims of the major powers and their obligation to maintain world peace by force, if necessary. Apparently the statesmen of the major powers in 1945 thought they were acting out the Churchillian notion. Finally, there also exists a "Gandhian" conception of the status quo; it implies a provisional and expediential acceptance of the new rules in order to be able to change them peacefully by continued participation in the new institutions, while quite frankly disputing their legitimacy.

The policies of the states meeting in San Francisco in 1945 provide the data which infuse life into these concepts. Their style of negotiation—open debate, majority voting, secret talks, extra-conference consultations, appeals to non-members and to principles rejected in advance of the meeting—illustrates the conceptions in practice. The UN Charter and the basic instruments of the specialized agencies, finally, as inter-

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preted varyingly by their drafters, constitute the final evidence of the initial policy expectations.

The next obvious step is to study the system in operation. The original inputs are provided by national expectations and particularist conceptions of the status quo that the United Nations was to protect. The interplay of these forces must now be scrutinized to discover the global task which may emerge. Which ordering concepts seem useful here? The "purposes and principles" of the UN as set forth in the Charter provide a much-used point of departure; put in more abstract terms, notions of the "general interest" make their appearance here, in both the descriptive and the prescriptive sense.

But as we are concerned with the isolation of *causal* patterns in the evolution of the system, we should be leery of over-generalization. Imputing a general interest comes close to assuming, merely by virtue of the acceptance of the Charter, the existence of some kind of community. Decision-making analysis should have taught us the dangers of this assumption. Hence I consider it safer to analyze the emergence of a global task in terms of the policy expectations of the participating states. Here three possibilities emerge: states may espouse identical policies for identical reasons; they may espouse identical or similar policies for quite divergent reasons, a pattern I call "converging aims"; and they may espouse opposing policies. The first possibility, if enough states have identical—and mutually compatible—aims, leads directly to the evolution of a global task and even a true general interest. But this is most unusual in practice. The pattern of convergence is more likely to prevail, but even it may well lead to the acceptance of a global task, unstable though it will be. Opposing aims, unless mediated by some force in the organization, must lead to stalemate if the opponents are well-matched in influence or if the institutional structure is entirely non-coercive.

A majority-voting rule will induce the members of the Organization to coalesce in blocs in order to make their aims prevail. Convergence of aims may suffice for this, though identical aims will accelerate the process. Blocs internally united by identical aims will then face one another as opponents with rival global programs. Effective mediation between opponents is possible only if the mediating state or bloc is not committed to either of the rival programs—i.e., if its aims only occasionally converge with those of either or both opposing units. In any event, attention at this stage must be focused on the evolution of blocs, their internal cohesion, and their mutual relations.

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Then comes a substantive study of the UN program which emerged: checking "aggression" in Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, Korea; inaugurating the technical assistance program; formulating a world capital-loan policy; seeking to assure a stable food supply; mitigating the effects of the international business cycle; institutionalizing trusteeship procedures so as to facilitate colonial emancipation with the participation of the metropolitan powers. "Policy" in each of these fields emerged as a compromise from conflicting and converging aims, but patterns were established and followed even if they remained unstable and were not in conformity with the text of the 1945 Charter. What is of importance is the specification of the ingredients of the compromise in each field and the consequent delineation of which alignments produced what results. A comparison of the alignments on each issue, reflecting, as they did, national aims in conflict, will yield the lines of influence and pressure—and the ideologies identified with each—which gave us the specific global task. Obviously, the development and implementation of a given task must then be contrasted with the degree of satisfaction or disappointment experienced by member nations, since these reactions are likely to influence the continuation or amendment of the task during another phase of the organization's life.

But this is merely sharply focused empirical work, the bulk of which has already been done. It can be justified in terms of a theory of international organization only if it can then be summarized in terms of a crucial set of concepts which are prescribed in order to explain the evolution of the system. Some of these are already part of the lore of international organization; others still remain to be accepted as germane.

(1) *Collective Security.* Under this heading an effort should be made to sum up the conceptions of the status quo which have gained general acceptance in the operations of the UN. Previous studies should indicate under what circumstances and influences collective action for stopping or obviating hostilities was taken or dodged. By correlating types of situations with types of action—given the strength and aims of blocs—the systemic qualities of the norms of collective security can be isolated.

(2) *Peaceful Change.* The history of the UN, during any period, will have yielded evidence of the circumstances and fields in which changes in national policy recommended by the organization have been accepted. Such changes may be formulated in general discussions and resolutions of the specialized agencies, the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, and the Economic and Social Council. They may also form the substance of the work of special mediatory agencies ap-

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pointed to deal with highly specific problems: boundaries, national self-determination, minority rights, commodity prices, freedom of the press, compensation for nationalized property, water rights—the list is coterminous with the modern pattern of economic and ideological interdependence. As in the case of collective security, the work of the UN should be summed up in such a way as to correlate types of recommended solutions with types of issues.

(3) *Value Change.* So far our guiding concepts have hinged around policies, not around the attitudes and beliefs of nations, groups, elites, or individuals. The operations of the UN, and especially of such specialized agencies and other bodies as have direct contact with individuals rather than governments, *may* influence the beliefs of such persons and groups. If so, rigorous empirical theory requires that the direction of such changes be correlated with functional fields of action, with circumstances, and with institutional powers. Comparative evaluations of various nations and various organizations, based on the historical material, thus become imperative here, too. Information concerning public and elite satisfaction or dissatisfaction with UN policies in various spheres is clearly germane in this context.

(4) *Institutional Autonomy.* The evolution of the UN system as a result of the changing pattern of bloc aims and expectations, the emergence of a world task, its implementation through new norms, procedures, and institutions, and the reverse influence of these patterns on the expectations and aims of the member nations can result in a new system only if UN organs acquire independent powers of some kind. These powers will differ functionally and will enjoy uneven popularity among member states. They may involve the evolution of the role of the Secretary-General or Director-General, growing respect for IBRD survey teams, IAEA inspectors, or TAB resident-representatives. But their impact must be summed up conceptually, thus requiring much more attention to systematic comparative studies of international administration focused at the member state level.[7]

(5) *Legitimacy.* It is more than doubtful that the UN system enjoys legitimacy in the minds of member governments in any thoroughgoing sense of that term. But the position of the system in the total scheme of national ideologies and international politics could be summed up very convincingly if—at any one time—its legitimacy could be specified

[7] This suggestion is inspired by Walter R. Sharp's for a comparative study of international administration. His list of questions is central to the kind of focus I have in mind. See his "The Study of International Administration: Retrospect and Prospect," *World Politics*, XI, No. 1 (October 1958), pp. 114-17.

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and stated, together with the *authority* it enjoys. I suggest that a rough measure of legitimacy can be provided by distilling from the historical material the situations in which member states invoke the purposes and principles of the UN to justify some item of national policy *and* in which such invocation is accompanied by an expansion of the global task. The use of UN plebiscite machinery, inspectors, and general resolutions in deciding upon the future of the two Togoland trust territories, in conjunction with the French and British governments, is an example of such invocation-*cum*-task expansion.

(6) *Authority.* Legitimacy and authority are closely linked concepts. I suggest that the acceptance of UN procedures and norms as "legitimate" hinges on the authority the UN enjoys. Further, in order to eliminate the tautological qualities of this dictum, I must insist that *authority* can be judged operationally only by correlating the types of resolutions adopted with the types of situations in which they were demanded, and with *the degree of implementation they received at the hands of member states and international administrative bodies.*

This ensemble of conceptually focused empirical investigation and conceptual summation must be repeated at regular intervals in the life of the UN and the specialized agencies in order to ascertain and causally pinpoint changes in the system. But how are the intervals to be fixed? I suggest that we operate on the presumption that a given combination of inputs—based on the numerical strength of blocs and the stability of their aims—will yield a stable pattern of conduct. A change in the nature of the system may be assumed when we know that the input pattern is changing. In the life of the UN I suspect that such a change occurred gradually between 1951 and 1955; the post-Stalin revisions in Soviet ideology and policy (however expediential they may be in purpose) and the dramatic increase in the strength of the Afro-Asian bloc are the factors which altered the earlier pattern of American-led anti-Communist predominance. The post-Yalu phase of the Korean War and the package deal on admission symbolize the turning point.

In the second phase of our comparative study, the input pattern differs from that of the first phase in the sense that the foreign policies of the member states may now have incorporated the behavior patterns developed at the UN. National aims and expectations are now reconstituted so as to take account of what is considered "legitimate" at the UN level, or of what can be gotten away with in terms of multilateral pressures and possible interventions. Hence the techniques of empirical and conceptual investigation used at first can be reapplied, subject to the understanding that more attention must be bestowed upon the

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evolution of national policies as the member nations "learned" from the UN encounter. Understood in this somewhat mundane sense, then, systemic factors can be assumed to be assimilated into the policies of states, and thereby transform the international system further.

Our causal theory of international organization will have served its modest purpose when we can specify, on the basis of comparative analysis, what kind of international functional pursuits yield the greatest amount of legitimacy and authority, which institutional devices are most important in such transformations, and what kind of socio-political culture is most receptive to these processes.

III

To what extent does the Carnegie Endowment's series constitute such a comparative study? The Endowment posed certain questions which each of the twenty-two national committees charged with producing a national study were to answer. Each committee was to assess the effect of the UN on national attitudes *and* policies, the adequacy of the official UN purposes and principles in terms of national expectations, the compatibility of the UN institutional structure and its constitutional evolution with national expectations, the role to be assigned to the UN in relation to regional organizations, the degree to which the UN has advanced common, rather than purely particularist, interests, and the changes in law or practice which seem called for as a result of these assessments. If each question suggested by the Endowment had been fully and conscientiously answered, we would be able to breathe full and flourishing life into the concepts posed above. Further, since the studies all end their survey in 1954 and 1955, the material would illustrate expectations during the founding period, during the initial United States-led phase of operations, and during the transitional period in which the tight bipolar pattern yielded to multiple bloc and functional bargaining, which is the dominant pattern today. But, of course, very few of the national studies actually took the questions sufficiently seriously to still our hunger for systematic observations.[8]

So varied, indeed, is the material opened up by the national studies that the two official summaries quite legitimately arrive at totally opposed conclusions. Thus, in *The Nations and the United Nations,*

[8] No effort will be made here to discuss the full content of each volume in the series. For such reviews, see Stanley Hoffmann, "National Attitudes and International Order: The National Studies on International Organization," *International Organization*, XIII, No. 2 (Spring 1959), pp. 189-203; Ernst B. Haas, in *American Political Science Review*, LIII, No. 1 (March 1959), pp. 205-11.

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Professor MacIver finds that the practice of multilateral diplomacy in the "forum" setting of the UN has become both legitimate and authoritative in the eyes of the world. But he correctly concludes that this development has gone hand in hand with the discrediting of the concept of collective security, if this means enforcement measures at the hands of the major powers. General attachment to collective security survives only in the sense of a universal desire for the pacific settlement of disputes through multilateral diplomacy-*cum*-conciliation and law, though in my opinion the stress on law is MacIver's; it was discovered only in the Uruguayan and Swedish studies. Consequently, the concepts of peaceful change, institutional autonomy, and increasing UN authority acquired flesh and bones in the universally recognized UN roles of bringing about higher living standards and the peaceful emancipation of colonies; these, rather than collective security, were found to be the truly legitimate function of the UN. Finally, MacIver concludes that UN measures to establish standards of fair play and justice—for individuals as well as governments—contribute to an active change of values leading to universalism, especially because of the increasing participation of voluntary groups and unattached individuals in decision-making processes. If no major wars occur, this rosy constellation of developments will ultimately lead to the creation of a true world community and the atrophy of the state. Economic, legal, social, and colonial demands constitute the true "common interests" of the world community, not collective security. Hence programs designed to meet them are thought to yield the greatest amount of legitimacy and authority for the system as a whole.

It is not clear from MacIver's analysis what is individual prophecy and what is derived from the material in the national studies. MacIver starts with the assumption that the sovereign state is a fiction and that the supremacy of group beliefs and ties makes a world community immanent. While he says that "the success of the United Nations depends on the modification of the traditional concept of the state in the light of the conditions that make for the welfare of peoples" (p. 165), he implicitly assumes that genuine popular interests are already supreme. The "people's" interests in peace and welfare, when confronting one another at the UN, are considered as the "common interests" of mankind, and confirmed in this position in perpetuity by the legitimation of procedures of peaceful change. The needs of our era for peace, freedom, and welfare, as expressed in the universal forum, transform these national popular demands into UN interests. The national interest,

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far from being a sinister force for international dissent and conflict, is actually the invisible hand of global unity.

Professor Bourquin, by contrast, indicates in *L'Etat Souverain et l'Organisation Internationale* that he is overwhelmed by the heterogeneity of the "field" in which the UN operates, by ideological dissonances, by national institutional differences, by irreconcilable expectations. Whereas MacIver is preoccupied with distilling common values from the material at hand—and in the process minimizes the varying inputs of national aims, beliefs, and expectations—Bourquin sees no immediate possibility of transcending these differentials. Hence he assumes no world community, actual or immanent, and assigns a very modest role to the UN in a world still very much dominated by sovereign states, each of which is considered merely interested in twisting international law, practice, and institutions in such a way as to assure the success of its national policy.

But Bourquin notes the importance of bloc formation and the inevitable reduction of the primacy of national demands in the process of bloc decision-making. While MacIver relies on the experiences of groups and individuals to result indirectly in the strengthening of common interests, Bourquin ties community development to a direct UN consciousness; since he finds it patently lacking, he concludes that there exist barely enough common interests to maintain the UN system in its present state. He fears that the legitimacy of UN principles is endangered by their being invoked hypocritically in excessively public debates, and he holds that the flagrant disregard of most UN resolutions shown by most members indicates no growth in authority. Like MacIver, Bourquin is completely skeptical with respect to the UN collective security function and therefore pins his hopes to pacific settlement and peaceful change brought about by quiet multilateral diplomacy.

Bourquin and MacIver agree in summarizing certain propositions as having been overwhelmingly demonstrated by the national studies. All nations agree that the UN system is necessary and desirable in its present form; very few strong demands for constitutional change are in evidence. All members adhere to the universality principle on membership questions. The need for effective representation at a multitude of meetings compels even the smallest states to develop attitudes and policies with respect to issues formerly removed from their interests. While moderation in the use of the veto is advocated by all, no state has demanded its abolition or drastic curtailment; some studies actually praised it as accurately reflecting international reality. Small states overwhelmingly favor the institutional supremacy of the General Assembly

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in all UN matters. And everybody has the kindest words for the program of social and economic co-operation and demands more of it.

My reading of the national studies confirms these findings. But how much do they tell us? Unless they are put in the context of time and circumstances, unless they are modified and elaborated in terms of the functional setting, they remain isolated statements which are of little help in gaining a coherent picture of evolutionary forces. Because each author is understandably more concerned with presenting *his* views about the UN than with the comparative analysis of twenty-two *national* views, these summaries remain essentially non-systematic and highly individualistic statements. If it is true that every contemporary social scientist is his own theorist, it would be foolish to expect these summaries to be exempt from the rule.

IV

The full distillation of the separate national studies into a comparative scheme of analysis is beyond the scope of this article. I shall confine myself to certain high points which may serve to demonstrate the much more general usefulness of this material in the elaboration of the theory which preoccupies me. The studies will be grouped in terms of regional ties.

Unfortunately the numerically preponderant Western studies are not all equally useful for our purposes. The Greek volume is a legal commentary on the UN Charter and contains practically no references to the evolution of Greek policy and expectations, apart from noting that Greece was satisfied with the UN solution of the civil war and the Balkan crisis, and very dissatisfied with its failure to obtain Cyprus. The Swiss volume is a treatise on the law of neutrality, interesting only because it suggests the reasoning pattern whereby Switzerland considers itself free to participate in the work of the specialized agencies and in certain mediatory activities, as in Korea. Even "pure" neutrality, it appears, is now construed to imply a definite responsibility to aid in the peaceful solution of disputes—so long as nobody is given cause to get angry at Switzerland.

Nor, regrettably, is the American volume dealing with public opinion especially useful. It contains large numbers of public opinion polls taken between 1945 and 1955; unfortunately they are all based on representative national samples. One is reminded in this connection of Bourquin's penetrating remarks with respect to the role of "public opinion" in the evolution of the UN (pp. 223ff.). He argues that there

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is none; masses of literate, newspaper-reading, radio-listening Western people are generally woefully misinformed about the UN, and either entertain completely unrealistic expectations with respect to its functions or—more likely—are utterly indifferent. Furthermore, the general lines of policy followed by their governments bear little relation to these opinions because they are vague enough to be permissive. Bourquin suggests an approach which would add a much more precise focus to this type of analysis: the systematic study of elite attitudes and expectations with respect to the UN system, instead of the polling of mass opinion, which plays almost no part in the evolution of international organizations. The authors of the American volume do little to strengthen their case by modestly leaving the interpretation of their data to the reader and by providing a social-psychological scheme for the explanation of individual action and attitudes concerning foreign relations which begs more questions than it answers.[9] Among their substantive conclusions, two stand out as supporting Bourquin's point. (1) In contrast to the elite opinions quoted in almost all the other national studies, the mass opinions uncovered in the American volume identify the success of the UN with the reform of the constitutional structure, including the modification of the veto. (2) The degree of satisfaction with the UN is correlated with the success of American foreign policy pursued by unilateral steps, regional self-defense organizations, and the UN; respondents thus tended to identify *all* American participation in foreign ventures as a generalized "internationalism" and only in this sense seem to have rejected isolationism. Clearly, in terms of a study of value change and reorientation of values to the universal system, this evidence is far from reassuring. This is borne out further by the sharp fluctuations in American satisfaction with the UN recorded by the authors, fluctuations which correlate with the fortunes of American foreign policy.

The British, Canadian, Belgian, and Danish volumes all devote space to the study of opinion; but since they eschew exclusive attention to representative samples and concentrate on elite opinion, their findings are much more revealing in terms of comparative analysis. In addition to polls, these studies includes analyses of positions taken by government officials, political parties, and the press. They record modest ex-

[9] See the curiously apologetic remarks on p. 251 of *The United States and the United Nations*. The conceptual scheme states categories of perception and action but professes inability to link these in a causal manner. It is particularly unsatisfactory with respect to the values that individuals allegedly entertain with respect to international affairs, values imputed from mass survey interviews and therefore much too vague to permit rigorous analysis. See pp. 226 and 245ff.

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pectations of success in 1945, based on an uneasy mixture of Churchillian and Wilsonian notions of the new status quo; the Churchillian pattern apparently won, since Denmark gave up its neutrality to seek the protection of the big powers and Canada similarly modified her ebullient new nationalism. The Charter provisions regarding collective security were taken seriously; but not for long. The advent of the Cold War resulted in the initiation of the regional military trend, in which even Denmark reluctantly acquiesced. While it appeared for a few months that UN legitimacy and authority would gain new strength in these countries as a result of the Korean action, the entry of China into the war soon changed that. In the eyes of these Western nations, the UN has no legitimate collective-security function any longer; its function is confined to conciliation between regional blocs whose military might is to guarantee security. Let it be understood that while this conciliation function is conceded in practice, it is not approved in principle when the countries in question are parties to the disputes.

Peaceful change perceptions have also undergone a striking evolution. In principle, these nations denied the UN a meaningful role in such matters as economic development and colonial policy during the first phase, preferring to rely on regional action in the economic realm and on unilateral policy in the colonial. Hence their insistence on the Charter's non-intervention clause, on the voluntary elements inherent in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, and on a minimalist interpretation of the chapters dealing with trusteeship and non-self-governing territories. But note the changes in perception and policy during the transitional period, 1951-1955: Belgium's role in advancing the creation of SUNFED and IFC; British deference to the anti-colonial bloc in Togoland; Denmark's willingness to discuss colonial issues in the General Assembly, without conceding the UN's right to impose policies; Canada's eagerness to furnish troops and ideas for truce supervision and relief.

That a new realization of a changing international scene was brought home by participation in the UN is made perfectly clear by these four excellent studies. But the striking conclusion which emerges from them is that, *despite* the gain in UN authority, the over-all impression in the four countries in question after ten years of UN activity is one of frank dissatisfaction. This is least evident in the Danish case and most evident in the British and Belgian volumes, largely because of the colonial issue. The proof of open dissatisfaction is the candid preference for regional organizations expressed by all four studies, though they all agree in stressing the interregional conciliation function of the

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universal system. This is true especially of the ambivalent Danes, whose faith in direct UN action was severely shaken in 1946 and 1947 when the General Assembly declined to interest itself in the fate of the Danish minority in South Schleswig and the German refugees in Denmark. Hence, if the authority of the universal system can gain to the accompaniment of growing dissatisfaction, it would appear as if positive value change is *not* a necessary ingredient in the progressive legitimation of the universal system.

Unfortunately only two studies dealing with Latin America are available. The Mexican volume is so similar in tone and emphasis to the Afro-Asian neutralist theme that I shall discuss it in that context. As for the Uruguayan perceptions of the world of international organizations, a remarkable stability of the faith of 1945 is manifest. The Charter provided the best of all possible worlds then, and still did ten years later. The Wilsonian status quo desired by Uruguay in 1945 called for compulsory arbitration (instead of big-power enforcement or conciliation) as the key to collective security; universality in membership with privileged voting rights for "democratic" states; safeguarding the rights of individuals through the Charter; the supremacy of the General Assembly; and the co-ordinate equality of the Organization of American States with the UN, including the right of the OAS to intervene in Western Hemisphere countries on behalf of human rights. While Uruguay did not expect to realize this program, its later UN policy remained faithful to these precepts and its assessment of later UN history is wholly positive: collective security through the Uniting for Peace principles is desirable, the growth of influence in colonial questions is wholesome, and the economic work of the specialized agencies is excellent. Only the matter of human rights leaves much to be desired.

This study is unique in infusing an unflinching ideological stress into the assessment of the UN. If my reading of UN history fails to corroborate the glow of liberal satisfaction here reflected and if the other studies show quite a different strain, the fact remains that in this case a net growth of authority and legitimacy must be recorded as flowing from satisfaction with many UN activities subsumed under our other concepts.

Four additional national studies fall into quite a different pattern. The Carnegie Endowment's volumes on Mexico, Egypt, and India, as well as the independent study by Berkes and Bedi, *The Diplomacy of India*, provide exceedingly useful material for evaluating neutralist perceptions of the UN. In 1945 elite opinion in these countries shared

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quite pessimistic expectations: committed to a Wilsonian or Gandhian notion of the new status quo, these countries tended to look on the Charter as an ill-disguised conspiracy of the major colonial-capitalist nations to continue their sway. Each objected to the inadequate scope of powers made available in the economic, social, and colonial spheres. Egypt resented the supremacy of the Security Council and felt that the domestic jurisdiction clause gave her insufficient protection in the Suez Canal dispute with Britain; but India and Mexico favored the veto principle in the Security Council and soon began to give an interesting twist to this interpretation.[10]

By 1955 Egyptian perceptions had deteriorated further. Because of the Palestine War and because the UN had proved useless in the dispute with Britain, Egyptian leaders even prior to the Nasser revolution had concluded that collective security and peaceful change were a function of "power politics" (i.e., "justice" was consistently betrayed when Egyptian demands were not met). Hence there was no positive value change, no growth in Egyptian eyes of either UN legitimacy or authority; reliance on regional organization appeared instead. Certainly, the advent of integral nationalism under Nasser could not be expected to reverse this trend. But let us note once more that while Egyptian policy continued to reject in principle international value-sharing, growing institutional autonomy of UN personnel and agencies, collective security, and peaceful change voted at the expense of Egyptian demands, *in fact* the Suez and Sinai episodes of 1956 tell a different story. Despite dissatisfaction with the UN and despite the absence of demonstrable value change, UN authority increased because the eventual solutions accepted by Egypt were those worked out by UN procedures. Let us add that even Nasser is quite satisfied with the increased UN role in colonial and economic development matters, even if the forum does not result in immediate peaceful change.

Egypt, Mexico, and India agree, now as in 1945, in giving a minimal interpretation to the authority of the UN in matters concerning the sovereignty of small states. In fact, they assert that the purpose of the Charter is to safeguard this sovereignty. But they also agree in using this interpretation so as to emasculate the enforcement function of the UN, minimizing the pacific settlement powers in disputes among small states, and stressing instead the UN right to intervene in colonial dis-

[10] The Mexican study appears to be the personal statement of the author rather than a report on Mexican policy and elite opinion. The study contains practically nothing on policy and dismisses the matter of opinion by asserting that there is none. While interesting because of the views expressed, it probably should not be taken as representative of "Mexican assessments" of the UN.

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putes: UN legitimacy and authority are equated with the ascent to sovereignty of small, non-Western nations and the descent (into which circle of the Inferno?) of the West.

Crucial to this position is the theory of the veto entertained by the Indian and Mexican studies, as well as the unpublished French memorandum contributed to the Endowment. Here we find a neat application of Georg Simmel's notion on the integrative role of conflict: the veto is a desirable instrument for compelling the major powers to attain consensus by means of unceasing negotiation and mediation. The veto ensures consensus, for decisions made in contravention of it do and should lack legitimacy. Therefore (*mirabile dictu*) the veto is essential to persuade the superpowers to transcend their Cold War differences and rescue the non-Western world from being embroiled in UN-sponsored collective security adventures which provide merely a smokescreen for certain national aims. In this view the increasing authority of the UN system becomes the function of de-emphasizing security questions of all kinds and of stressing the peaceful change possibilities which relate to colonial emancipation and economic development. These studies leave no doubt that such an increase in authority has taken place during the transitional period following American pre-eminence.

All this emerges plainly from the two studies dealing with Indian policy. Yet the two differ basically in tone and intent, though each is a very useful contribution to this type of analysis. The Carnegie Endowment's volume, written by Indian academics, officials, and journalists, is a straightforward exposition of how and why these UN policies serve the cause of Indian foreign policy, or the national interest of a new state which is radical only in the anti-colonial sense and very conservative in every other sphere of international involvement. The Gandhian veneer loses its gloss quite perceptibly at the hands of these analysts; Indian policy at the UN—like that of any other member—appears as an instrument of national aims which are tied to the elite's perception of India's needs in the modern world, and not even nonviolence emerges as an end in itself. Berkes and Bedi, however, miss this point. Their work is confined to Indian statements and action in UN agencies and is therefore divorced from the over-all context. This results in their taking literally the frequently rhetorical arguments of Mr. Menon *et al.* and in accepting as of true causal significance the merely instrumental "cardinal principles" which Indian spokesmen never tire of expounding. In my judgment, the UN ideology of the

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Indian delegation should not be confused with either Indian policy or a detached analysis of international organization.

While Berkes and Bedi miss the conservative aspects in India's international conduct, they do make another vital point. They invoke Nehru's "climate of war" doctrine to explain why India insists on excluding all Cold War disputes from the UN agenda except in the setting of negotiations among the big powers, while being perfectly willing to have disputes among small states settled outside the organization: by pretending to judge each situation "on its merits," the Indian government quite consistently sidesteps at the UN all issues which would increase the chances of major war. What happens to the oft-mentioned Indian moral concern for the sovereignty of small nations as a result of this policy will be of vital significance to the future of the UN; but it does not receive any systematic treatment from the present authors, who persist in mistaking ideology for theory. They find, however, that over the years the Indian position on trusteeship questions has grown less doctrinaire in response to continual contact with colonial powers in retreat, Communist powers moving ahead, and neutralists re-examining the meaning of virtue in the mediating position which has become their chosen role since Korea.

There remain three national studies, those of Sweden, Israel, and Japan, which cannot be fitted into any category. The Swedish study contains an excellent analysis of the expected benefits of UN membership for a self-consciously neutral country, as expressed in party debate, the press, and learned disputation. It also contains an admirable typology of "neutralism," as expressed in syndromes of ideological and policy commitments, which makes clear that only a minority of the Social-Democratic intellectuals are "neutralist" in the Afro-Asian sense of the term (pp. 157-60). For almost all other Swedish politicians, neutrality means abstention from NATO but participation in other anti-Communist security arrangements which would leave Sweden free from any overt military commitment. Sweden has suffered no disappointment with the UN because she expected so little in 1946 when she joined, having no colonial interests, relying for economic co-operation primarily on regional arrangements and GATT, and being more than skeptical about the possibilities of successful collective security. While this detachment linked with pragmatism may result in willingness to advance peaceful change and UN institutional autonomy, it displays no evidence of change in either values or policy. Yet Swedish policy was always such—because of its detachment—as to advance the present UN pattern of inter-bloc and inter-functional bargaining.

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This conclusion may apply equally to Japan. Like Sweden, the Japanese parties and elites were internally in disagreement over the proper degree of commitment. Consonant with their post-1945 orgiastic internationalism, certain Japanese intellectuals opposed joining the UN in order not to be compelled to participate in military sanctions, while others saw in UN membership the only way for a disarmed state to be secure. The conservative parties soon espoused membership in order to join the anti-Communist alliance, while the Socialists did so in order to join the neutralist camp. At the same time, Japanese membership was to benefit her emigration, trade, and social welfare policy. Since the study was completed before Japan was actually admitted to the UN, there is no evidence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. But it may well be surmised that the Japanese tendency will be to take increasingly mediatory positions and thereby contribute to the UN's authority.

The Israeli study stands by itself. It is a forthright, well-documented, and exhaustive discussion of Israel's dissatisfaction with the UN, as expressed in party attitudes, in the press, and in foreign policy. The reason? As in the Egyptian case, "justice" was sacrificed to "power politics" by the UN. Instead of standing foursquarely by the 1947 General Assembly resolution on partition, the UN became the forum for successive compromises which deprived Israel of her rights. None of the advantages which membership was thought to confer in 1948 actually eventuated; not even the now dominant principle of regionalism redounded to Israel's benefit since the Arab League is unreconciled to her existence and the Afro-Asian bloc declined to admit her. Israel sees nothing in collective security, opposes peaceful change at her expense, finds increasing institutional autonomy to be at variance with her sovereignty, and disputes both the legitimacy and the authority of most UN decisions affecting her—and the volume mentions very few others. Values have definitely changed, to the detriment of the universal system. And so another Wilsonian principle stands confounded by the evidence: despite her increasing integral nationalism, Egypt contributes to the authority of the UN; despite her liberal nationalism, Israel detracts from it. What theoretical principles, then, does the comparative study of the United Nations uncover as being of causal significance?

V

In the days of the League of Nations, states dissatisfied with the nature of the universal system simply resigned from the organization. Yet despite the unmistakable pattern of disappointment bared by many

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of the Carnegie Endowment's national studies, no state has left the UN and all continue to admit the necessity of the system as now constituted. Even though the series contains no study originating in the Soviet bloc, we may safely assert from the record that this generalization applies to the Russians as well as the Chinese. More significant still, disapproval and dissatisfaction—unlike experience in League days—have certainly altered the pattern of action foreseen in the Charter, but they have not thereby reduced the over-all legitimacy and authority enjoyed by the system. Dissatisfied states persist in paying homage to UN phrases and continue to adjust aspects of their national policies in response to pressure put upon them in UN organs.

The author of the British study is perfectly sanguine about this pattern. He demonstrates how British leaders painfully learned that in a world made interdependent by the ideological, military, and economic clamor which does not respect national frontiers, unilateral action entails even more painful consequences than deference to unpalatable organizational decisions. The corollary of this lesson is that national policy which can be legitimized by channeling it through UN resolutions and discussions tends to be free from the kind of stigma all states—including the Communist—seem anxious to avoid in our era. Inescapable interdependence, as determined by the "field" of contemporary international relations, is the key to the amazing adaptability of the UN system, a system which can enlarge its authority without winning the love and admiration of most of its subjects. States join the system because of national self-interest; they are active in it because of the same compulsion; they learn to compromise in order to achieve some of their aims while sacrificing others; and in the process they master the art of presenting and interpreting their national policies in terms of what the UN system decrees as permissible—permissibility being determined by multilateral parliamentary diplomacy and not by the Charter. Mastery of this art constitutes the only approximation to the "internalization of systemic rules" which we discussed above.

Internalization was not in evidence until the present pattern of interaction among three major blocs came to dominate the life of the General Assembly and the specialized agencies. Neither the Communists nor the United States-led majority displayed much deference to UN procedures until after 1951. Such deference developed only after the unity of the West was shaken by the internal dissent engendered by the enforcement function, and after the cohesion of the Afro-Asian group increased in its determination to transform this function into one of pure conciliation and negotiation. Internalization in economic matters

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became established only with the inauguration of the Soviet aid program and Western approval of UN capital-aid schemes which are not based wholly on sound banking principles. Finally, internalization in colonial questions manifested itself only when the combined Soviet, Afro-Asian, and Latin American onslaught produced consistent British, French, Belgian, and Dutch concessions; but let it be noted that these were accompanied by a mellowing of doctrinaire demands among certain Asian and Latin American delegations.

Thus, in the period following that surveyed by the Carnegie series, a realignment of expectations was reflected in slight changes in national policy at the UN. In certain functional spheres, the disappointment of some states balanced the satisfaction of others; in others, the pattern of satisfaction was the reverse. The balancing of demands between blocs and between functions begot the eventual programmatic compromises which dominate the life of the UN system in its third, multipolar and multi-functional, phase. Survival and the acquisition of a world program demonstrate the growth in legitimacy and authority born of the successful balancing of demands and expectations, if not of full satisfaction and love. But who can predict, on the basis of our present knowledge, that during a fourth and fifth phase reflecting different international situations this evolution will continue?

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IN QUEST OF THE MIDDLE SECTORS

By GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN

John J. Johnson, *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1958, 272 pp. $5.00.

THIS study by John J. Johnson is an interpretative review of the recent political histories of Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. One chapter is devoted to each of these countries, and the central method of the study is the presidential synthesis, with political developments organized on the basis of the terms of office of the recent chief executives of the countries discussed. Like Harry Bernstein's *Modern and Contemporary Latin America*,[1] Johnson's work is, happily, free of the area specialist's compulsion to write about the area as a whole or geographically defined segments of it. Johnson is interested in events in only five of the Latin American countries, and his book discusses them only. Moreover, this is a curiously urban-oriented study, heavily concerned with recent politics as reflected in the big-city life of the five countries involved.

On the one hand, the bulk of *Political Change in Latin America* is given over to a review of recent political developments. On the other, what endows the book with more than routine interest is a potentially significant idea advanced in the early general chapters. This idea, unfortunately not completely developed in the volume, suggests both a formulation of the process of political change and a concept—the "middle sectors"—for the analysis of that process. Thus, Johnson's work merits a place in the currently expanding literature on social change in the underdeveloped areas.

That literature, as it takes form, exhibits two chief characteristics. One of these is a geographic emphasis upon non-European, "non-Western," or underdeveloped areas, and the other is a sharp focus upon the processes of change there. The new geographic interests—particularly on the part of American social scientists—appear to respond to a number of fairly obvious forces. One, no doubt, arises from the circumstance that an impressive number of new states with strange-sounding names have been erected in a wide range of faraway places

[1] Chicago, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1952.

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within the past fifteen years. A fair amount of natural and healthy curiosity about these newly independent states underlies much of the current research into the nature of their politics. Next, despite the fact that this is rarely admitted in the prefaces of books on comparative politics, the interests of American social scientists frequently follow the foreign policy concerns of the United States. In the last decade and a half, these dramatically changing concerns have pointed increasingly toward the so-called "non-Western" world. Finally, many theoretical questions faced by political scientists—especially in view of the currently turbulent state of their discipline—chart paths to non-European doors. Culture-bound errors in theory must be avoided; universal political propositions must apply outside as well as inside the "West."

The processes of social change have, of course, been central to a more long-standing concern. Heavily committed to the formulation of their data in terms of dynamic systems, social scientists are deeply interested in the mechanisms of interaction and change. And nowhere has change been more sharply and dramatically in evidence than in the underdeveloped areas. Since the end of World War II, these have been theaters of nationalist movements leading to the creation of new states and other rapid political changes. Indigenous cultures offer some evidence of operating as instruments of, rather than as barriers to, change. And economic development—perhaps the most spectacular of the changes now afoot in the underdeveloped areas—has acquired an increasingly recognized significance.

If taken seriously, then, Johnson's *Political Change in Latin America* should be evaluated not merely as an account of what happened in Buenos Aires under Perón, in Rio de Janeiro under Vargas, in Mexico City during the administration of President Ruíz Cortines, and so on, but rather—and more importantly—as an attempt to formulate "political change" as a researchable process. As such, the book suggests a new approach to the political problems of underdeveloped areas with which social scientists like Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman, Lucian W. Pye, and Dankwart Rustow have grappled. They have sought operational concepts which would embrace the complex of change processes involved in urbanization, class restratification, secularization, commercialization, movements toward national unification, technological innovation, and the retreat of mass illiteracy in the face of spreading "Westernized" education. There is little doubt that such changes are of political significance, and that they appear to be occurring at high rates of speed in many of the underdeveloped areas. But severe difficulties confront the social scientist who endeavors to study these changes.

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It is not easy to construct a matrix for their analysis or to develop a concept useful in studying them. Indeed, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council has experimented with two concepts proposed for this purpose—"Westernization" and "political modernization." Both have their difficulties, particularly in precision of meaning.

Johnson suggests a third concept in the emergence of what he calls the "middle sectors." He identifies these as "politically ambitious middle groups" (p. vii) with six characteristics. That is, they are (1) urban, (2) educated, (3) committed to industrialization, (4) nationalistic, (5) sympathetic to state intervention in the economy, and (6) active in political parties. If the book is to be received as an approach to analysis of political change, it must stand or fall on the utility of the "middle sectors" concept—that is, on the extent to which the concept captures the elements of political change, on its efficiency as a research tool, and on the precision which Johnson has achieved in its use.

Unfortunately, Johnson did not complete the task of identifying the "middle sectors" and giving the idea the definitional precision it should, and probably can, have. His partially formed concept, however, holds a remarkable potential for capturing the central elements of political change in the underdeveloped areas. Do not the "politically ambitious middle groups" as characterized by Johnson comprise the significant aspects of urbanization, class restratification, secularization, commercialization, movements toward national unification, technological innovation, and the spread of "Westernized" education? The obviously affirmative answer is downright exciting. In the concept of the "middle sectors" we can—but do not yet—have an amazingly efficient instrument for structuring what thus far have appeared to be amorphous and sprawling indices of change. Indeed, this reviewer may well come to the point of buying the "middle sectors" approach in preference to that of "Westernization" or "political modernization."

But the problem—and the book's central defect—is that Johnson did not finish the job of defining the "middle sectors." He gives the reader a few strong hints, to be sure; but the basic service of precise definition remains to be performed. It is argued, in the early pages of the book, that the emergence of the middle sectors explodes the widely held belief that in Latin America there is "no middle class to speak of." This suggests that the middle sectors are a middle class. However, Johnson then takes some pains to point out that the terms "middle sectors" and "middle class" are not synonymous. This would have been a constructive step if he had gone on, from telling the reader what the

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middle sectors are *not*, to telling him what they *are*. That crucial move, unfortunately, is not made in the study. Consequently, the reader is left with a clear understanding that there is a basic difference between "middle class" and "middle sectors"—i.e., one has been defined and the other has not—but confused as to how and why this reduces the notion that in the area there is "no middle class to speak of" to the status of an old wives' tale.

As a review of recent political events in Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, *Political Change in Latin America* is both acceptable and useful. But as an approach to analysis of political change, the study's contribution—as it stands—is more limited. Everywhere there are impressions, hints, suggestions of the nature of this change. Most observers can sense these impressions and hints; indeed, this is not at all difficult to do. What *is* difficult is the task of raising the social scientist's awareness of the processes involved from the level of impression and suggestion to that of conceptualization and theory productive of reliable knowledge. Johnson refuses to accept this challenge, and consequently does not carry the middle sectors from the domain of impressionism to the world of testable theory.

Yet the part of the job he did perform is of considerable value. In the middle sectors there may well be some of the basic ingredients of useful conceptualization for a solid understanding of political change, not only in Latin America, but also in other areas. This can become a valuable study if used as a point of departure for the theoretical task of fashioning the middle sectors into a concept that might be of research use.

A further point remains. *Political Change in Latin America* is heavily urban-oriented. The book immerses the reader in the big-city life of Montevideo, Santiago, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. This is proper up to a point. The book, after all, *is* concerned centrally with the middle sectors, presumably an urban phenomenon. But this otherwise justifiable big-city emphasis skirts two pitfalls. First, it is easy for the reader to develop an overly urban perspective. Secondly—and more importantly—a piece is missing from the puzzle. The emergence of the middle sectors, while an urban development in the first instance, would operate as a stimulus to political change throughout the national systems involved, including their rural components. Johnson is not much concerned with the bridge linking the citified middle sectors with the remainder of the structure of which they form a part.

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Despite its shortcomings, some of them serious, *Political Change in Latin America* is an important book. The basic problem Johnson set is sound. If it is true that he did not finish his homework, it is also true that the assignment is eminently worth completing.

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